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

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the Navy and Marine Corps might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, to stimulate and challenge the readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, usefulness and interest to servicewide readership and timeliness. Reproduction of articles in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author. Reproduction of articles published in the *Review* is subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and treaties of the United States, to the extent that they are applicable. Caution should be exercised in the case of those articles protected by copyright, as may be indicated by a copyright notice at the beginning of such articles. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or the Naval War College.

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Cover: Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce. Painting by Fredrick P. Vinton.

TAKING STOCK



After nearly 2 academic years at the helm of this institution, I can appreciate the thoughtful and studied progress of its 95-year history and can understand the changes in style, curriculum and focus that have evolved over time to support the original goal of studying the profession of arms. That goal remains our raison d'être and hasn't changed since General Order No. 325 was issued in 1884. As we shape our curriculum and procedures for the Class of 1980, I'd like to take the opportunity to review the bidding and to express some of the educational philosophy that underlies the changes I've made and determines the direction we're going.

Educating people to make sound decisions has never been a simple process, nor is designing the curriculum to do it. A realistic program of study must be uniformly rigorous yet encourage original thinking. It must include a survey of what's new in technology, tactics and foreign affairs as well as foundation work in the immutable lessons of history. Four principal activities comprise our curriculum: the traditional prescribed courses in Strategy and Policy, Defense Economics, Naval Operations and the Electives program. The three prescribed courses are offered at both the senior and intermediate levels with a distinct variation in focus that reflects prospective needs of future assignments.

We've made a conscious shift to war gaming in the Naval Operations course, and our students participate to an ever increasing extent in major CINC-level games during the year. With the completion of our new facility in 1980, I see the trend continuing towards more and more gaming activity at all levels. The reputation of the Naval War College was built largely on the tremendous impact gaming had on World War II. As Nimitz later wrote, "The enemy of our games was always Japan—and the courses were so thorough that after the start of WWII—nothing that happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected."

The Electives program has been a most enlightening educational experiment and for the Class of 1980 it will have equal status and credit weight with the prescribed courses. About 90 percent of our students are able to get their first choice of an array of 16 electives each trimester. The selections thus far have revealed a marked interest in area studies (Russia, China, Middle East), Electronic Warfare and Soviet studies. I am of course delighted with the response to my "Foundations of Moral Obligation" which I team teach with Dr. Joseph Brennan, professor emeritus of philosophy at Columbia University. We will offer that twice again next year. Additionally, the Naval War College will be privileged next spring trimester to have in residence Dr. Philip Rhinelander, professor emeritus of philosophy at Stanford University where he was also Dean. My old friend Philip has additionally been director of general education at Harvard, and a Boston lawyer before that. He is now teaching philosophy of law at Stanford while writing a new book on law and morality that will be the text for a special elective course entitled "The Scope and Function of Morality" for the NWC Class of '80.

Philosophy is the logical discipline from which to draw insights and inspira-

tions into military leadership in general, and combat virtues in particular. In my view, trendy psychological chitchat case study leadership courses usually wind up in a welter of relativism. In fact, current literature tells me that the social sciences as a whole are becoming committed to a veritable ideology of relativism, an "egalitarianism of ideas" via the route of a logical positivism that most philosophers have long since rejected. If one leads men into battle while committed to the idea that each empirically unverifiable value judgment is just as good as the next, he's in for trouble. Thus, I think offerings of a discipline whose founder (Socrates) was committed to the position that there *is* such a thing as central, objective truth, and that that which *is just* transcends self-interest, provide a sensible contrast to much of today's management and leadership literature.

A quality program is thus in store for this first class of the new decade, in each of the four parts of our curriculum. Throughout its preparation we in Newport will be guided by a historic precedent that has consistently emphasized process over perishable content, concentration over fragmentation and education over training. We will continue to require that students read widely and critically, write extensively and analytically and define their ideas forcefully and logically in graduate-level seminars.

The quality of the academic excellence of any institution is tied directly to the rigor of its curriculum. Grades are an important and necessary adjunct to this rigor. For the Class of 1980, I have made a departure from the traditional 4.0 grading system and have implemented a straightforward A, B, C format. However, grades will be considered privileged information, and they will not appear in any fitness or efficiency reports. In fact, they will be released from the college only on the request of the student who earned them; this is an important provision, particularly because Naval War College transcripts have become increasingly valuable for accreditation and admission to other institutions. (Each year our Registrar processes 150 transcript requests from our graduates.) To summarize my position on grades for the Class of '80, I am continuing to assume that they are an important form of communication between professor and student in our education process. But I do not want the process of grading to generate a rat race or result in a senseless competition that inhibits a mature officer's desire to concentrate study time on issues in which his interest is peaked. Subordination of our educational goals to the relentless logic of a measurement system based on weighted coefficients is *not* what is desired here. The provisions herein are designed to free all from any shackles, save their desire to learn and thereby better serve their country.

I hope this "academic report" gives the alumni, friends and particularly the inbound Class of 1980 a clear picture of what we're doing in Newport. I think of the academic year as an intellectual and philosophical "pit stop" that should give military officers a fresh, positive frame of mind as they glance down the track at the second half of their careers. This is where the creativity and measured outlook gained (I hope) during their War College experience realize utility. We try to build the self-confidence our students will need to fashion that most important and productive part of their careers around their individual strengths. So, Class of 1980, we see our job as one of boosting you to a tall ship and hope that in the process we may help you find a star to steer her by.

J.B. STOCKDALE
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

When Douglas Southall Freeman gave this speech in Luce Hall 30 years ago this month, he had been Editor of the Richmond News Leader for 34 years. It had been his historical scholarship and writing, however, that had already made him famous. (Lee's Lieutenants et al). At the time Freeman spoke, he was just starting his biography of George Washington, which has since become a classic. A deep perspective of man's past is the best credential for describing the requirements of Leadership; they don't change. History is truly "a glass wherein each man may see things past, and thereby judge justly of things present, and wisely of things to come . . ."

JBS

LEADERSHIP

A lecture delivered by

Dr. Douglas Freeman

at the Naval War College

11 May 1949

When I was a lad I had the great pleasure, the infinite honor, of seeing some of the great men of the war between the states. Strange as it seems, I can remember Jubal Early. What a somber (I almost said a sinister) figure he was as he walked around town, chewing tobacco fiercely and leaning on a long staff. As soon as we little lads would see him we would run away because it was thoroughly understood among all of us lads of about 5 years old or thereabouts that General Early ate a little boy for breakfast every day.

I remember John B. Gordon; I remember Fitzhugh Lee; I remember James Longstreet. I knew well a number of the younger staff officers of General Lee and General Jackson. I knew personally and talked often with three of General Lee's staff officers, one of them his Assistant Adjutant General, and of course I knew the leaders of the Spanish War, of the First World War and of the Second World War. Many of these men of the Second World War I taught at the War College. And it was amusing beyond expression to go to headquarters immediately after hostilities, to go to General Eisenhower's headquarters, or to General Clark's headquarters, or to General MacArthur's headquarters and see some of these men I had known as majors at the War College, stand up and say, "My God, am I going to have my historical photograph taken now?" So those are the circumstances that make me feel, as it were, that I am the Rip Van Winkle of the armed services.

But no man can go through this long stretch of years and have the honor of seeing these great men without having

an admiration for them, an admiration for the service and a reverence for the leadership that these men exemplify. I have seen a new chapter of it during the last year because I have been studying George Washington after he came to the command of the American Army in June 1775. Nothing that he had ever done before showed the qualities that he then displayed. I don't think anybody who studied Washington as he was in 1759 is prepared for what Washington was in 1775. I think strangely enough, that out of his civilian training, out of all the difficulties he had to endure, there developed the patience, the maturity of judgment, the essential sanity that were the hallmark of the remarkable ability of that man.

You know we look at Washington usually through the silly pages of Parson Weems or as we see him in the portraits of Gilbert Stuart. I think either approach is wrong. Washington wasn't the stupid prig that he is made out to be by Weems, nor was he the embalmed celebrity that he appears to be in Gilbert Stuart's portraits. Of course, many of the portraits of Gilbert Stuart are pretty good works of art of the type and of the age (he made a good living in portraits of Geroge Washington), but personally, except for the one at the Boston Art Museum, I'd like to see all the Gilbert Stuarts of Washington destroyed. I wish they were all burned up because they give such a false impression of the man. The Peale portraits of him, even the Trumbull portraits, have so much more of the vitality that was Washington—the sanity, the judgment, the humanity that was his. You who are older used to see George Washington presented to you in front of the East Portico of the Capitol. Washington, being a modest man, I think would have been very much embarrassed if he had seen how nearly naked he was presented in that statue of him in front of the Capitol where he sits in a Roman toga which would suit Washington weather in July and no other weather in the world. And he sits there with his hand outstretched as if saying, as Lorado Taft used to put it, "My body lies over at Mount Vernon—my clothes in the Pension Office."

He exemplified leadership which is not anything like as complicated as some of the psychologists would make it out to be. Psychology is going to be a great subject one of these days. Now it's just in its infancy, and when we try to apply it in the abstract to problems of leadership we usually make monkeys of ourselves; we don't get very far. Leadership is fundamentally commonsense and mankind. Maybe I'm going to oversimplify it for you this afternoon, because I'm going to say that it consists fundamentally of three things and three only. If a man meets these three conditions he is going to be a leader; if he fails to meet them he may be on the roster as the head of a command, but he will never be at the head of that command when it marches down the pages of history—never!

First, know your stuff. Know your stuff, just that. If you are an aviator, know it. And know something else besides. We are entirely too much disposed in the American armed services now to have men who begin their professional career on too narrow a foundation and they go up and up and up, and the higher they go the thinner their knowledge is. We have to have specialists but very few of them can afford to be primarily the leaders of men. Our advanced specialists, they must be men who know something about leadership but they are primarily laboratory men—research men. The leader must have a broad foundation if he is going to keep his position. Know—know your own branch, know the related arms of the service; you can't know too much if you are going to be a successful leader. And know the yesterdays. I have always said, and said many times here at the War College through

the years, "Don't rely on us military historical writers too much. We don't know but so much. We can't fight wars." But after all don't ignore the yesterdays of war in your study of today and of tomorrow.

I always thought that one of the finest things that ever was said about MacArthur was that when he had a period in which he was relieved of active administrative duties and was for 3 months able to do as he pleased, he took those 3 months and caught up on everything that he could read in order to bring his knowledge of today into line with the yesterdays of war. The same thing is true of Marshall. Marshall is one of the most avid readers of military history that I know. The same thing is ture of Nimitz. Of course Nimitz sometimes made bad choices of his reading. He said to me one time for example, "Ah, Doctor, you never will know how grateful I am to you," and he mentioned one of my books that he had read at Guam while he was in command there. I said, "How is that, Admiral?" "Well," he replied, "every night after I had finished my duties I would go to bed and turn on the light and I would read for about half an hour of some of General Lee's problems in dealing with his subordinates. Then I would go peacefully to sleep, because I would reason then that General Lee's problems of command were infinitely greater than mine were, and that I had a far easier time with my subordinates than he had with his." I said, "Admiral, you never were more mistaken in your life; you had 'cuckoos' and some 'prima donnas' with you and I'll not argue with you about that, but what put you to sleep was not peace of mind—it was my style."

Know your stuff—know your specialty, know the background of military history. Know it so that when the man comes to you and says, "What do I do in these circumstances, with this weapon, with this gun?" you can tell him, and if you don't know and want to be a leader, then for Heaven's sake tell him honestly, "I don't know." A man very seldom loses the respect of his men if he says he doesn't know something when he can demonstrate that he knows something else, but look out for that man who tries to bluff about his knowledge.

I was dealing one time with a very tough audience and I happened during the course of my remarks to say something about Iwo Jima. I didn't think I was doing so hot myself. I wasn't getting on so well, but when we came around to the question period, some man way back in the audience said, "Doctor, you have been talking about Iwo Jima; would you mind discoursing for a minute on what you think of the tactics of small landing parties as they were employed at Iwo." I said, "I don't know a thing in God's world about it." I saw my audience was very much relieved from that minute. If you don't know, say so and try to find out.

Know your stuff. Now that means a lot in the way of the utilization of your time. And it means a lot in the way of utilization of a Navy wife or an Army wife. You boys think you have a hard life to lead. You don't have any tougher life to lead than the life of a Navy wife. And both the Navy husband and the Navy wife need to learn all they can, when they can. I'd like to give you a little motto on that question. I gave it to one of my historical secretaries. She happens to be the one who came up with me this morning. She said it was the most useful thing I'd ever told her. It came from Oliver Wendell Holmes, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, who should have been Chief Justice. Holmes would get a boy from Harvard Law School every year, and that boy would have one year as Holmes law clerk, a magnificent training, out of which in their generations have come some of the best lawyers in public service in America. And one of

the favorite things that he would tell these boys was, "Young man, make the most of the scraps of time." Now believe me, if you want to know your stuff and know it better than the other man, you've got to spend more time on it, and if you are going to spend more time on it you've got to make the most of the scraps of time. The difference between mediocrity and distinction in many a professional career is the organization of your time. Do you organize it, do you make the most of the scraps of time? Bless my soul, I don't suppose that the admiral with his dignity and justice and regard for all the amenities says "no" to you about playing bridge, but there is many a man who would have three more stripes on his sleeve if he gave to study the time that he gives to bridge. Don't say that you have to have the recreation. You have to have enough recreation, but diversification of work is the surest recreation of the mind. You don't have to go and forget the whole world. You have to work different brain centers and that is all you need to do. If you do it you get the recreation and out of the recreation you will get the training. Write it down, my young seamen, my young mariners (I love the word "mariner")—write it down. "Make the most of the scraps of time."

If we have another war, which Almighty God forbid, and I know not one single leader in the armed services who does not say Amen to that—if we have another war it is going to be a highly technical war, but the older principles of leadership will stand. Number one will remain—know your stuff.

I have not a record of a single American soldier, a single American admiral who, when all was said and done, was not proficient in the knowledge of his specialty. Don't think the time spent at schools is lost either. Professional training for war is a categorical imperative of efficiency. In history I believe I knew General Lee's brigadier, major, and lieutenant generals pretty well. I think I have written about most of them, however poorly. Of all that company there were only two who became distinguished division commanders who had not had professional training.

This idea of the inspiration of the soldier is nonsense. The idea that out of the great body of our people, you are going to get soldiers of high eminence—there is absolutely nothing to it. If you require professional training to save the lives of men in peace, and you call the man who does it a physician—are you not likewise called upon to have professional training for war in order to save the lives of men in war? And that man you call an admiral or you call him a general. Professional training is worthwhile. The best money that ever was spent on the Navy of this country has been the money that was spent here at Newport. I don't believe any man can contradict that.

Know your stuff—and be a man. That is number two. Be a man. We have had some leaders in American history who may not have been all they ought to have been in their regard for some of the amenities of life, but I never knew a great American seaman, I never knew a great American soldier, or read about one, who was not fundamentally a man. And that means a man of character; it means a man of industry; it means a man of fair play. We were talking at the house of the president of this College a little while ago about the matter of courage. And the admiral said to me, "Doctor, have you ever found in history any process by which you can tell whether a man is going to show courage in action?" I said, "No, you never can; I don't believe you ever will. If we do, it will be thousands of years hence and by that time, please God, we may have sense enough not to fight wars." But this is a fact—the type of courage that keeps a man from turning his back on his adversaries and running away is one

thing. That is not so uncommon. But the type of courage that is shown by a leader who will take his part of the load in all circumstances—that's a much rarer type of courage.

What is the coward? Who is the coward in the high rank? He is not apt to be a physical craven but he is a man who sometimes tries to pass on to the other fellow the more difficult job and won't do his own. You take that great captain of the state from which I have the honor of coming. You can see beautiful stories of the physical courage of Gen. Robert E. Lee. I never go to Washington from Richmond on Highway No. 1 that I don't see the house where he was standing one day on the porch, with a glass of buttermilk between the table and his mouth, when a round shot came within four feet of him and shattered the lintel of the door. You can see the place there today, and it was said that no man observed a quiver when the glass went to his mouth. I have read the story of how he conducted himself on that bloody field of Spotsylvania Courthouse. That is fine, but if you want to see what courage is, what the real test of the man is, you read Lee's farewell to Jackson on 2 May 1863. When Jackson, called upon to make the great turning movement there at Chancellorsville, was asked by General Lee, "What troops do you propose to make this movement with?" Jackson said, "My whole corps, sir." Lee then had about 50,000 men. Jackson wanted to take 28,000 of them, put them in motion around the flank and leave Lee 22,000 men with which to face the Federals while Jackson was out of action and making that movement around the flank. Lee could have said, "Why those are impossible figures. Take fourteen thousand men, and leave me enough at least with which to defend this line against these seventy-five thousand Federals here in the wilderness." Not so. Lee knew what concentration of force meant; Lee knew the doctrine of superiority of force at the point of contact. Lee had the courage to take his chance in order that his comrade might have superiority of force for difficult offensive operations. In that, gentlemen —and it is repeated gloriously a hundred times in American history—in that you see what I mean by the word courage. What I mean by the words: be a man.

Aye. Be a man who is disciplined in spirit. Be a man who is observant. How many fine persons there are who go through this world. Never forget and, as God gives me might, I shall never fail on a lecture to mention Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox—Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox and his observation of a string over the shoulder of the Federals in that same battle of Chancellorsville. Remember Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox? What a name. Cadmus had his orders, "You move when the Federals do. You've got one little brigade here; you are holding Banks Ford and when they move, you move." Cadmus went out the next morning early. (Every good seaman ought to be out early. People talk about what you ought do for the redemption of the American people. The American people need nothing in this world more than they need to get up earlier and go to bed earlier.) Cadmus Marcellus got up earlier than most men, and he went out and looked, which a great many people never do, and over Banks Ford he saw that Federal sentinel walking his post, and another and another down the line, in plain view. Well there is nothing uncommon about a sentinel walking his post is there? But Marcellus wasn't content with that; Marcellus took his glasses and he looked at that sentinel who may have been thinking about anything under the sun other than his military duties; and Marcellus observed that over that sentinel's shoulder there was a string, and behind that sentinel's left hip as he looked at the end of the string was his haversack. And Marcellus looked at the next sentinel and he had on his haversack and the next and the

next and Marcellus said to himself, "Those birds are getting ready to move because if they were simply in camp they wouldn't have on their haversacks and their haversacks wouldn't be full. They have got their rations on them because they are getting ready to move." He ordered his artillery hitched, got his infantry in position and within 15 minutes after those Federals started their withdrawal, Marcellus was in the road and he hadn't gone 3 miles before he had the great opportunity of his career to stop a Federal offensive.

Observation! Be a man, not a blind man. Might as well go down in the engineroom and stay there if you are not going to look and see.

Last of all, the third point. Look after your men. Look after your men. What a simple thing you are saying, Rip Van Winkle! Here you have three-fourths of the brass and nine-tenths of the brains of the American Navy before you and you are saying that leadership is three things and you have listed those things so simply. Know your stuff—be a man—and look after your men. We came a long way to hear you, Rip Van Winkle, and is that all you have to say? Yes! That is all, because that is the sum observation of my travels. Look after your men.

I mention to you the fact that as a youth I saw those gray columns moving up the street and I heard the clatter of cavalry 40 years after. I saw those men who had thrust through the wilderness, those men who had stood at Second Manassas, and those who had climbed the hill at Gettysburg and had their red banners with them until 22 of those flags were there on one acre in the Federal position. I saw them; I knew many of them, and often I asked them, "Tell me, that great man who is our southern demagogue, this Lee, what was there about him that made you reverence him? What was there in him that made you tell us that next to the love of God and His Son, there had to be reverence for him?" An incredibly simple answer, my friends, they gave me. "Oh," they said, over and over again, "he looked after his men! We knew that when he demanded anything of us, it was because he had to. And when he said, 'Men, you must take that height,' we took it, because we knew that was the cheapest thing to do." He looked after his men. So did the lieutenants—some of the men to you unknown. Did you ever hear of the name of John R. Cooke? Some of you did; just a brigadier general in the Confederate Army. I remember him well, an old man running a grocery store, an unprosperous grocery store. He had in his head the most beautiful bullet hole you ever saw in your life. He must have been hardheaded—it never cracked his skull. One day when he was in his thirties he was commanding two little regiments at Sharpsburg. On his left early in the morning something had happened. Something had gone wrong even with Stonewall Jackson, and the flank had been swept back. The Federals were at the Dunker Church, and Hood's great Texans, the Grenadier Guard of the Confederacy were panting in the woods. The tide swept around to the center of that segmented battlefield. There an impression was made, not too deep. Cooke stood there, a little salient—two regiments; and against his fire, with the supporting artillery around the Dunker Church a Federal corps broke itself in vain. During the fight Longstreet sent word to him and asked him if he wanted help, and I am told that of all the classic cussing that ever has been heard in the American Army—and the American Army sometimes casts reflections on its adversary's ancestry back six or eight generations—there never had been heard such words as those that Cooke sent back. "Give him help! Not until every man he had was pursuing through hell the last Yankee in front of him!" Or words to that effect. I said to myself, "What is in that man? What made that

Twenty-seventh North Carolina regiment that way? This Third Arkansas—Arkansas is a good state, good fighters. They have some mighty long-winded politicians among them, but what made that Third Arkansas regiment do that?" And I took the pains to go back and I found that from the very time that Cooke had taken over that regiment (he had been a captain in the regular army before the war) he had done everything he could to tell those men, "I am going to demand the maximum of you and I am going to do the maximum for you." He held them to the highest standards and he did for them everything that a man could to protect them from casualties.

Look after your men—it means many things; it means many things that you don't think about. It means mail facilities; it means food. General Lee, no matter how much impoverished his commissariat was, never failed to increase his men's rations after they had won a fight. Hot food is one of the greatest builders of morale in the history of war. Looking after your men means looking after their clothes. I was telling one of the officers today how much emphasis George Washington laid on the cleanliness of person. That great builder of morale, that same Lee, when he got his men out of a dirty campaign always tried to put them by a stream where they could wash. And the most valiant men were the men who, if they needed it, got the new uniforms. Look after your men and your men will look after you. I don't believe there has ever been an exception to that dictum.

I said one day to MacArthur, "You know, I think when I come to write the history of your campaign, there from the Solomons northward, one of the things I am going to find the most difficult to understand is how you did so much with so little." Well he lighted his corn-cob pipe for the 453rd time that afternoon, and made the 17th oration that he had delivered to me that day, and he said many things that were absolutely true and sound. And we talked about his casualties, about how few there were in terms of what was done. I said, "Difficult as it was, you looked after your men." And I quoted him some of the things I told you. He said, "Well if there was economy of life, it is something for which"—and he dropped all his theatrical manner—"something for which I will be grateful to the end of my days." He said, "When I thought about the number who were killed, nothing could console me except the thought that maybe by God's grace and hard effort we had saved some that might otherwise have been slain." He is a tall man; he got up and walked the floor as he sometimes did when he spoke, but believe me he grew taller and taller in my eyes as he spoke those words.

Gentlemen, have I oversimplified this case? I think sometimes we overcomplicate it. I think sometimes we take these books on psychology, we take all the arts of salesmanship and we try to apply them to the armed services in a manner that is too elaborate. I don't believe I'm oversimplifying when I say to you, know your stuff, be a man, look after your men.

Remember you may in God's mercy have had your day of battle. You who were there in the Arctic night—you who flew across the hump—you who went from South America to Africa—you who fought those submarines up and down our coast—you who went out from Pearl Harbor never knowing whether that submarine would come back again or whether your burial place ever would be known to men—you who were in the supply service—you who were in the battlefield—you who had the immortal honor of serving with Spruance, with Kinkaid, with Halsey—you may have had your day, you may live until over it all comes the glamour of the years and you may tell the tale so often that you'll hardly be able to distinguish the fabric from the em-

broidery. Such things happen. On the other hand your challenge may lie ahead—the era of atomic warfare may bring us problems vaster than anybody ever faced before.

I covet but one thing for you and that is, if you come to the final day which must for America always be the day of victory, I covet for you nothing more than that in the day of victory you can say with a clear conscience what was said by the vanquished as he rode back through those thin gray ranks across the red hills of Appomattox one day in April 1865. The men knew that something had happened because he had been in the midst of the Federal lines. They broke ranks, they thronged the road, they gathered around him, they put up their hands. "General!" they said, "General! Are we surrendered? General! Give us another chance, we'll fight them now." He said, "No, my men. I've done for you the best I knew how to do." Your nation demands of you no less than that; your conscience should ask no more than that you do your best.



This paper is adapted from an address given at the Naval War College on 11 January 1979.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY

by

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, U.S. Air Force (ret.)

The character of the role of the American people in international affairs has been molded to a considerable extent by two factors—the attitudes and perspectives of our founding fathers and our geopolitical position. Our early leaders were profoundly influenced by the age of the enlightenment—that period of intellectual ferment based on the proposition that the application of rational thoughts could cure the ills of mankind and bring about peace and harmony. These molders of the American nation therefore conceived their task as something far more grand and noble than simply putting together a functional government. It was to be, in addition, a noble experiment for all mankind, trusting in the philosophical premise of man's ability to govern himself in liberty and equality.

This idea, that the United States was a nation apart, that it was a crucible in which freedom would flourish and spread as an example for the entire world, has had profound implications for American foreign policy. It has resulted in the injection into our policy of a strong moralistic tradition. We came to believe that we would prevail in foreign affairs as a result of the purity of our motives. We have not thought of ourselves as being concerned with the narrow preoccupations of our European counterparts, pursuing particularist advantage through great power politics and balance of power manifestations. Indeed, those terms even today have a pejorative connotation in many of our most intellectual circles. Instead, our foreign policy has had about it something of a messianic quality. It has been our moralizing mission—championing the ideas of freedom, democracy, human rights; serving as a haven for the oppressed and the breadbasket for the hungry—these and other noble and moral purposes have been the enduring threads woven deeply into the fabric of our foreign policy over the years.

This tradition of the enlightenment has met with two other associated traditions—pragmatism and legalism. Thus we have often waited for a problem to arise and become profound in its dimensions; then we would throw all our resources at it, solve it, and turn away again. We've also tended to try to turn international political issues into legal issues, and push for the formation of international bodies to deal with them in a rational and judicial manner.

Besides this penchant for legalism these special dimensions of our foreign policy have had other distinguishing manifestations. They've at times exhibited themselves in the form of U.S. withdrawal from participation in the international system because we thought we were too good for it. Or

even (of recent times) arguments claiming just the reverse—that we were not good enough. At times we've gone to the opposite extreme, throwing ourselves into total involvement, usually in the form of great moral crusades under such noble slogans as "Fighting the War to End All Wars" or "To Make the World Safe for Democracy."

Even when we engaged in power politics for our own aggrandizement, which has happened more than occasionally, we customarily cloaked our actions in a moral or moralistic rhetoric and, to a considerable extent, we tended to believe what we were saying.

In a general way, this moral dimension led us to the notion that international political and military conflicts were aberrations from the norm that arose by accident or from particular evil, such as munitions makers or other bad influences, rather than from more basic sources in the nature of man and his social structure. This in turn reinforced our tendencies either to withdraw from participation or to launch a crusade in moral indignation to punish the wrongdoer. Likewise, our long repugnance to the traditional ways of international politics reinforced our legalistic tendencies to prescribe devices such as neutrality legislation, utopian disarmament agreements, arbitration, quarantine, and international organizations for curing the ills of mankind. We've been able to indulge ourselves in this unique and sometimes quixotic behavior for much of our history for two related reasons: first, two great oceans and the British Navy provided military security and security from involvement except on terms of our own choosing. And, equally important, other nations assumed much of the burdens of preserving a world power equilibrium. It is instructive to realize that in the two World Wars had the security of the world depended on our understanding of the dangers involved, the aggressors probably would have won.

And thus our foreign policy tradition has been different, unique—the impulses behind our behavior have not been bad or wrong, not at all; they have provided the dimension to American involvement in the world that has been a fundamental element in our greatness. But the enviable world situation that enabled us to pursue our principles without restraint is no longer with us. The world has changed irrevocably, and we have lost our freedom of maneuver. No more are there other nations strong enough to carry the burden of resisting major aggression while we contemplate the situation and our own interests at our leisure. And modern technology has robbed us of our isolated position that had allowed us the option of standing aside from world events. We are now inextricably involved throughout the world.

Among free countries today, and for as far into the future as we can see, only the United States possesses the overall power, the military capability and the domestic cohesion to maintain a world balance of power. There's no escaping that responsibility where there is no one else to whom the free and the oppressed can turn. The biggest problem the American people face is how to think about a world for which we have had so little preparation. We must adjust to the fact that we carry the burden of leadership of the free world and that there can be no end to this involvement. The world will never be set to rights so that the United States can turn its back, as has happened so often in the past, and withdraw into its shell. We must realize that the problems are unending and gear ourselves for the long haul. The world is becoming more and more complex and more interrelated. It is increasingly difficult for us to cope, in view of these ingrained attitudes of an earlier era.

There seems little doubt that the American people are uneasy with the permanence of this leadership responsibility. We grasped the baton of leader-

ship with some enthusiasm in the early days following World War II, convinced that we could remake the world in our image, and that would cure its ills. But the inescapability of providing leadership of every international issue, the growing realization of the difficult if not intractable nature of many international issues and of our own limitations, our inevitable setbacks—all have combined to make us restive under our burdens. We long for the good old days when we could turn our backs on the evils of the world. We have become frustrated with the world, with ourselves, and sometimes with our dreams.

Adding to the difficulties of adjustment has been the struggle between the Congress and the President. While the roots of the struggle are inbedded in the Constitution, and the battlefield includes some domestic areas as well, foreign policy has added special emphasis and drama to this confrontation. In its contemporary manifestation, it has stemmed partly from a series of activist Presidents recognizing and playing this new world role demanded of us by circumstances. To that has been added the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate, resulting in a redoubling of congressional efforts to curb Presidential initiative or to itself play a role perhaps more suited to those days when our initiatives and our might were not crucial to resolution of world problems. In other words, Congress has been and is widely reflecting these values and has tried to force them on the President.

The War Powers Act is a good example. Passed over Presidential veto, it was seen as a means of curbing Presidential impetuosity that could involve the country in hazardous enterprises of dubious value. The constitutionality and other aspects of this legislation are beyond the scope of this paper but the Act does point up a real dilemma. Frequently action can be most efficacious and minimal when a problem is still incipient and therefore its true nature still ambiguous. Yet that is precisely the time when the mobilizing of public opinion and supportive action is most difficult. Conversely, when a problem is unambiguously urgent it is relatively easy to generate support for taking action. At that point, however, the action necessary to arrest or correct the situation often can be vastly more costly.

A recent example of this sort of thing occurred in Angola in 1975. President Ford was barred by the Congress from providing assistance to pro-Western forces in Angola because he was unable to prove what the consequences of action, or of inaction, would be. I don't want to argue here the merits of the Angola case, but it definitely does illustrate the kinds of difficulties a President faces in trying to respond to challenges around the world.

Other congressional actions have also severely limited the President's freedom of action. The embargo on arms sales and aid to Turkey has done perhaps irrevocable damage, not only to U.S.-Turkish relations but also to the Turkish body politic. The full consequences of that action may be years in unfolding. The congressional right of veto over significant arms sales has likewise made difficult and sometimes impossible the subtle employment of this very useful instrument of foreign policy.

Vietnam, of course, bears a significant share of responsibility for these current congressional attitudes. From their attitude towards Vietnam one could get the impression that the American people woke up one morning and found themselves with 550,000 troops in Vietnam, slipped in by a deceptive president on an unsuspecting nation. The facts are far different. The buildup in Vietnam was a lockstep operation. The congressional bailout came only after a quick victory eluded us.

Regardless of the facts, the attitude remains and it illustrates another difficulty in the conduct of foreign policy.

that is, that public attitudes, which frequently are mirrored in the Congress, often lag the actual international situation. For example, the American people, soured by the experience of World War I, refused to respond to President Roosevelt's warning about the far different situation developing in the 1930s, leading potential aggressors to believe they would be able to act with impunity. The same phenomenon may be present today. Vietnam is frequently cited as an argument against taking action in circumstances not remotely similar to those of Vietnam, aid to Angola again being a prominent example. Thus it is possible that the ill-effects of that American involvement may adversely effect American foreign policy for a dangerously long period of time.

One of our big foreign policy issues since World War II has been coping with the Soviet Union. Previous major threats to the United States, such as the two World Wars, have been acute, overwhelming threats. We have mobilized to deal with them and eventually have disposed of them. But the Soviet threat is with us constantly and will be for as far in the future as we can see. We have not really learned to behave in the face of a more or less permanent problem such as this. The results have been sharply fluctuating attitudes--from considering the Soviet Union as evil incarnate, to the spirit of Glassboro, the spirit of Camp David, and other euphoric manifestations. We may be going through another such cycle at the present time.

The United States and the Soviet Union hold incompatible concepts of world order, the organization of society, and man's place in it. Because we are at the same time incomparably the two most powerful nations in the world, nations whose interests impinge on each other throughout the globe, a competitive relationship between us is inevitable. The existence of nuclear weapons imparts to that competition a special danger unique in history. In the past, major powers have decided conflicts between them by war. Today the stakes in a conflict between the superpowers are not simply the defeat of one of them but their mutual devastation and perhaps even the destruction of mankind itself. To cope responsibly with this danger and the competition that has given rise to it, recent administrations have generally pursued a concept described by the now famous (or infamous) word "détente."

Détente, described briefly, is an attempt to reduce the threat of nuclear war by tempering the rhetoric of the cold war, ending or abating the attempt to score cheap debating points on every issue on which U.S. and Soviet interests collide, striving to develop areas in which mutual interests potentially exist, building habits of mutual restraint and patterns of coexistence. But détente did *not* mean the ignoring or glossing over of the fundamental antagonism between our two systems. On the contrary, accompanying a positive effort to improve relations and thereby provide an incentive for more constructive Soviet behavior was a determination to react strongly, with whatever means were required, to deter or to counter Soviet tendencies towards aggressive or irresponsible behavior. This, obviously, demanded the maintenance of powerful military forces across the entire spectrum of conflict, and the will to use them if necessary. That, however, is a very sophisticated policy to pursue. It is difficult to obtain public understanding and support at one and the same time for attempts to reduce tension with our enemies and for heavy defense expenditures. We have not been notably successful in the effort.

While détente enjoyed considerable popularity and some success for a time, it gradually and perhaps, in view of our heritage, inevitably became identified only with the conciliatory rather than

with the coercive dimensions of the policy. This, coupled with charges and indeed some evidence that the Soviets may not share our interests in mutual restraint, has led to a new wave of suspicion and antagonism against the Soviet Union.

Some of the recent rhetoric has been reminiscent of the darker days of the cold war. That is not to say that there is not a foundation in reality for these suspicions. There has been, and continues to be, an impressive growth in Soviet military power. But that is not the whole picture. We must also keep in mind that this is not a new phenomenon. It has not been a sudden expansion; rather it has been a steady, constant growth. At least since the time of the Cuban missile crisis the Soviet Union has been adding to its defense budget at an annual rate of 3 to 5 percent. Such an annual increment adds up over the years to enormous sums and while it is not necessary to catalog the military capability the Soviet Union has acquired with that differential investment, it is a spectacle not calculated to reassure even those who take a sanguine view of Soviet intentions.

But these developments, deeply troubling as they are, do not necessarily mean the Russians have suddenly changed their strategy and have begun to prepare for some specific military crisis or confrontation with us. We do not and cannot know Russian intentions but this military growth is at least logically explicable in terms of a number of traditional Soviet and Russian attitudes. There are several: the long-standing Russian inferiority complex with respect to the industrial West; the residual influence of ideology that still preaches implacable capitalist hostility; the very mixed record of Russian and Soviet military forces in conflict, the momentum and inertia of a system and of a bureaucracy that erect high barriers to changes of direction; a traditional defensive orientation and insistence upon a comfortable excess margin of military equipment; and, frequently ignored by this country, the possibility of having to fight a two-front war. Also, to a far greater degree than we, the Soviets are aware of the political value and use of military power.

In addition, we should not make the error of assuming that the Soviet Union is a monolithic and inflexible entity. It is affected by interactions with and reactions to the outside world, especially the industrialized West, and to developments within the Soviet system. The leadership is beset by problems—industrial, technological, and economic inferiority, lack of true friends and allies, a rapid growth of internal minority groups and an approaching change of leadership and of leadership generations to mention only a few.

Listing these problems, weaknesses and explanations of Soviet behavior is not intended to rationalize away growing Soviet strength or the new and troubling phenomenon of Soviet and Cuban adventurism. The threat is real enough but it is not immutable and the outcome is, in the last analysis, really up to us. If we match them strength for strength, if we display the ability and determination to prevent Soviet successes through the threat or use of military force, it is possible to prevail—and to work with them for the benefit of both. It seems reasonable to conclude that if we can successfully contain and compete, the strains facing the Soviet system over a historical period are far more serious than those that will face us. But this will not be easy—above all we must be intelligent, not emotional, about the character of a very real and enduring threat that faces us and about the requirements for responding to it to preserve American security and world stability.

There are two closely related problems with which we must deal—the reality and the perception of Soviet power. Independent of the intentions of

Soviet leaders, we must recognize that power has its own imperative and creates its own opportunity. I cannot recall a historical period when an unfavorable balance of power was not sooner or later translated into political advantage. Such a judgment could prove to be incorrect in current circumstances, but if we're directly wrong on a matter of such cosmic importance, on which side is it better to err? Equally important from a political standpoint is the impression of Soviet superiority. Should such an impression, accurately or inaccurately, gain currency, it can have a profound effect on the behavior of not only the Soviet Union but of our allies, the Third World, and even of ourselves—an effect greatly to the detriment of the West. Such a perception could alter world political alignments, increase Soviet propensity toward adventurism and risk-taking, and add greatly to our burden of exerting effective leadership. Our first and essential priority, then, must be to do whatever is necessary to prevent the reality, and the perception, of Soviet superiority.

But dealing with this direct U.S.-Soviet relationship is not the only, and perhaps not even the most complex task facing us. There is the matter of exerting leadership in an increasingly complex, interrelated, troubled world and the indirect, and sometimes direct, clash of interest with the Soviet Union over the social and political nature and direction of development of the remainder of the world. As already noted, there is no escape from this responsibility. Not too many years ago President Kennedy served notice to the world that we "would go anyplace, bear any burden, support any friends, oppose any foes, in defense of human liberty." Vietnam was a traumatic shock to that ringing declaration of unlimited commitment. The additional shock of Watergate has made us question even our successes and to doubt our motives, in whatever enterprise. The combination of the two has placed a heavy burden on the American people. We must learn from these searing elements of our past but we must not be overwhelmed by them.

In our efforts to cleanse ourselves, we have among other things attacked the CIA, preached open diplomacy, and elevated human rights to a cardinal operating principle of our foreign policy. Actions such as these have struck a very responsive chord in our sense of moralism, and they have, indeed, restored some measure of confidence in ourselves and what we are about. But they carry with them the potential for great danger. While we must never succumb to the notion that the end justifies the means, we must constantly keep in mind that there are those in the world who do not wish us well. We've come a long way from that day in the 1930s when Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, informed that a cryptographic breakthrough would enable us to decipher the Japanese code, responded that "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Yet the basic outlook represented by that comment remains a part of our moral makeup, and has come again to the fore with the revelation of the so-called CIA scandal. Not that that is intrinsically bad; it is simply too good for the world in which we find ourselves.

Intelligence is one of our vital tools in preserving our security. And our security is a prerequisite for the advancement of the ideals for which we stand. We're engaged in a worldwide struggle with opponents who, to say the least, do not feel themselves bound by the Marquis of Queensbury rules. This game is for keeps. There is no reward for losing with dignity. Our opponents will not hesitate to employ any means to advance their cause. Intelligence is by its nature an unpleasant amoral business and there perhaps have been times when our practitioners may have been inclined to play the game for its own sake. On balance, however, when one

considers the requirements for secrecy, compartmentation, the numbers of people involved, and the need for flexible operating rules, the amazing thing to me is not that there were mistakes, but that so very little over for so long a period did go wrong. In any event, it is vital that a few aberrations not blind us to the absolute requirements for a strong aggressive intelligence organization if we are to survive. In my opinion, we have hurt ourselves badly, both substantively and procedurally. Just imagine the effort the Soviets would have been willing to expend to acquire the evidence of our intelligence operations that was spread across the front pages of our newspapers during the recent investigations. If we cripple our ability to compete in this vital but arcane field we hurt only ourselves, and of course delight our opponents.

There is no doubt that human rights is an enduring component of American foreign policy, pursued with a variety of styles by virtually every president of modern times. But several particular difficulties arise when human rights become a cardinal operating principle of foreign policy. First, we must recognize we are facing them in many areas of the world--fundamental, historic, revolutionary changes that go far beyond our own liberal slogans. This out-of-step nature of our attitude leads to difficulties in many areas, even that of definition. Fidel Castro in a speech a year or so ago came out strongly for human rights. What were those rights? The right to a home, to a job, food, health care, and an education. But the principal problem is the difficulty of, or the practical impossibility of, universal application as we have seen time and time again. The consequence is not only that the whole policy may have become counterproductive and may come to be viewed as a cynical exercise in public relations, but it also leads to sarcastic charges that we attack our friends because it is too dangerous to attack our enemies. We may find in this policy an excellent example of the dictum that seeking the best can be the enemy of achieving the good.

As for open diplomacy, the nature of the path between the rhetoric of 1976 and the negotiations for the normalization of relations with China indicates that the learning curve in this particular area has been high.

The essential elements in the ability of the United States to play an effective role in the world are support and leadership for friends and allies and the capability and determination to react strongly and effectively to Soviet adventurism. The key element, again, is a perception of American strength and steadfastness. On this point there is cause for concern--beginning with Vietnam, the refusal to act in Angola, and on through the cumulative effect of a number of recent events. Confidence is a very fragile commodity in international politics. It can sometimes outlast the actual concrete circumstances, such as the reputation of the French Army on the eve of World War II. But once erosion sets in, it is inordinately difficult to reverse.

The present signs are not encouraging for the United States and could foreshadow many serious challenges in the future. Indeed, with the possible exception of NATO, there is little reason for optimism in whatever direction one looks. I shall not belabor the issue of troop withdrawal from Korea. However we are here not simply dealing with the confrontation between two small powers on a remote peninsula. Korea is the point at which the interests of all the great powers in the Pacific area converge. It is of vital concern to Japan, China, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, as each has demonstrated at one time or another by undertaking military action on the peninsula. Any suggestion of U.S. withdrawal or lessening interest is fraught with the profoundest implications, particularly if done at a time of

the questioning at home of the moral validity of our commitment to South Korea's defense.

The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China was an objective of three Administrations. Only the conditions and the timing were at issue but notions of "playing the China card" are troublesome. Implicit in that notion is the idea that we can substitute the Chinese for some of our own efforts. The China card is not ours to play. The fundamental Chinese interest in the United States is in our strength and our willingness to stand up to Soviet adventurism. We did not generate the Sino-Soviet split. We didn't even understand it for 10 years. To the extent that the split becomes a strategic necessity for us, we will lose our leverage and could perhaps become hostage to both powers.

Although they now appear moribund, earlier negotiations for an Indian Ocean arms control agreement with the U.S.S.R. could easily be interpreted as another U.S. intention to withdraw in a region of growing importance. The strategic issue involved is that U.S. access, or presence, in the Indian Ocean can be maintained only through our naval forces. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is a back-door neighbor of many of the most important states of the region, and can easily overfly the entire region from bases in its own territory. In view of this reality, the potential modification of power relationships implicit in such negotiations surely did not escape those in the region who look to the United States for support.

Likewise, the blasé reaction of the United States to the recent coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen could not have been reassuring to our friends such as Oman and Pakistan.

Our current arms sales policy also carries with it some disturbing connotations. In a world still heavily burdened with poverty and disease we certainly should not heedlessly promote the sale of arms. At the same time, we should not be lulled into the simple and comforting notion that arms create war. Long before there were nuclear explosives and electronic precision weapons—long before there was gunpowder—there was war. Military conflict is older than recorded history and its causes are manifold, complex and deeply rooted in the nature of man. Arms and arms races represent the thermometer, not the fever itself. We will not cure the disease simply by breaking the thermometer. Nor can it be considered reasonable that a major preoccupation of our foreign policy should be the inadequacies of our friends rather than those of our adversaries. Some countries undoubtedly want arms for purposes we do not consider overriding. But should we set ourselves up as the final judge of a legitimate national interest of our friends—friends who seek our support for measures which at least in their own eyes are important to their own security? We cannot deny them without damage to perception of American loyalties and steadfastness.

In sum, we must be true to our principles or we will lose sight of our goals and end up being false to ourselves. But to further our principles we must survive in a world of sovereign nations, competing wills, and widely differing goals and values. We cannot do that if we continue to view foreign policy as a contest between good and evil. President Carter has said that anticommunism is no longer to be the motivating foundation of U.S. foreign policy. The accuracy of the implications in that declaration aside, the fact is that the U.S.S.R. is the only nation in the world with the power to threaten us. It is the chief politically directed threat to that world stability that is in the interest of the United States and to the ability of the people of the world to choose their future in the absence of totalitarian coercion. If that is anticommunism, we can

abandon it only to our own mortal peril.

In a very imperfect world, as we know it, we must not abandon those ideals that have made America different. But we must also insure that all people, friends and foes alike, understand that the United States is aware of its long-term interests and that it has the means and the will to protect them.

Luce is widely known as the father of the Naval War College but this article holds that he should more properly be acclaimed as the man responsible for America's 20th century naval greatness, for laying the ideological and organizational foundation of today's Navy.

STEPHEN BLEECKER LUCE

AND

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

by

Captain Kay Russell, U.S. Navy

The *Review* is saddened to announce that Captain Russell was stricken at work and died shortly after this article was written. It is adapted from his recently completed Ph.D. dissertation.

War is not a game of chance, as so often asserted. The saying is true only when the game is undertaken by those unprepared for it by previous study.[1]

At the firing of the first gun proclaiming war, the so-called "inspiration of genius" must be trusted only when it is the result of long and careful study and reflection.[2]

Not often in the life of a nation comes one whose effect is enduring and far-reaching upon its institutions, but in the last quarter of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century Stephen Bleecker Luce was such a man. His contributions to the maritime institutions of the United States and, more importantly, the thrust of his intellectual innovations, continue to have an effect today. Yet Rear Admiral Luce received little credit, outside the Navy and a small group of influential and knowledgeable civilians, for his work in the reformation of naval thought and his adaptation and innovation of revolutionary ideas subsequently applied to the U.S. Navy. While his protege, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, was reaping the rewards and honors so richly deserved for his literary efforts, Admiral Luce continued to work behind the scenes to achieve his vision of the future of the Navy. Luce, known as the father of the Naval War College, should more properly be known as the man responsible for the naval greatness of the United States of America during the 20th century. To Luce may be attributed the organizational and ideological foundations of the modern American Navy.

If one word could serve to describe Stephen Luce it would be "preparedness." To him preparedness meant the act of preparation, and the essences and forerunners of preparation were education, training, organization, and administration. He felt that Lord Nelson's Trafalgar campaign illustrated the fundamental truth that the effectiveness of a navy (or any military instrument) "consists more in the method of its use and in the practical skill of the human element than in the material perfection of the weapon itself."[3] This emphasis by Luce on voluntarism and the ability of man to focus his efforts on changing his destiny was a sharp departure from the highly deterministic views of Herbert Spencer, the father of sociology and advocate of Charles Darwin's theories as applied to man. Separating man from animal as did Lester Ward, author of the first comprehensive American treatise on sociology, Luce combined a pragmatic and religious outlook with his Darwinist beliefs to conclude that man through his own efforts working as God intended could chart his own path through the world. Hard work and complete dedication could overcome any obstacles encountered in one's path.[4]

Luce's initial reputation in the Navy was a result of his work in the training of midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy during the Civil War. Because there existed no text for the teaching of seamanship, Luce compiled the sailing knowledge he had accumulated during a career of over 20 years since his appointment as a midshipman by President Martin Van Buren in 1841. These years prior to the Civil War were spent mostly at sea, and they included a visit to Canton, China and to Japan aboard *Columbus* as Commodore Biddle sought to open Japan for intercourse with the West. Luce's collection of sailing knowledge was published under the title *Seamanship* in 1863 and, through many editions, served as the Naval Academy's text on the subject for the remainder of the 19th century. Luce was unrivaled in the American Navy as a master in the art of sailing.

From the training of midshipmen Luce's attention turned to the training of seamen. In the period after the Civil War, as he watched a once mighty Navy and merchant marine decay at the piers and those ships that remained in active service become increasingly manned by foreigners, Luce sought methods of stemming the decline in American naval power through improvement of readiness and capability by a program for training "boys." If his Navy couldn't be the biggest or the most modern, it could still be the most effective by being the best prepared, and this necessitated training the best seamen. Luce was instrumental in the establishment of state maritime schools (he actually drafted the bill that Congress passed authorizing them) and the establishment of the apprentice training system in the U.S. Navy. No longer would "boys" go to sea without knowledge of sails and ships. Under the principles established by Luce the U.S. Navy trains its sailors today.

With the establishment of the maritime schools and the apprentice system, Luce's thoughts and energies turned to the education of officers. With a seed planted during a conversation with General Sherman at Savannah in 1865 and nourished by the military writer Gen. Emory Upton in 1877, Luce brought forth his idea of a college to teach naval officers the "Art and Science" of war. This seed came to fruition in 1884 with the issuance of a General Order by Secretary of the Navy William Chandler establishing the Naval War College on Coasters Harbor Island at Newport, Rhode Island.[5] The College's home, the former Poor House of the City of Newport, was an indicator of the rough times in store for it during the next 12 years. From its earliest days subject to derision, jealousy, and the

victim of political in-fighting, the college emerged as an institution emulated by nations around the world. The survival of the college may be directly attributed to the vision, wisdom, perspicacity, and unending labors of Stephen Bleecker Luce in its behalf.

The arrival of Luce at Newport in early 1862 at the Naval Academy, recently moved from Annapolis as a result of the Civil War, marked the beginning of a love affair between Luce and Newport that was to last 55 years until his death in 1917, at the age of 90. When rumors circulated of the impending return of the Academy to Annapolis, Luce urged its retention in Newport because there the midshipmen could be drilled, exercised, and prepared for life at sea.[6] Luce felt that training facilities should be closely tied to operational facilities, and this advantage, together with its location and climate, gave Newport its special place in Luce's thinking.

After teaching seamanship and conducting training cruises at the Academy throughout most of 1862 and 1863, Luce was ordered to blockade duty off Charleston, South Carolina. In connection with this assignment Luce, in January 1865, met General Sherman at Savannah, Georgia, where the general exposited his plan for taking Charleston, a task the Navy had been unable to accomplish in 3 years. To this meeting with Sherman, Luce attributed his ideas for a war college and a general staff organization for the Navy. Upon hearing Sherman, Luce realized that there were "certain fundamental principles underlying military operations; principles of general application whether the operations were conducted on land or at sea," and that there was "such a thing as a military problem, and there was a way of solving it; or what was equally important, a way of determining whether or not it was susceptible of solution."[7] Thus the seed that led to the development of the Naval War College was implanted in Luce's fertile mind.

Following the Civil War, Luce once again had orders to duty at the Naval Academy, which had been returned to Annapolis—a move Luce viewed as strictly political.[8] As Commandant of Midshipmen he served under the Superintendent, Rear Adm. David Dixon Porter, thus renewing an acquaintance dating from Luce's midshipman days aboard *Congress*. Luce became a trusted advisor and confidant of the future Admiral of the Navy, and the friendship of these two men was to be an important factor in the success of the struggle for preservation of the college.

After tours of duty in the Pacific and then the Atlantic, Luce found himself at the Boston Navy Yard, an assignment that provided ample opportunity for his involvement in establishment of the Nautical Schoolship at New York, the Apprentice Training Program, and a proposal to establish a school of naval architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The ideas germinating since 1865 continued to grow at Boston, as evidenced by Luce's recommendations to Porter preparatory to the Admiral of the Navy's Annual Report. The outline of the broad purpose of the course of instruction at the Naval War College may be found in Luce's statement to Porter that

> to reorganize the Navy Department and line out a wise, comprehensive and far reaching Naval policy for peace and for war, requires not only a knowledge of law, but broad & enlightened views of Statesmanship, together with a familiarity with the Science of War . . . and when I speak of the Science of War I mean in its application and operations on land as well as at sea—for I believe the military importance of a Navy will readily be conceded by our best military men.[9]

Luce's inclusion of "a knowledge of law" in this letter may be traced to his

feeling of inadequacy on this subject when he was called upon to treat with both German and French naval officers in his position as commanding officer of a neutral warship during the 1870s conflict between Germany and France.

The result of Luce's experiences at the Boston Navy Yard was the broadening of his knowledge concerning the political life of his country. Luce became thoroughly familiar with the political ins and outs associated with navy yards, which at this time hired employees as rewards for political services and were considered important by party politicians for patronage purposes. Never one to hesitate to speak out or to express his opinion to those in position to influence projects in which he was interested, Luce met and corresponded with many politicians, businessmen, and educators in his efforts to gain support for his schools and training programs.

On 8 August 1877, while commanding the flagship *Hartford*, Luce took his first action toward obtaining authority to establish a war college by proposing a school for junior officers where they could learn the higher branches of their profession.[10] Luce's model for this proposed school was the army's artillery school at Fort Monroe, Virginia, headed by Brig. Gen. Emory Upton. Upton in turn had been influenced by the Prussian staff school model that he had observed during his wide-ranging travel studying foreign military institutions and techniques.[11]

Luce was particularly concerned that the naval officer, whose business it was to fight, did not receive formal training in strategy and tactics and as a result was not properly prepared to engage in war. In addition Luce felt that without a knowledge of naval history officers could not be properly prepared either. Strategy and tactics, naval history, and international law became the foundations upon which the course of instruction at the Naval War College was built.

Luce, while not advocating war, believed that war and religion were the "two great central facts of history" in that education was born of religion and civilization was born of war.[12] Luce did not think that war was intrinsically evil, but rather that war could benefit mankind by promoting human progress through the chastening of a nation, the stimulation of national growth and the solution of problems of the domestic and political economy.[13] Because war was a calamity and a tragedy that could cause much suffering, Luce urged even the most peaceful nation to ensure "against war by preparation for it" because this would be "the most business-like, the most humane and the most in accordance with the Christian religion."[14] The role of the Naval War College was "to be an instrumentality for the prevention of war by being prepared for it."[15]

Preliminary to increasing pressure for establishment of a war college, Luce made efforts to obtain Coasters Harbor Island as a permanent site for the Navy while importuning Secretary of the Navy Thompson at the same time for a managerial head of the apprentice training system.[16] This led to the establishment of a board headed by Commodore English, Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting and an officer with whom Luce had not been on good terms, which recommended Coasters Harbor Island as the most suitable location for a Naval Training Station. Luce attributed English's concurrence to Coasters Harbor Island as a site to a dispute between English and Thompson and also to the fact that Luce had "made up" to English: "Having practiced 'eating dirt' since my first steerage mess claimed me as its own, I had no objection to taking one more gulp, and so the thing was done."[17] Following extensive lobbying efforts by Luce, the City of Newport ceded the island to the State of Rhode Island which in turn gave title to the Government of the United States. On 7 August 1882,

Coasters Harbor Island was obtained, thereby realizing Luce's aspiration dating back to 1863.[18]

The problem of management in the navy was one that was to continue to plague Luce throughout the remainder of his active life and one to which he was to devote considerable effort. The crux of the problem lay in the advisory role of the Admiral of the Navy and the power exercised by the chiefs of the eight autonomous bureaus. Having no organizational power base and no control over finances, David Dixon Porter was forced to rely on his reputation, friendships, and powers of persuasion to influence the Navy, its Secretary, and other influential personages both in and out of government. While Porter was persuading, the bureau chiefs exercised almost complete control of their individual domains. Rivalries and conflicts of interest inevitably resulted as individuals struggled for influence with the Secretary and with the Congress. The Navy could not speak with one voice to Congress because of the virtual impossibility of coordination of these eight satrapies. Porter, knowing that the bureau chiefs had succeeding Secretaries in their "hip pockets" and that they controlled activities of the Navy as they wished, tried to install officers sympathetic to his thinking in the key bureaus to help ensure success of his programs.[19] Luce felt that something must be done to reorganize naval administration as like the "House of Bourbon . . . its scions never forgot anything and never learned anything."[20]

Fortunately Porter championed Luce's causes in the Navy Department, for Luce created an influential enemy in the spring and summer of 1881. On 11 April 1881 Luce was given command of all training ships by Secretary of the Navy W.H. Hunt. Capt. Ralph Chandler of the Practice and Training Squadron resented having to send all transmissions to the Navy Department through his new superior. Having been rebuked by Hunt for an offensive communication, Chandler tried to discredit Luce by accusing him of having profiteered to the sum of $5,000 for his role in the establishment of the public marine schools in 1874. After Porter upheld Luce, Chandler retaliated by attacking Luce in the *Providence* (Rhode Island) *Journal* implying malfeasance on Luce's part regarding desertations from training ships. Jonathan Gilpin, editor of the *Newport News* and friend of Luce, took offense at being incorrectly quoted by Chandler. Secretary of the Navy Hunt acquitted Chandler of complicity for the false newspaper reports but wanted him to find out who was responsible. In answering this request Chandler said that he didn't know who wrote the article in question but that Luce probably did "since he controls to some extent the *Newport News*" regarding the Navy. Luce endorsed this letter by asking the Department to rebuke Chandler for gross disrespect. On 27 July 1881, Chandler reported Luce for violation of the laws of Congress and the *Regulations for the Better Government of the Navy* by ordering expenditure of lumber and labor (approximately $100 worth) for boxes for Luce's personal use. Luce admitted he had done this in accordance with "immemorial customs of the service upon leaving the ship." On 30 July Porter relieved Chandler who replied by accusing Luce of departing his command from a Saturday afternoon until a Monday morning. Porter again intervened for Luce even though he had been approached by Senator Ambrose Burnside of Rhode Island on behalf of Chandler. Luce was ordered to sea by Hunt to allow time for a cooling-off period. However, Chandler's charges had left their mark on Hunt, who accepted the story of the "large number of desertions" and the "attractions of Newport" infecting the "boys."[21]

Although Luce was exonerated of all charges brought against him, emotions

had been stirred and sides had been taken. According to Porter, Commodore English was importuning Secretary Hunt regarding the "fascinations of Newport" and its demoralizing influence on the boys in the apprentice system. (The "delights of Newport" were to be encountered again as the college fought for its survival.) While pressure was exerted by English within the department, Chief Justice Waite of the U.S. Supreme Court was espousing the advantages to be gained by moving the training squadron from Newport to New London, Connecticut. Porter took advantage of this occasion to present Hunt with an eight-page letter attacking the bureaus as "full of nastiness" that would be impossible to "get rid of [it all] in a week."[22]

The nastiness surrounding the Chandler affair must certainly have reinforced Luce's antipathy towards the bureau system of naval organization. Normally an officer of Luce's rank and experience could have expected a tour of duty as chief of one of the bureaus. With a benefactor such as Porter, Luce need only have indicated his desire to become a bureau chief. However, he preferred not to be bogged down in the pettiness and in-fighting that were the vogue of Navy life in Washington. By remaining away from Washington and the bureaus he felt he could maintain a better perspective in his drive towards the establishment of a more effective Navy. By remaining unparochial in his outlook he could better serve the needs of the Navy and his country. Besides, there was little he could accomplish in Washington that Porter could not, and Luce and Porter saw eye to eye on most issues.

In late 1882 while commanding the Training Squadron home ported at Newport, Luce launched full scale his drive to establish a war college by broaching the subject to Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler, Porter, and several others. Encouraged by initial reaction to his proposal, Luce wrote an editorial squib that his friend, William Conant Church, published in the *Army-Navy Journal.* Luce hoped to obtain from younger officers in the Navy expressions of opinion, start a controversy and then a "BOOM" for the college.[23] Luce's informal approaches to the new Secretary of the Navy were followed by an official letter proposing the establishment of a naval college.[24]

Luce never underestimated the importance of professional opinion within the Navy Department. Realizing the reluctance of some of the entrenched bureau chiefs to accept new ideas, Luce sought converts among the junior officers of the Navy, fully cognizant that in the future they would be bureau chiefs, leaders, and commanders. One of the tools used for reaching these officers was the U.S. Naval Institute that Luce had been instrumental in founding in 1873. Luce served as president of the Institute for over 11 years, and his guidance of it, as well as of naval thought, was felt through 1911. Luce was in a key position to control the selection of articles to be published in the *Proceedings,* and the *Proceedings* became a valuable tool of progressive officers in furthering modernization of the Navy.

The Institute published articles and professional notes, of interest primarily to naval officers, in its *Record of the United States Naval Institute.* After several years the name of the publication was changed to *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute.* Articles reflected the growing concern of naval officers about the state and the future of their naval force and its development. Prize essay contests were conducted each year on a topic of current concern. These topics often reflected the guiding hand of Luce: 1879—Naval Education, I. Officers, II. Men; 1880—The Naval Policy of the United States; 1881—The Type of (1) Armored Vessels (2) Cruiser Best Suited to the Present Needs of the

United States; 1882–Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of its Decline, and the Measures to Be Taken for its Revival; 1883–How may the usefulness of Naval Officers be extended in time of peace with advantage to the country and the Naval Service?

The winning prize essay in 1883 mirrored Luce's thoughts on the importance of education:

> Naval officers . . . suffer from want of opportunities for professional improvement and from too much dependence upon routine and obsolete methods. Responsibilities come too late in life to be effective in promoting intellectual activity and professional pride . . . they [naval officers] do not receive instruction or training for the specific purpose of fitting them to perform the duties of independent commands.[25]

The essay suggested postgraduate study of history, languages and law, political-economy, social science, and even literature and art. It further proposed that this training should be conducted apart from the Naval Academy as postgraduate education at that institution would result in "in-breeding."

Although responses published in *USNIP* were generally favorable, there was significant disagreement with this essay, especially as regards the proposals concerning education. Conservative, traditional officers were appalled at the suggestion of engaging in an "extensive system of investigation of everything of interest and importance to the civilized world, with, perhaps, a slight leaning in favor of the interests of the naval service."[26] There was (and remains today) a substantial measure of support for the proposition that operating ships at sea was sufficient in itself for the educational needs of the Navy's officers.

As discussion of the prize essay was being generated, Luce entered the lists with an article on "War Schools" in which he submitted for consideration of the members of the Institute the question of establishment of a postgraduate course for the study of the science of war, ordnance, and international law at a location affording the greatest advantages, Coasters Harbor Island. In this article Luce set down the thoughts that a year later were to launch Alfred Thayer Mahan on his career as a historian:

> . . . he [the naval officer] should be led into a philosophic study of naval history that he may be enabled to examine the great naval battles of the world with the cold eye of professional criticism, and to recognize where the principles of the science [of war] have been illustrated or where a disregard of them has led to defeat or disaster. Such studies might well occupy the best thoughts of the naval officer for they belong to the highest branches of his profession.[27]

Even though Secretary Chandler had not acted upon Luce's Naval War College recommendation of November 1882, Luce was not discouraged because "the ball was rolling." Luce availed himself of opportunities to present his plans verbally to Chandler who suggested a presentation in front of the line bureau chiefs: Rear Adm. E.J. Nichols (Yards & Docks); Capt. John G. Walker (Navigation); Capt. Montgomery Sicard (Ordnance); and Capt. Earl English (Equipment). Luce's recollection of the occasion was that his proposition had not been met with enthusiasm and that "Captain Sicard treated [it] . . . in a manner bordering on derision."[28] Fortunately Walker, a friend of Porter and Luce, head of the most important bureau and "the most politically powerful man in the Service,"[29] was receptive to Luce's proposal, and over the years he remained a firm friend of the Naval War College.

Luce had sent copies of *Naval Songs*, a collection that he edited, to key

civilians and officers in the Navy, but even this did not help him convert Capt. Francis M. Ramsay, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, who viewed the War College as a threat to the academy. Ramsay's views differed materially from those expressed by Luce in the "War Schools" article. He felt that even if postgraduate education were necessary it should commence where the academy course for cadets stops.[30] Later in a position of authority as a bureau chief, Ramsay proved to be a potent enemy of the Naval War College and its existence on Coasters Harbor Island.

Luce followed up his presentation to the line bureau chiefs with another letter to Secretary Chandler in which he submitted a proposed General Order that would establish a school of application under the general supervision of the Secretary to provide for the study of the science of war, international law, ordnance, and other professional studies in the future.[31] Examinations were to be held and certificates of graduation would be issued and would be considered in officer promotions. Chandler, acting through Captain Walker, appointed Luce president of a three-officer board "to consider and report upon the whole subject of a post-graduate school or school of application . . . for officers."[32] The hand of Walker was evident in his selection of Cdr. William T. Sampson and Lcdr. C.F. Goodrich as the other two members of the board. Luce referred Goodrich to the "War Schools" article and, confident of the board's favorable report, instructed him that "whenever you feel prepared to meet and draw up plans for the operation of such a school . . . inform me and I will convene the Board."[33]

On 13 June 1884 the Board submitted its report to Secretary Chandler.[34] This report justified the reasons for establishing such a school, gave an outline of the proposed course of instruction, and recommended a location. Setting forth the views of the progressive camp of the Navy the report pointed out the confusion resulting from the effect of the technological revolution within the Navy,[35] the sense of frustration caused by the inadequate material condition of the Navy, the authors' faith in history, the immutability of the principles of naval strategy, the faith in education as a means to make up for material deficiencies, and the unwavering belief that the *raison d'être* for naval officers was to conduct war and that they should be trained for that purpose. Progressive in their realization that the Navy and the country would be forced to modernize in order to survive and to meet the challenges of the fast-approaching 20th century, these reformers led by Luce would distill, from their study of history, the principles that would allow them to protect and to conserve their heritage.

The Board's report was favorably received by Walker and Chandler, who directed the three officers to reassemble to prepare a plan for implementing the organization of the proposed war school.[36] Luce wasted no time. Writing to an officer who had instructed seamanship under his direction at the Naval Academy and who had served subsequently as his Executive Officer aboard *Macedonian*,[37] Luce set about to assemble a staff. Alfred Thayer Mahan, then commanding *Wachusett* on the Pacific station, accepted the tendered position of Professor of Naval Warfare, stating "I take it the subject you propose to me involves an amount of historical narrative specially directed toward showing the causes of failure and success, thus enforcing certain general principles."[38] In his biography Mahan acknowledged his debt to Luce:

> With little constitutional initiative, and having grown up in the atmosphere of the single cruiser, of commerce-destroying, defensive warfare, and indifference to battle-ships; an anti-imperialist,

> who for that reason looked upon Mr. Blaine as a dangerous man; at forty-five I was drifting on the lines of simple respectability as aimlessly as one very well could. My environment had been too much for me; my present call changed it.[39]

Two years were to elapse before Mahan presented his first lecture to students assembled at the college.

On 20 September 1884 Luce was detached from command of the North Atlantic Station to assume duties as President of the Naval War College, established by Navy Department General Order No. 325 on 6 October 1884. Arriving at Coasters Harbor Island, Luce christened the former poor house "in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost . . . the War College of the American Navy."[40] The college, under the management control of the Bureau of Navigation, was tasked to present "an advanced course of professional study for naval officers" that would embrace the higher branches of the profession.[41] In a tradition-bound Navy this marked a tremendous departure from the usual procedure of training aboard ship at sea. Now officers were to receive substantial advanced training through the media of lectures and reading, and by using scientific method to distill general principles from the study of specific events, battles, and naval engagements. The lessons to be learned from the past would be digested by the American naval officer. Luce was fond of using two quotations, and through the agency of the Naval War College he was to instill these thoughts in the hearts and minds of future generations of naval officers:[42]

> No past event has any intrinsic importance. The knowledge of it is valuable only as it leads us to form just calculations with respect to the future
>
> Macaulay, *Essay on History* (1828)
>
> History is philosophy teaching by examples.
>
> Bolingbroke, *Letters on the Study of History* (1752)

Although Luce had his college established in the former poor house on Coasters Harbor Island, his battle for its survival was just beginning. He had no students, no money, and he was experiencing difficulties getting a faculty ordered there for duty. Mahan, despite efforts to be detached from *Wachusett* early, was kept in the Pacific until 1885. Luce's efforts to obtain an army officer on the staff were thwarted, in a portent of heated struggles of the 20th century, because of interservice rivalry. According to Luce "One distinguished officer, not wholly unconnected with Arctic fame, declared with emphasis, that he would rather see the project [the college] abandoned entirely than that such a thing [i.e., an army officer teaching naval officers] should be permitted."[43]

While seeking to pry instructors from the Navy Department, Luce tried to obtain students for the college. Owing to the surplus number of officers available as a result of the reduced number of ships (evidencing the Navy's deterioration following the war) Luce anticipated no difficulties assembling a class. He hoped to have students from the nearby Torpedo School on Goat Island, but lack of instructors precluded holding a class at the college in the fall of 1884. The location of the Training Squadron, the Torpedo School, and the ships of the North Atlantic Station in the Newport area provided a ready and convenient source of students for the college. These units were also to provide Luce the opportunity to fulfill his desire to have the students practice applying the knowledge they acquired at the college.

After Cdr. W.S. Schley of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting responded to a Luce query that as there had been no appropriation for the War College by Congress there were no funds avail-

able,[44] it was apparent that money and the official recognition of the college by Congress in order to obtain money were to be the toughest hurdles in getting the college on its feet. Without official recognition of the college by Congress it would be ever vulnerable to its enemies within the Navy Department and to their attacks—cutting off of funds, threatened moves to and consolidation with the Naval Academy, and consolidation with other organizations in Newport thereby downgrading and emasculating the college. Luce wanted nothing less than an independent college that could investigate and study the "Science of War" in all its manifold aspects.

To ensure the continued survival of the college Luce turned his attention and his efforts toward obtaining congressional recognition. By December 1884 Luce had met with limited success in lining up support in both the House and in the Senate.[45] He had arranged for his "friends" to have "the amount asked for the college placed on the [Naval Appropriation Bill], and to try *to keep* it there."[46] Feeling that if Congressmen knew the purpose of the college they could hardly fail to endorse it with their support, Luce's friends in the Senate by resolution requested Secretary of the Navy Chandler to inform them of steps taken by him "to establish an advanced course of instruction . . . and the reasons which have controlled the action of the Department."[47] Chandler, recognizing the necessity for advanced military and naval education in the United States and also the surplus of officers in the navy, gave the college his approbation and "commended [it] to the notice and favor of Congress."[48] Attached to Chandler's response to the Senate were the report of Luce's board recommending establishment of the college and the general order establishing the college.

While Luce concentrated on getting congressional approval of the college he did not neglect other aspects of the college. Not only did he find time to attend to rectification of the filth and squalor of the former poor house, but through superior management skills he attended to the myriad other tasks inherent in the establishment of a new institution. He carried on a correspondence with Mahan, which was to continue throughout their active lives, as Mahan awaited orders detaching him from the Pacific. Arrangements were made for Professor James R. Soley of the Naval Academy to prepare a series of lectures on international law for delivery to the first class planned for the fall of 1885. Luce submitted articles and editorial reviews to W.C. Church's *Army-Navy Journal*.[49] Luce's prolific hand, in addition to writing personal letters requesting friendship for the college, penned an article published in *The United Service* outlining the planned course of instruction at the War College and setting forth the idea of and the need for a naval chief of staff.[50] To friends, acquaintances, politicians, superiors, contemporaries, and juniors Luce wrote searching for support. All of Luce's prior experience gained in connection with the establishment of the marine schools and the apprentice system were called into use.

Before action could be taken by the 48th Congress to appropriate money for the college, Grover Cleveland, his Democratic administration, and a new Congress came into office. This was to prove a blow to the fortunes of the college because Luce had managed to generate the majority of the support for the college amongst his Republican friends. Enemies of the college were to find a fertile new ground in which to work against the college. Initially, however, the new Secretary of the Navy, William C. Whitney, in his Annual Report endorsed Porter's ringing advocacy of the college by stating that "the importance of the work to be done by the college can hardly be overestimated . . . the increased complexity of Naval Science makes this hitherto neglected branch of

professional education an indispensable element in naval efficiency."[51]

Luce was undaunted and optimistic when in September 1885 the first class of eight officers assembled at Newport to receive instruction from Luce, Soley, Lt. Tasker Bliss, U.S. Army, and Cdr. Henry Clay Taylor for a period of 1 month. Luce received additional encouragement from the facts that Mahan had been ordered to duty at the college and that with Luce's promotion to rear admiral, his already considerable prestige and power would be enhanced.

Arriving too late to participate in the 1885 term at the college, Mahan settled in New York City, where he would have access to an adequate library, to prepare for the 1886 term when he would begin to lecture at Newport. Keeping Luce's analogy between land and naval warfare before him, Mahan studied Elkin's *Naval Battles* and Jomini's *Art of War*. By January 1886 Mahan had formulated general thoughts on the course at the War College. These thoughts formed the basis of the thesis that brought Mahan fame and served as the guiding light for the expansionists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Mahan passed his thoughts on to Luce, who certainly could see the germination of his own ideas in Mahan's letter. The course at the War College should begin with a

> general consideration of the sea, its uses to mankind and to nations, the effect which the control of it or the reverse has upon their peaceful development and upon their military strength . . . . This will naturally lead to a . . . consideration of the sources of Sea Power, whether commercial or military; depending upon the position of the particular country, the character of its coast, its harbors, the character and pursuit of its people, its possession of military ports in various parts of the world, its colonies and c., its resources in the length and breadth of the world.[52]

And so the beginnings of the *large policy* of the expansionists had been set down on paper. They would be expanded and publicized—that was Mahan's great contribution.[53] However, Luce gave Mahan the call to come to Newport, planted the ideas in his mind, and provided him the opportunity to pursue these ideas and to write in an atmosphere of encouragement. More than anything else Luce contributed behind the scenes with his untiring efforts to insure the success of the War College. In addition, Luce introduced Mahan to the two individuals who were in large degree responsible for implementing this large policy as national policy of the United States—Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge.[54]

Mahan's work was going well in New York City when Luce turned his attention to the annual battle in Congress to obtain an appropriation. Senator Aldrich of Rhode Island and Congressmen Spooner of Connecticut and Boutelle of Maine shepherded the college's appropriation through the Naval Affairs Committees, finally securing an appropriation of $8,000 for maintenance and $14,000 for operations.[55] Worries over instructors, students, and money temporarily a thing of the past, the class convened in September 1886 with 17 students.[56] Contributing to the success of the term was the presence of the North Atlantic Station Flagship, *Tennessee*, with Rear Adm. Luce's flag flying.[57] Luce had been detached from the presidency of the college in June, but, along with his replacement, Mahan, he lectured during the term. The class closed on an optimistic note in November 1886 with Secretary Whitney's endorsement in his annual report.

However, Whitney's endorsement was gradually to turn to an attitude of, at best, neutrality in 1887.[58] According to Mahan there was an "official collision" between Whitney and Luce

"which turned Secretary Whitney's attitude towards the college into hostility, and encouraged the enemies of the college in their efforts to destroy the institution."[59] Because Hilary A. Herbert, Congressman from Alabama and powerful Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, was also opposed to the college on the grounds of economy, the college faced an uphill struggle to obtain money with which to operate in 1887, after the committee rejected the proposed $12,000 for the college.

Congressman John R. Buck of Connecticut introduced an amendment to the appropriations bill on the floor of the House that would have restored the college's money if passed. Speaking in behalf of the college, Buck refuted the claim that the Naval War College was an extension of the Naval Academy and cited support from Whitney (!), Porter, Sampson (Superintendent of the Academy), Walker, and Soley (quoting from his article in *Scribner's Magazine*, February 1887). Joining Buck in speaking for the amendment were Spooner (R.I.) and Boutelle (Maine). Representative Thomas (Ill.) called the college "a poor house unfit for habitation."[60] Speaking against the bill were Chairman Herbert and Representative McAdoo (N.J.) who mouthed the words of Captain Ramsay by advocating Annapolis as a site for the college. McAdoo declared:

> In a country like ours, where the people are rightfully fearful and wisely jealous of military pageantry and display, it is a great misfortune that our military schools should be established in connection with watering places . . . . There was no opposition in the Naval Committee to this postgraduate course for naval officers nor to the war college proper, but there was a well-founded suspicion that this so-called munificent gift on the part of the State of Rhode Island to the United States Government was given for the purpose of enhancing the charms of her well-known watering place, the city of Newport.[61]

The amendment for repairs and improvements was defeated by 70 to 81. After no quorum was claimed, it was rejected again by a vote of 83 to 88. The Senate approved the college's appropriation only to have it deleted in conference.[62] The enemies of the college and Newport scored a victory.

The college did not go without funds, however, as $6,000 was assigned to it out of the Yards and Docks appropriation. Luce was not satisfied with this because even though the money was obtained, congressional recognition was not. To correct this deficiency Luce planned to meet with Senator Chandler to map out strategy for the coming year. He did not propose to be "beaten in this little game, I assure you, if hard work will achieve success."[63]

Still in command of the North Atlantic Squadron, Luce found time to lobby extensively for the college during the winter of 1887. He wrote to Theodore Roosevelt, whom he had known while serving on the New York Board of Education, praising his book *The Naval War of 1812* and inviting him, as a foremost naval authority, to lecture at the War College and to meet Mahan.[64] Roosevelt replied that he would be "delighted to do anything in my power to help along the Naval College."[65] True to his word, Roosevelt lectured during the 1888 term. Corresponding directly with Congressmen Whitthorne and Elliott and Senators Chandler and Aldrich among others, enlisting his friends to write to their contacts in Congress and in the Administration, relying on the rapidly expanding favorable reputation of the college spread by its graduates and converts, Luce mounted his most successful lobbying campaign by converting all but three members of the House Naval Affairs

Committee.[66] The appropriation for 1888, although only $10,000 ($4,400 less than asked), carried by a large majority in the Congress. Luce and his fellow lobbyists could justifiably take pride in their successful efforts in obtaining such overwhelming congressional recognition of the college. Mahan, in his opening address to the session of 1888, alluded to the uncertainty long held about the appropriation and stated "that fear has now happily been removed."[67]

The advocates of the college congratulated themselves and relaxed their guard too soon for they had not counted on the antagonism their actions created with Secretary Whitney. Expressing his feelings to this wife, Whitney wrote:[68]

> I got mad about a small thing and concluded I would make a fight.... It was about the infernal war college at Newport. These officers have been working behind my back all winter and I recommended, but I didn't seem to get it as I recommended, and I finally awoke to the fact that the whole thing was being set up and worked in Congress behind me. I will wipe the whole thing out shortly.

Act shortly Whitney did. Knowing that Mahan and Luce were the guiding lights behind the college and that without them the college would flounder, Whitney ordered Mahan to duty in Puget Sound following the 1888 session while Luce was kept occupied with a cruise down the inland waterway and later with the "Haytien Republic" incident involving the capture and detention of an American merchant vessel at Port au Prince during a revolution in Haiti.[69] On 7 September 1888, Whitney obtained congressional approval for the consolidation of the college with the Torpedo School and its removal to Goat Island, and he ordered this consolidation into effect on 11 January 1889.[70] Mahan's reaction was "If by consolidation is meant the merging of two lines of thought radically distinct and in temper of mind opposed, under a single directing intellect, the result will be the one or the other."[71] Whitney also obtained from Congress an appropriation of $100,000 for construction of a building for the War College on Goat Island.

Without Luce's presence and guiding hand the advocates of the War College in its location on Coasters Harbor Island reverted to delaying tactics until Luce returned to the scene and a new Republican administration took office in 1889. Porter and several others petitioned Whitney to retain the college on Coasters Harbor Island as a separate institution.[72] In letters to Luce neither Walker nor Porter were sanguine about their prospects of success with Whitney.[73] Recalling an incident in his early career, Porter likened Whitney to a Spanish pilot at Port Mahon who informed him that he "never takes advice from a d-----d Midshipmite." Porter did hold out one ray of hope:

> The Republican administration may take advice if we can get a Secretary who wishes to run the Navy on true principles and does not allow a lot of shysters who have no interest in the service, and who should modestly keep themselves in the background, now that they are retired, to run it for him. In that case we may in the end have the War College, provided we obtain a man who will prevent the rehabilitation in connection with the Torpedo School, as the notoriously imbecile features of the latter would not be conducive towards giving the former any prominent place or one from which the Navy would derive any benefit.

Following successful resolution of the "Haytien Republic" incident Luce requested to be detached from his

duties. On 25 March 1889 he was placed on the retired list but Stephen Luce was not one to lead a quiet retirement or to be put out to pasture at the age of 62. Continuing with pen in hand, he strove to salvage the wreck that Whitney, at the urging of Ramsay and Schley, had made of the college. Luce pleaded through Porter, with General Schofield of the War Department (which had custody of Goat Island), and with Benjamin Harrison's nominee for Secretary of the Navy, Gen. Benjamin Franklin Tracy to help save the college. Porter didn't know about Tracy but "had a strong friend in the President who will express to the Secretary his wishes that he shall consult with me . . . . If I find that he refers all matters to the Secretary as did the last President—I will write a novel and send you a copy."[74] Schofield replied that he would give "full attention in hopes a solution mutually beneficial to the Naval and Military Services" could be reached.[75] Luce's extensive letter to Tracy reviewed the history and purposes of the Naval War College and the Torpedo Station and contained information on Goat Island and Coasters Harbor Island. Luce vigorously attacked the transfer of the college as being "not in the interests of economy, not in the interest of public service; not in the interests of the naval profession; but simply that one Bureau of the Navy Department, might eject from a building that it cannot use itself, officers working under another Bureau."[76] Using ammunition provided by Whitney's statement in General Order No. 365 that a "more thorough system of instruction . . . will be issued by the Department," Luce called upon Tracy to appoint a board of officers to draw up such a system. In the report of this proposed board Luce desired a definitive expression of opinion on the merits of the college as set up by Secretary Chandler and the merits of consolidation with the Torpedo Station on Goat Island. Luce did not get his board of officers, but he did enlist the sympathy of Tracy.[77] Upon Mahan's return from Puget Sound Tracy ordered him back to the college for the 1889 term.

The War College was to pay the price for its wounds under Whitney and the Democrats. In 1890 and 1891 no students were ordered there as Luce, Mahan, and Tracy sought to reestablish the college in new quarters on Coasters Harbor Island. Also important as a determinant in the failure to order classes in 1890-91 was the priority afforded to rectification of the material condition of the navy.[78]

President Harrison in his inaugural address stated his intention to build up the Navy and to acquire bases as dictated by strategic necessity.[79] In keeping with Harrison's announced policy Tracy prepared the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy calling for naval expansion. The influence of Mahan, Luce, and Porter was evident in Tracy's report. Deprecating the naval strength of the United States as 12th among the world's naval powers, Tracy recommended a departure from the traditional American naval policy of commerce raiding and coast defense. He proposed the creation of a two-ocean, 20-battleship modern fleet capable of coordinated offensive operations to protect American interests particularly in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Pacific. Foreign coaling stations would be a necessity to service these two fleets. To provide the trained officers to effectively man this fleet, Tracy recommended that the Naval War College be transferred back to Coasters Harbor Island as an independent command, stating that "The War College is unquestionably one of the most important institutions connected with the Navy."[80]

While Tracy's report was being prepared Luce was publicly calling for battleships for the new navy. He proposed an offensive navy as "A

solitary American steel cruiser, with the delusive prefix 'protected,' represents the latent possibilities of a great country placidly awaiting some national disaster to generate its mighty force."[81] In response to an inquiry from Charles Boutelle, new chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, Luce proposed a 17-battleship force.[82]

In addition to pursuing his own writings and publications Luce sought to help Mahan obtain a publisher for his *Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783.*[83] However, before Luce could arrange this Professor Soley had intervened to persuade Little, Brown of Boston to publish Mahan's manuscript.[84]

With Tracy's support and Republicans in firm control of both houses of Congress, with such powerful friends as Boutelle, Lodge, Chandler, and Aldrich holding key committee positions, the Naval Act of 1890 was approved providing for a modest (compared with the request) naval construction program and authorizing the return of the college to new quarters to be built on Coasters Harbor Island.[85] This $100,000 building was begun in 1891 and completed in May 1892.

As there were no classes during this period, Mahan, through Tracy's patronage, was free to pursue his research and to write. In addition he was available for consultation with Tracy, who had come to rely increasingly on Mahan's counsel following Porter's death.[86] Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History* was published in 1890, catapulting him to worldwide fame. In August 1890 a Mahan article outlining his "large policy" was published in the *Atlantic Monthly.*[87] Mahan viewed America as in a period of changing thought as to its relations with other nations. No longer would America be exclusively turned inward to domestic thoughts, but rather America would look outward for foreign markets "to seek the welfare of the country." America must expand militarily in order to protect its interests and to keep them from being encroached upon by foreign imperialism. Foreign intervention in the Caribbean, attracted by the commercial opportunities provided by an isthmian canal, could not be tolerated. The Monroe Doctrine was not to be a paper doctrine which, like a paper blockade, was not worth the paper it was written on.[88] "Whether they will or no, Americans must now begin to look outward."[89]

The large policy was not one of strictly American self-interest but included an added benefit for the world. This benefit for the world was to come through the auspices of the republican institutions of the United States. Luce was in the forefront of the fight to get this policy accepted in the United States. Indicative of his success was a letter responding to his reply to an enquiry addressed to the Editor of the *North American Review,* a magazine with which the expansionists Luce, Mahan, Roosevelt, and Lodge had close ties:

> I suppose few people love war less than those whom duty calls to engage in it. There is laid upon this Republic a destiny of greatness it cannot escape if it would. In the march of that destiny it is too much to hope that the previous history of the world will be reversed & that the evil passions of men will not foment trouble & bloodshed. They are not true prophets who cry "peace" "peace" when there is no peace, nor any possible. It is therefore the plainest duty of those who feel this most to prepare for the future. I think here in the West [Minnesota] there is a growing feeling of the importance of an adequate naval force & I trust that the time is not far distant when the Stars & Stripes on war ship [sic] and on the navies of peace will fly in every sea.[90]

One of the places that had long been dear to American expansionists was Cuba. Disgruntled with repressive Spanish rule, many Americans longed to see Cuba liberated, especially as a free Cuba would be morally obligated to the United States, thereby creating more favorable conditions for expanded commercial activity. Luce was one of those Americans who considered it inconceivable that "plans for a joint naval and military campaign having for its end the occupation of Cuba" had not been formulated by the government.[91] Moving a step closer to his concept of a general staff, Luce urged the president of the War College to undertake to persuade the Secretary of the necessity of drawing up such plans "at once." The college could "not do a better, or more patriotic work."[92]

As the college prepared to reopen in 1892 with Mahan as its president, Luce urged upon Tracy the need for basing our naval and military policy upon our international policy.[93] Luce called for the formation of a distinguished committee of Senators, Representatives, Navy and Army officers, and civilians with the Secretary of the Navy as chairman to formulate naval policy and recommend the construction of a fleet to implement and carry out the national policy of the United States. In his usual, methodical way, Luce called for preparedness, realizing that without a specific confirmed plan of action inefficiency and waste would result.

In 1892 President Harrison appointed Luce Commissioner General of the United States at the World's Columbian Historical Exposition in Madrid. Although Luce was out of the country for an extended period, he continued to keep abreast of developments at the War College.

With the advent of Cleveland's second administration in 1893, prospects for the college were not good. Mahan, under protest, was ordered to sea by Ramsay, who was now in the powerful position of Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. The new Secretary was Hilary A. Herbert who long had been receptive to Ramsay's suggestions. Mahan felt rejected by both Ramsay and Herbert. This was extremely disappointing to the sensitive Mahan, who in 1893 had been received by both Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Balfour in England and had been presented an honorary degree by Oxford University.[94] Mahan considered himself a pariah in his own country.

Ramsay's opposition to the college continued unabated but fortunately for the college Herbert became a convert and Mahan's pariah status was quickly dispelled. By August 1893 Mahan was able to report to Luce the conversion of Herbert.[95] Cdr. French Chadwick reported to Mahan that the college was safe: "[The Sec'y.] read your last book [on Sea Power] and that convinced him. He told us some time since he was opposed to it. He now tells me he has informed Ramsay that he has changed his mind."[96] Luce reported Herbert's conversion:[97]

> In July 1893, a naval officer interested in the success of the War College (Captain McCalla) called upon the officer temporarily in charge (Captain C.H. Stockton) and learned from him that there was imminent danger that the College would be abolished. The grounds for the apprehension were the well known hostility of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Captain F.M. Ramsay), a quite recent visit of inspection by that official (who was spending his leave at Jamestown) and the public statement made by the Commanding Officer of the Training Station (Captain F.M. Bunce) to the effect that "in six months my boys will be eating their grub in the lecture room of the War College."

Hoping that some good might come from an indirect personal

effort to place before the Secretary of the Navy (Mr. H.A. Herbert) the true objects of the War College, the officer above mentioned wrote to the Commanding Officer of the DOLPHIN (Lt. B.H. Buckingham), an excellent officer and one entirely in sympathy with the War College, asking him to do what he could to prevent the consummation of the plot to abolish the institution.

Shortly after the Secretary of the Navy embarked on board the DOLPHIN, in August 1893, the Commanding Officer called his attention to Captain Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire," and so interested the Secretary in its contents, that the latter read it carefully.

The day before the DOLPHIN arrived at Washington in September, the Secretary of the Navy sent for the Commanding Officer and said in substance, "I want to tell you that when I started out on this trip I meant to break up the War College, but I have read this book [Mahan's volume above referred to], which is alone worth all the money that has been expended on the War College; and now I intend to do all I can to assist it."

The remainder of 1893 and early 1894 did not see Herbert taking an active part in doing all he could to assist the college. Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and others were working in behalf of the college, but Ramsay and Bunce were still attempting to break it down while Herbert was "lukewarm."[98] The apprentice training system still desired the college building for a barracks, and Captain Bunce had put Taylor on report with the Secretary for improper advocacy of the college. Herbert informed Taylor that "any attacks upon the Training Station by the College or friends of the College will bring about the College's immediate abolition."[99] It seemed the Secretary's words were to come true when he issued General Order No. 421 that combined the Training Station, the War College, and the Torpedo School under the command of the college's avowed enemy, Captain Bunce.[100]

Taylor, in true Luce fashion, saw public opinion as the only thing that would force Herbert to take an active role in maintenance of the college "for there has already been brought to bear upon him all the weight of Senators and Representatives, of seven of his Bureau Chiefs, and a lump of correspondence from myself which—if it does not kill, must permanently enfeeble him—but all of no avail."[101] Taylor warned Luce to pay no attention to the favorable press the college was receiving as it all came directly from his office. Taylor was superbly trained to influence public opinion as he had spent a 2-year leave of absence from the Navy as vice-president and general manager of a company promoting the Nicaragua canal enterprise. Continuing to "sow seeds all over the country" Taylor enlisted support from Boards of Trade, Chambers of Commerce, and other commercial bodies. If the college were to be buried, "it would require a large grave to be dug for the corpse."[102] Taylor closed his February letter to Luce thanking him for his role in a cable interview with Mahan that had been published in newspapers in the United States.

Much of the opposition to the college was based on jealousy of Luce's and Mahan's success.[103] Slowly, however, the patient work of Luce and Taylor together with the increasing support given to Mahan's theories was to subdue the opposition. The college's growing number of graduates were living testimony influencing their fellow officers. Guest lecturers, all prominent and influential men, were converted during their appearances at the college. There was

growing recognition of the need for a war college. Taylor planned to use the winter of 1895 to map out with his permanent staff "full plans for the Gulf of Mexico and vicinity" in hopes that "some day you [Luce] will find that your suggestion about Cuba has borne good fruit."[104]

Mahan's return to Newport to join Luce and Taylor brought together once again the three men most responsible for the success of the college. It only remained for Secretary Herbert in a speech at the opening session in 1896 to acknowledge his full conversion to supporter of the college and his recognition of the roles played by Luce, Mahan, and Taylor. Confessing his past opposition, Herbert declared the institution at last "on a sure foundation and destined to become a permanent feature in our naval administration."[105] The philosophy espoused by Luce and Mahan was gradually coming to be accepted by larger and larger numbers of Americans until finally in 1898 it became national policy, despite significant dissent, with the acquisition of insular possessions following the Spanish-American War.

Acting Secretary of the Navy Charles H. Allen returned the Naval War College to its independent status by General Order No. 496 that revoked General Order No. 421 of 1894 and restored the college as an autonomous entity on Coasters Harbor Island.[106]

Rear Admiral Luce was to remain actively associated with the college until 1911 when, at the age of 84, he ceased lecturing and put down his pen. His visions and dreams for the U.S. Navy had almost all been met. His lasting monument was to be the college for which he had fought so perseveringly.

In a period of rapid social and technological change Luce had the insight to insist that the Navy and the nation prepare for their destiny. It was a time when the idea of the survival of the fittest was omnipresent, and to Luce the fittest would be the best educated and prepared to utilize all their advantages—those of geography, religion, character, natural resources, technology, and intellect. Farmers, missionaries, and traders had long since turned outward for markets and converts. Traditionally the Navy had been called upon to protect these interests. Times of revolutionary technology and expanding corporate business would result in additional capacity to produce, and the search for additional markets would add the industrial capitalists' and laborers' cries for protection to those of the farmer, missionary, and trader. The Navy would have to be ready to answer those cries.

The technological revolution hit the navy also. New guns, steel cruisers, advanced engineering plants called for a new type of officer. The conservatism of officers who resisted change of any kind because it was change called for their reeducation or replacement by progressive officers who could take the U.S. Navy into the 20th century as a force to be reckoned with—one no longer 12th on the list of world naval powers, but one which would be first.

But not only must technology be mastered, the Navy must be able to utilize its new technology for its designed purpose—the prosecution of war, the protection of the vital interests of the United States, and the preservation of the republican institutions of the nation. In a Navy with overseas commitments officers needed to be versed in international law. They should be capable of pursuing independent action in remote locations. In addition, new technology meant new tactics must be mastered. The day of the single commerce destroyer and coast defense was past. Ships would operate as fleets and force would be concentrated. Since 1874 fleet tactics had been evolving, and officers had to be trained to operate in larger units using these new tactics.

What better way to master fleet tactics than by understanding the failures and successes of past naval commanders? By distilling lessons from

history it was hoped that past mistakes would not be repeated. Mahan showed the importance of history for a Navy and a nation in response to Luce's call.

Insisting on the universality of military strategy—whether on land or at sea—Luce launched Mahan on his career as a historian and naval thinker. Luce's great contribution was to insist that the proper study of a naval officer was war. Only by mastering international law, new technology, history, and every facet of his profession could a naval officer be properly prepared, and the Naval War College was the institution that would help ensure this preparation. Only through preparation could the United States take its place in the evolutionary scheme as the "fittest," and Stephen Bleecker Luce prepared a navy and a nation.

STEPHEN BLEECKER LUCE

Naval Officer
Progressive
Statesman
Patriot

Every man exerts some influence: the lives of even the humblest of us exert some pressure on the lives of others. The lives which exert the greatest influence are the lives of men who apprehend truths that other men have not apprehended, and who, by force of mind and will, and usually by self-sacrifice as well, are able finally to make others apprehend those truths, and follow the paths those truths point out.[107]

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Captain Kay Russell was a prisoner of war in North Vietnam from 1967 to 1973. He later commanded VF 126 and had been a faculty member of the Naval War College from 1976 until his untimely and regretted death in February 1979. He held degrees in economics and operations research and his Ph.D. degree in diplomatic history will be awarded posthumously by the University of California this year.

NOTES

1. Stephen B. Luce, "Naval Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (hereafter cited as *USNIP*), March 1909, p. 93.

2. Stephen B. Luce, "An Address Delivered at the United States Naval War College, Narragansett Bay, R.I., June Second, Nineteen Hundred and Three," *USNIP*, September 1903, p. 544.

3. Stephen B. Luce, "Naval Administration, II," *USNIP*, December 1902, p. 839.

4. For Herbert Spencer's and Lester Ward's roles in the spread of Darwinist thought in America in the late 19th century see Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, rev. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 5ff.

5. Navy Department General Order No. 325, 6 October 1884.

6. Luce to Senator James Wilson Grimes, 2 April 1864, Naval War College Archives (hereafter cited as NWC), MS Coll. 10.

7. Stephen B. Luce, "Naval Administration,III," *USNIP*, December 1903, p. 820.

8. Stephen B. Luce, "Talk on the History of the War College," delivered at the college on 20 August 1906. Unpublished MS in the Naval Historical Foundation Collection (hereafter cited as NHF), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

9. Luce to Porter, 17 November 1874, Hayes Collection, NWC.

10. Luce to Secretary of the Navy R.W. Thompson, 8 August 1877, NHF.

11. Ronald Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977), pp. 16-17. For Upton's tour see Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964).

12. Stephen B. Luce, "Christian Ethics as an Element in Military Education," *The United Service*, January 1883, pp. 1-16. Reprinted in *USNIP*, December 1906, pp. 1367-1386.

13. Stephen B. Luce, "The Benefits of War," *North American Review*, December 1891, pp. 672-683. Reprinted in *USNIP* as "War and its Prevention," September 1904, pp. 611-622.

14. Luce, "War and its Prevention," p. 622.

15. Luce, "An Address Delivered at the United States Naval War College, Narragansett Bay, R.I., June Second, Nineteen Hundred and Three," p. 543.

16. Luce to Thompson, 19 November 1880, NHF.

17. Luce to Lt. Boutelle Noyes (Luce's son-in-law), 19 July 1883, in Albert Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy* (New York: Putnam, 1925), p. 162.

18. Luce, "Talk on the History of the War College."

19. Porter to Luce, 5, 6, 8, and 15 August 1881, and 14 March 1889, NHF. Luce wrote extensively on Naval Organization and Administration. His first article on this subject was "Our Naval Policy," *The United Service*, May 1882, pp. 501-521. Later articles appeared in *USNIP* and in *North American Review*. An article by John D. Hayes summarizing Luce's writings may be found in *Military Affairs*, Winter 1955, pp. 187-196.

20. Luce to Noyes, 19 July 1883; Gleaves, p. 162.

21. Hunt to Luce, 11 April 1881; Chandler to Hunt, 19 April; Hunt to Chandler, 22 April; Luce to Chandler, 23 April; Hunt to Chandler, 22 July; Chandler to Hunt, 27 July; Hunt to Luce, 3 August; Porter to Luce, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 15 August 1881, NHF.

22. Porter to Luce, 8 August 1881, NHF.

23. Luce to Church, 2 November 1882, NWC.

24. Luce to Secretary of the Navy W.E. Chandler, 6 November 1882, No. 54, U.S. Flagship *Portsmouth*, 3rd rate, Newport, R.I., NWC.

25. Carlos G. Calkins, "How May the Sphere of Usefulness of Naval Officers Be Extended in Time of Peace with Advantage to the Country and the Naval Service?" *USNIP*, vol. 9, 1883, p. 158.

26. F. Winslow, "Discussion," *USNIP*, vol. 10, 1884, p. 246.

27. Stephen B. Luce, "War Schools," *USNIP*, vol. 9, 1883, p. 656; Hayes, p. 194.

28. Luce to Chandler, 25 February 1905, NHF.

29. Gleaves, pp. 172-173.

30. Luce to Ramsay, 7 January 1884; Ramsay to Luce, 10 January 1884, NHF.

31. Luce to Chandler, 8 March 1884, NHF.

32. Walker to Luce, 3 May 1884, NHF.

33. Luce to Goodrich, 6 May 1884, NHF.

34. "Report of a Board on a Post-Graduate Course," *Senate Executive Document No. 68*, 48th Cong., 2d sess., 1885.

35. In 1883 Congress had authorized the first steel cruisers and a dispatch vessel (the ABCD's—*Atlanta, Boston, Chicago,* and *Dolphin*). Numerous technological innovations were shaking the Navy out of the torpor of the immediate post-Civil War period. See Walter R. Herrick, Jr., *The American Naval Revolution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), and Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 183-201.

36. Walker to Luce, 10 July 1884, NHF.

37. Richard S. West, Jr., *Admirals of Ameriean Empire* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1948), pp. 43-44; Spector, p. 30.

38. Mahan to Luce, 4 September 1884, NHF. Mahan very nearly did not get the opportunity that was to change his life. The position of Professor of Naval Warfare was first offered to Lt. M.R.S. MacKenzie who was unable to accept. See Spector, p. 29.

39. Alfred T. Mahan, *From Sail to Steam* (New York: Harper, 1907), p. 274.

40. *Army-Navy Journal*, 27 September 1884, p. 168. There are several different accounts of what Luce said on this occasion. See Spector, p. 26 and Gleaves, p. 179.

41. Navy Department General Order No. 325.

42. Hayes, p. 196.

43. Luce to Senator W.E. Chandler, 15 March 1887. The officer "not wholly unconnected with Arctic fame" was probably Winfield Scott Schley, who had organized the Greeley Relief Expedition in 1884. Luce's antipathy towards Schley probably stemmed from Schley's self-seeking publicity attempts on his successful return from the Arctic and his failure, as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, to aid the War College in its time of financial despair. Porter shared Luce's antipathy towards Schley (see Porter to Luce, 10 June 1889, NHF). In later years Luce sided with his old friend W.T. Sampson against Schley in the controversy over their

roles in the Battle of Santiago, Spanish-American War. To Luce's credit he declined the offer to sit as the third member on the Board of Inquiry in the Sampson-Schley dispute.

44. Leroy Eure, "Milestones of Naval War College History," Unpublished manuscript, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1957.

45. Luce to Senator Nelson Wilmarth Aldrich, 22 December 1884, NHF.

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Senate Exeeutive Document No. 68.*

48. *Ibid.*

49. Luce to Church, 1 January 1885, NHF.

50. Stephen B. Luce, "United States Naval War College," *The United Service,* January 1885, pp. 79-90.

51. Austin M. Knight and William D. Puleston, "History of the United States Naval War College," Unpublished manuscript, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1916, typescript, pp. 3-6.

52. Mahan to Luce, 22 January 1886, NHF.

53. Not everyone, of course, has considered this to be a contribution to mankind. Louis Hacker, noted historian, observed that "*The Influence of Sea Power* became a work whose immediate consequences were among the most terrible in history. Mahan, unwittingly, had furnished the rival imperialistic powers of Great Britain and Germany a keen sword that was to destroy both," "The Incendiary Mahan," *Scribner's Magazine,* April 1934, p. 263. Mahan's contemporaries did not all agree with his philosophy either. See Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

54. Roosevelt to Luce, 5 March 1888. Luce's tie with Lodge was familial as well as intellectual—the sister of Lodge's wife married Luce's son.

55. Aldrich to Luce, 27 May and 2 July 1886; Boutelle to Luce, 30 May 1886; Spooner to Luce, 8 June 1886; Eure. Boutelle was an ex-Navy captain and Luce's good friend. The possibility exists of a marital relationship through Luce's son-in-law, Lt. Boutelle Noyes, USN, but the author has been, as yet, unable to determine this positively.

56. *The New York Times,* 7 September 1886, p. 5.

57. Gleaves, p. 181.

58. Mahan, *From Sail to Steam,* p. 298.

59. Knight and Puleston, p. 4.

60. *Congressional Record,* 49th Cong., 2d sess., 25 February 1887, p. 2289.

61. *Ibid.,* p. 2290. J.A.S. Grenville and George B. Young, *Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 21.

62. Luce to Chandler, 15 March 1887, NHF.

63. *Ibid.*

64. Spector, pp. 54-55.

65. Roosevelt to Luce, 5 March 1888, NHF.

66. Mahan, *From Sail to Steam,* p. 298.

67. *Ibid.,* p. 299.

68. Grenville and Young, p. 25.

69. *Philadelphia Inquirer,* 15 September 1888; Gleaves, pp. 220-224.

70. Navy Department General Order No. 365, 11 January 1889.

71. Gleaves, p. 183.

72. Petition of Porter, et al., 13 August 1888, NWC.

73. Walker to Luce, 19 November 1888; Porter to Luce, 29 November 1888.

74. Porter to Luce, 14 March 1889, NHF.

75. Schofield to Luce, 9 March 1889, NHF.

76. Luce to Tracy, 24 November 1889, NHF.

77. Tracy to Luce, 30 March 1889, NHF.

78. Mahan to Luce, 24 November 1891, NHF.

79. Herrick, p. 59. See also Herrick's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "General Tracy's Navy, A Study of the Development of American Sea Power, 1889-93," Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1962.

80. Navy Department, *Annual Report, 1889;* Herrick, *The American Naval Revolution,* pp. 54-58.

81. Stephen B. Luce, "Our Future Navy," *North American Review,* July 1889; also in *USNIP,* vol. 15, 1889, pp. 542-552.

82. Luce to Boutelle, 1889; Boutelle to Luce, 30 December 1889, NHF.

83. Mahan to Luce, 1 August 1889, NHF.

84. Mahan to Luce, 7 October 1889, NHF.

85. Boutelle to Luce, 1 and 6 March 1890; Grenville and Young, p. 27; Herrick, *The American Naval Revolution,* pp. 74-77; Gleaves, p. 186.

86. Herrick, *The American Naval Revolution*, p. 51.

87. Alfred T. Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward," *Atlantic Monthly*, August 1890; also in Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power Present and Future* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897), pp. 3-27.

88. Luce to Tracy, 18 March 1892, NHF. Luce stated that "Naval policy and military policy complement each other and . . . A 'paper' Monroe Doctrine is entitled to no more respect than a 'paper' blockade."

89. Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, p. 21.

90. Albert Wilson to Luce, 12 December 1891, NHF. For a full treatment of American attitudes towards overseas commitments see Milton Plesur, *America's Outward Thrust* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971); see also William A. Williams, *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (New York: Random House, 1969). Williams concludes that it was the intellectual urban minority in the northeast who influenced Congress to adopt an expansionist policy that had long been developing amongst the nation's agrarian majority.

91. Luce to Henry Clay Taylor, 10 December 1891.

92. *Ibid.*

93. Luce to Tracy, 18 March 1892, NHF.

94. Mahan to Luce, 22 May 1893, NHF.

95. Mahan to Luce, 24 August 1893, NHF.

96. Chadwick to Mahan, 10 August 1893, NHF.

97. Luce, "Talk on the History of the War College."

98. Lodge to Luce, 22 January 1894, NHF.

99. Taylor to Luce, 10 March 1894, NHF. Taylor had enlisted the support of the Governor and the legislature of Rhode Island, and this had infuriated Herbert.

100. Navy Department General Order No. 421, 14 March 1894, NHF.

101. Taylor to Luce, 8 February 1894, NHF.

102. *Ibid.*

103. Taylor to Luce, 28 December 1893; Lodge to Luce, 3 September 1894, NHF.

104. Taylor to Luce, 5 August 1895, NHF.

105. H.A. Herbert, "The Sea and Sea Power as a Factor in the History of the United States," *USNIP*, vol.. 22, 1896, p. 574. Opening address at the 1896 session of the War College.

106. Navy Department General Order No. 496, 16 August 1898.

107. Bradley Fiske, "Stephen B. Luce, An Appreciation," *USNIP*, September 1917, p. 1939.

To some extent, American perceptions of the Reich Navy were formed or affected by Admiral Erich Raeder's My Life. This paper is an analysis of the control of professional perception, perception of the past that was considered vital to the future of the interwar German navy, and Raeder's role in deliberately adopting and encouraging the distortion of history.

THE ORIGINS AND ROLE OF GERMAN NAVAL HISTORY IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 1918-1939

by

Keith W. Bird

In 1919, *Grossadmiral* von Tirpitz lamented the "tragic fate" of Germany's attempt to become a seapower with the words: "the German people do not understand the sea."[1] Tirpitz, however, remained confident that a "thorough and fair history" would vindicate the creation of the Imperial Navy's High Seas Fleet.[2] In the years that followed, the policies of Tirpitz and the Imperial Navy's role in World War I were vigorously defended by a coalition of retired and active naval officers, historians and civilian supporters. Their goal was to establish the Republic's "lilliputian navy" as the legitimate successor to the *Kaiserliche Marine* and build the foundations for a future German fleet.[3] The recording of Imperial Germany's rise and fall at sea was therefore a sensitive and critical issue closely tied to the navy's "right to existence." Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the navy's leaders insisted upon a close involvement with the naval archives and the monitoring of all official or unofficial publications.

Burdened with the onus of having been the "bearer of revolution" from the left (naval mutinies 1917-1918) and right (Kapp *Putsch* 1920), the navy could not ignore the importance of public opinion—especially when there was open talk of dissolving the navy altogether.[4] Where the officers did acknowledge internally their shortcomings and failures in World War I as well as their lack of political discretion in the Republic, they could not do so publicly and deliberately adopted and encouraged the publishing of a distorted view of the past.[5] This deception was paralleled by the navy's attempt to disguise its long-range objectives of recreating a *Weltflotte* as represented by its attempts to "pass off" the new

Panzerschiff as being designed exclusively for coastal defense in the Baltic and North Seas.[6]

The consequences of the navy's efforts to rewrite its past and create a tradition that would support its aspirations led to an attitude of isolation and distance from the government and society of Weimar Germany. The need to protect certain "principles" such as the importance of battleships over U-boats also prevented the navy from adequately studying the implications of its tactics and strategy in World War I.[7] Because naval writing and the development of naval strategy rested upon the interpretation of the historical evidence, the navy's influencing or manipulation of its history became self-defeating.[8] The failure of German naval history writing "to re-examine the strategic implications of the political decision to build the High Seas Fleet" was certainly "as much institutional as individual" and closely tied to the circumstances of the interwar period.[9] The "intellectual impoverishment" of German strategic thinking was a direct result of the navy's fixation on what the officer corps described as their "national task"—the reestablishment of German seapower.[10] Only the tradition of the High Seas Fleet promised to return the navy to its pre-1914 preeminence in foreign policy and the national defense budget.

At the same time, the rigid adherence to prescribed guidelines for writing or discussing the Imperial Navy served as a means of disciplining and mobilizing the officer corps shaken by defeat and with no visible future under the restrictive terms of the Versailles Treaty.[11]

The need to restore the unity of the officer corps and provide the political basis for the navy's "second bid for *Weltmacht*" culminates in the policies of the new navy chief, Erich Raeder, in 1928. Raeder's active involvement in the perpetuation of the Imperial Navy's world view reveals the continuity that characterizes the navy's selective interpretation of its brief tradition through the Weimar period into the Third Reich.

Intellectual Foundations of German Navalism. The building of a German navy and a naval tradition where none had existed before could not proceed without the development of political, military, and strategic foundations. Imperial Germany's *Baumeister*, Tirpitz, not only created these foundations but succeeded, by the creation of a unique and efficient political propaganda arm, the *Reichsmarineamt's Nachrichtenbureau*, in successfully maintaining "a kind of naval-political coalition" for over one and a half decades in support of Germany's sea interests.[12] To provide the intellectual justification for the fleet and create a popular base, Tirpitz had concluded quite early that an approach to the "educated class" was essential and therefore sought to win the support of Germany's university professors.[13]

As events proved, it was not difficult in the context of the imperialistic *Zeitgeist* for the navy to enlist the support of prominent university professors in writing articles that justified "the economic necessity of the navy and its importance as a political power-factor."[14] Although Tirpitz and his subordinates were able to manipulate the timing and placement of such articles and even to suggest "guidelines," the avalanche of scholarly articles supporting imperial sea interests represented a unique conception of history that affected both scholars and officers alike and that would continue to form the world view of postwar naval writers.[15]

The legacy of Ranke's political historicism, the political realism and deification of the state as represented by the writings of Treitschke merged with the Social-Darwinist basis of navalism in the works of Mahan. The message of Mahan's *Influence of Seapower upon*

History provided a bridge between the professors and the navy as well as serving as a cohesive theoretical base for the naval officer corps that justified the navy's claims over the army. According to Mahan, history had demonstrated that a power with trade and cultural interests overseas required a strong fleet to expand. The attempt of a nation to become a World Power and secure colonies could only be done at the expense of others.[16] After World War I and what they interpreted as a jealous attempt to prevent Germany from attaining its legitimate great power status, the officers maintained their faith in the "historical principles" as revealed by Mahan that promised a rebirth of German seapower.[17] The influence of Mahan on German strategy and naval construction policies, with his emphasis on the battle and battleships and his relegation of commerce-raiding as a "secondary operation," proved to be just as pervasive in the period after the First World War as before. The influence of Mahan pervaded German naval planning because it conformed to the already existing conceptions of history and reinforced the "short-war" philosophy that dominated German strategy as did the tradition of Clausewitz and Schlieffen.[18]

The attempt to justify the German Fleet from the study of the past and the close collaboration between historians and the naval officers can best be summed up in Dietrich Schafer's statement to Tirpitz in 1897 that "the lessons of history point incontrovertibly to the way that the Admiralty is endeavoring to take."[19] The propaganda machinery established by Tirpitz also left a tradition and a practice of officially and unofficially influencing public opinion that would be used in the Republic to keep the idea of German seapower alive and vindicate the building of the High Seas Fleet.

The Defense of the Imperial Navy. The failure of the German High Seas Fleet in 1914-1918 and the naval mutinies constituted a national humiliation. The "darling" of the middle class and the symbol of German national unity had betrayed Reich and Kaiser.[20] In the year immediately following the war, the officers were concerned to show that they had played their part. Hearing, for example, that the percentage of sea officers' losses was greater than army officers', a group of officers asked the Personnel Office to confirm this and publish it if it were true. While this could be done, it was noted that it meant "playing games with figures."[21] Believing the navy to be "cursed" (Scheer) and frustrated by the new Republic's antimilitarism, the navy's former leaders eagerly entered into a public debate with each other as well as the navy's civilian critics.[22] Sharply limited by the Versailles Treaty, the officers of the Reichsmarine encouraged and supported their former comrades until the frequency and tone of the arguments threatened the unity of the officer corps and the future of the young Weimar navy.[23]

Many of the issues that had been argued during the war continued into the interwar period: origins and justification of the Imperial Navy; the effect of the German Navy on English-German relations; the role of Tirpitz; the "holding back" of the High Seas Fleet; and the battle of Jutland (Skagerrak).[24] The origins and objectives of the 1918 *Flottenvorstoss*, the naval mutinies and the scuttling of the fleet in Scapa Flow in 1919 represented new debating issues.[25] As the officer corps struggled to define the "official" interpretation of these issues, the acceptance or rejection of the navy's point of view constituted guidelines for determining friend from foe.[26]

Against external critics, the navy and its supporters employed effective countermeasures learned during the Tirpitz era. Organizing a network of retired and active officers, sailors, newspaper editors, writers, etc., the former leaders of the Imperial Navy (Levetzow, Trotha, Scheer) used the press, the Reichstag's

"Special Committee to Investigate the Causes of Germany's Collapse" and artificially created events such as the Munich Dolchstoss trial to carry out the defense.[27] In order to discredit hostile politicians and writers (including former officers), the naval command actively supplied official material to this network as well as stocking public lectures with "battle ready and well-informed young officers."[28] Attempts to enlist the support of the Defense Ministry in combating criticism did not find sympathy and, in fact, caused the government to question the necessity of a *Nachrichtenbüro* in the naval command.[29]

The campaign to rehabilitate the navy's image, however, led to a division of the navy's supporters into two hostile camps, pro and contra Tirpitz. The press and memoirs gave an opportunity for the officers to settle "old scores" with their one-time rivals. Support for Tirpitz also had political implications as the debate involved choosing between the Kaiser and Tirpitz thereby, as some officers warned, endangering the cause of monarchism.[30]

The opening salvo of this internecine struggle was the publication of Tirpitz's memoirs in 1919. In his attempt to justify his policies, Tirpitz blamed the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg for the "holding back" of the High Seas Fleet. By holding the political leadership responsible for the failure of the Imperial Navy, Tirpitz provided the foundation for what was to become the central argument in the navy's defense.[31] Unfortunately, Tirpitz did not hesitate to attack his former naval colleagues for their role in the navy's demise.[32] Outraged, the officers at first protested these statements and then sought redress through the press.[33] As the war of memoirs and publications became more intense, the naval command and several of the older officers realized that the spectacle of the navy "washing its dirty linen" in public was directly playing into the hands of the navy's critics.[34] In 1927, Prince Heinrich of Prussia sought to end the frequent confrontations of "wounded vanity" (Admiral Keyserlingk's term) by circulating an appeal for a "cease-fire."[35] Using his senior and royal status, Prince Heinrich reminded the officers of the imperial officers' code of honor and asked the officers to concentrate their literary endeavors on one goal—"the recovery of the Fatherland"; the officers should refrain from further political writing and turn over any documents or personal statements to the naval archives. Heinrich deplored the damage to the unity of the officers corps caused by the proliferation of such writings and pointed out that it was doubtful whether these self-defensive writings would influence historians one way or another.[36]

The conflict and widespread publicity not only affected both active and inactive officers but also threatened the future of the *Reichsmarine*. Criticism of the prewar naval policy raised questions about the credibility of the postwar construction plans and strategy and invited unwanted comparisons. In 1932, for example, after listening to a foreign service officer lecture a group of young naval officers, the senior officer complained that even these "national-minded" men in the Foreign Office demonstrated their inability to understand the navy's sensitivity about its prewar naval policy.

> Those who criticized the navy's pre-war policy fail to recognize that the entire question is not only historical but also quite relevant and is [to be viewed] in the framework of a discussion of the post-war or future foreign policy. It is important because Germany can again be placed on the level of a World Power of the future with similar questions of *Flottenpolitik* and the word of the false *Flottenpolitik* before 1919 can so easily stand in the way of such a future.

> From such frequently repeated and unchecked views a psychosis can, under the circumstances, develop which stands in the way of a sound judgement (see Herrn Hittler) [sic!].[37]

"Psychosis," however, more accurately characterized the romantic "presumptuousness" of the navy that expected foreign policy to serve naval planning. The navy refused to accept its secondary role in national defense and "conform naval strategy more closely to continental realities."[38] Products of the Mahan-Tirpitz era, the navy's leaders considered their task as a stewardship to keep the ideas of *Seegeltung* and *Weltflotte* alive until the nation could "heal" itself from its current sickness (i.e., the Republic).[39] The primary mission of the officer corps was to maintain the spirit of the past and the hope for a future battle fleet. The officers were acutely aware that the Weimar navy was so confined by ship numbers and size that it had "no worth whatsoever."[40] Yet, it was necessary to defend the navy's role as "essential for coastal defense" in order to justify its existence.[41] The navy, therefore, tolerated the public's view of the navy as an auxiliary arm of the army as a necessary expedient.[42] According to one officer, "the belief that the future of the German people lies on the water must fix itself in the officer corps as a dogma of unshakeable certainty."[43] Training in the *Reichsmarine* assumed that Germany would someday be allowed to possess a fleet commensurate with its resources and needs and officers should be trained to be the leaders of a much larger force. The officers, therefore, regarded both the *Reichsmarine* and the Weimar Republic as transitions.[44] Essential to the navy's anti-Weimar "revisionist" policies was its conviction that the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty would not remain in force for very long. This attitude led directly to the navy's secret rearmament and its attempts to "subvert" any attempt at official investigation.[45] The Lohmann scandal of 1928 was doubly dangerous because it threatened public exposure of the navy's policy of subversion against the Treaty and its intent to pursue the same expansionist naval policies as the Tirpitz navy.[46] It also revealed the navy's command deficiencies that permitted these secret activities to be carried out with no supervision in order to carry out an official "cover-up" if discovered.[47]

This high sense of purpose and belief in the navy's future sustained the officers through the crippling terms of the Versailles Treaty, the economic crises and the constant criticism of its past and present role in national defense. The emphasis on leadership in the officers' education also reflected the determination to avoid a repetition of the naval mutinies that they privately recognized had been "primarily" their fault.[48]

It is no wonder then, particularly during the early days of the Republic when the navy lacked ships, that the officers and supporters of the navy repeatedly emphasized the role of ideas and the need for a close involvement with the recording of naval history. Wolfgang Wegener, whose controversial (anti-Tirpitz) strategical-theoretical studies in the interwar period can also be viewed as an attempt to reaffirm the role that the Imperial Navy had enjoyed *vis-à-vis* the army and foreign policy strongly reminded his fellow officers of the role of ideas and the lessons of the World War.

> It is always ideas that govern the world. We have before us a historical example of how a vital fleet becomes a coastal navy by means of ideas. Therefore, we may also hope that the opposite may be true—that today, when our navy is materially so weak, it may again be ideas that in spite of every weakness save the navy from the

> intellectual emptiness of a coastal navy and give it the high value of a *Traditionsmarine* for the future.[49]

The supporters of a strong navy also remembered and sought to remind their readers or listeners of the social-integration role that the fleet building had played in Wilhelmian society and could play again in the future. According to their conception, the Imperial Navy had been the "melting pot" of the nation "carried by the love and the recognition of the entire people."[50] As Admiral Trotha argued, the navy

> was the most pure expression of the national feeling of the German people. It is thus the thermometer for the strength of the pure German race and . . . the power of [the] German state—the weatherglass for the weakening of these factors.[51]

Recalling the popular enthusiasm for a fleet, the naval officers of the Republic deeply resented the estrangement of the navy from large segments of the population—a situation that they blamed on the antimilitary attacks of the Social Democrats and other leftist, pacifistic groups. It was difficult to forget that the founders and major supporters of the Weimar constitution were, for the navy, the same individuals and groups who before 1918, had represented the "internal enemy" that the building of a fleet would help to overcome.[52] The political consequences of the Tirpitz legacy, in addition to the dream of reestablishing German seapower, also reinforced the navy's desire for a forceful and dynamic leader whose will would focus all energies on one goal.[53]

The Official Naval Histories. In 1919, Admiral v. Mantey, head of the *Marinearchiv*, brought together a group of young officers to begin preparing the history of the naval war. Because the treaty prohibited the establishment of a naval academy, Mantey also hoped to utilize this duty to serve as the officers' naval staff training.[54] The substitution of historical studies for the development of operational studies for the postwar navy was, of course, quite understandable given the material and personnel difficulties.[55] Unlike the *Reichsarchiv* series for the land war, the *Marinearchiv's War at Sea* was not under civilian control and its volumes were written by active and inactive naval officers. While there is some controversy over the scholarship of the naval series, they were clearly written for two purposes: to describe in detail the numerous operations and actions involving the units of the Imperial Navy and to paint a heroic picture of the war at sea and the positive accomplishments of the navy for the public. The series would thereby provide the justification for the navy's existence and intellectual basis for its rebuilding.[56] The introduction to Volume One of *Der Krieg in der Nordsee* (the first in the series) states this unequivocally:

> Every volume should make the German people conscious of what deeds were performed on all seas by its navy and the men who created and lead it and what it [the German people] has lost through the loss of its seapower.[57]

Although the author of this foreword continued to say that the recognition of the lessons and errors of the war would prepare a basis for the rebuilding of Germany's seapower, it is perhaps more revealing to quote the words of the head of the Naval Archives speaking privately to a group of naval staff officers.

> . . . . History should not be written for the purpose of tearing down but for building up. Therefore, with marked failures, much must be done to cover them with love, because history must be constructive . . . . History writing must therefore be conceived as a

> part of building one's character. Not intelligence but character plays the [critical] role in war . . . .[58]

Entrusting the writing of the official histories to the officers also allowed them the opportunity to include their personal biases. Mantey and Widenmann, for example, parted ways over the former's description of the origins of the High Seas Fleet's "turning maneuver" *(Gefechtswendung)* as a result of *Grossadmiral* von Koester's policies. Mantey complained to Raeder that Koester, who also happened to be Mantey's father-in-law, had actually fought the use of this maneuver which had proved so useful in the battle of Jutland.[59] Although the official series' division of the topics into theaters of operations and methods of naval leadership prevented an overall view of the conduct of the war at sea, the authors' adherence to Tirpitz and his conception of the origins and problems of German naval strategy as well as a reluctance to risk confrontation with the Grand Admiral himself precluded any critical investigation. Given the officers' conviction that history would repeat itself and, therefore, the need to preserve the unity of the officer corps for the sake of the future fleet, it is no wonder that "most of the investigations of the basic strategical problems and conceptions remained incorrect, uncritical and one-sided."[60] Nor should it be surprising to learn from the private papers of Tirpitz, Trotha or Groos how the latter worked closely with the "old Admirals" in writing his volumes on the North Sea.[61] Frequently, the officers would send proofs of their memoirs of official writings to Tirpitz for his review and comments and then revise their manuscripts accordingly.[62]

The consequences of this careful attention to the Tirpitz line for the reasons described above, proved to be greatest in the evaluation of the U-boat war and the possibility of alternative strategies (Denmark-Norway).[63] The "official" description of German naval alternatives was as follows: "because of the unfavorable geographical situation the destruction of the English and the protection of German sea commerce could only be achieved . . . through fighting for command of the sea by a series of successful battles."[64] Those who supported a more aggressive submarine campaign were classified as opponents of Tirpitz and dismissed as "*U-Boots Fanatikern.*"[65] The Tirpitz "school" argued that an emphasis on the U-boat detracted from the role of the High Seas Fleet and was of secondary importance (Mahan). It is indicative of the reputation of the naval archives that Dönitz did not read the later volumes of *Handelskrieg mit U-Booten* because he had concluded that the *Marinearchiv's* treatment of submarine warfare was essentially negative.[66] Ironically, while the older officers sought to protect Tirpitz, the younger officers, influenced by the writings of Wegener, began to grow restless with the domination of Tirpitz in "not only our maritime reconstruction from the types [of vessels] to the tactics but also our strategic thinking."[67] The attack on the "great uniformity and rigidity of opinions" that occurred in the mid-20s and the "intellectual impoverishment" that was to characterize German naval strategy paralleled the growing public debate (described earlier) and would constitute a major problem for the new naval chief, Erich Raeder, in 1928.[68]

Raeder and the Regulation of Naval Studies. The appointment of Erich Raeder as Naval Chief in 1928 promised a new era. Raeder, a product of Tirpitz's *Nachrichtenbüro* and veteran of Skagerrak, appeared to be the best choice if the officer corps was to heal its internal problems and secure the *Reichsmarine's* new *Panzerschiff.*[69] Raeder was fully aware that the "tradition-carrying"

value of the Imperial Navy must be preserved if it was to be of use to the new navy.[70] Raeder's two volumes on *Kreuzerkrieg* did indeed pay homage to his former commander's conception of the secondary role of cruiser operation. As did other writers in the official series, he corresponded regularly with Tirpitz as his work progressed. In 1921, for example, he thanked Tirpitz for his review and comments on the manuscript proofs and indicated that he had endeavored "to integrate the valuable inspirations which you [Tirpitz] gave me . . . ."[71]

Shortly after his appointment, Raeder obediently "reported in" to his mentor. After reviewing the difficult political obstacles, Raeder asked Tirpitz for his blessing.[72] Tirpitz replied that Raeder's more important task was to educate the public—a task that Raeder understood well.[73] In spite of the Raeder navy's much vaunted "unpolitical" stance, Raeder indeed saw his role as navy chief as a political one if he was to rehabilitate the navy's reputation and secure the Reichstag's approval of the *Panzerschiff* program.[74] Although the navy had maintained an effective "lobbying" apparatus to support its annual budget requests, Raeder's attempt to conduct a Tirpitz-style propaganda campaign for the *Panzerschiff* was met with some resistance in the office of the *Wehrmachtabteilung* whose leader, Kurt von Schleicher complained to the Defense Minister:

> one [Raeder] makes the finest proposals to me about private conversations with prominent [people] of Reichstag deputies or naval writers, etc. and was, I believe, disappointed over my unfeelingness.[75]

The retired officers were enthusiastic about Raeder's appointment as he was regarded as the man who "could bring the old schooling to the leadership of the navy."[76] From Raeder's standpoint the weakness of the Imperial Navy and the *Reichsmarine* had been a result of a lack of centralized authority and command—a mistake he was determined not to make.[77] Raeder's emphasis on the authority of the naval command *(Marineleitung)* and the importance of the tradition of the Imperial Navy for the *Reichsmarine* can be seen in his treatment of the naval archives; Kurt Assmann, Mantey's successor as head of the naval archives, described Raeder's influence as a constant and pervasive one. ". . . he was concerned above all that through our work the great achievements of the navy and its men in battle . . . would be shown to the German people in the best light." The retired admirals, according to Assmann, frequently used their personal relationships with Raeder to influence historical studies according to their interpretations. In the confrontation that followed one of these occasions Assmann told Raeder, "I am convinced that it makes no difference to you, Herrn Admiral, what we write . . . We must only write in such a way that you have peace from the old Admirals."[78]

The effectiveness of the "old boy" network and the concerns of the retired officers during this period can be demonstrated by the Trotha-Levetzow correspondence over the preparations for a new volume in the official history series. In May 1933 Trotha wrote to Levetzow requesting his help in "assisting" the new head of the naval archives, Assmann, and a Captain Weniger who was working on the post-1916 naval operations. Trotha was alarmed that Weniger was "not suitable" for such a study. Although he was a

> precise and technically thorough individual he worked much too bureaucratically and was incapable of handling the details to ascertain why one decision was made and not another. Without having any proclivity for this kind of writing, the most he could do is

thoroughly sort through the mass of materials.[79]

More seriously, Trotha was very concerned that Weniger was too deeply influenced by the documents from the *Admiralstab* and would "mistakenly" indicate that, after the battle of Jutland, the initiative in naval operations was assumed by that office.

> . . . since he did not have combat experience, it would not be possible for Weniger to realize the difficulty in preparing a major fleet operation and the burden and limitations which the U-Boat war presented to the fleet.[80]

It was important that Levetzow become involved, warned Trotha, because

> even if present-day questions demand more from us as it is, we must not allow these occurrences of the past with their extraordinarily great historical worth to be ruined. The time will come soon enough when no one can represent our interests anymore . . . . We are obligated to help him [Assmann] in his new duties to do justice to the greatness of his work.[81]

Levetzow concurred with Trotha and sent appropriate materials to aid Weniger's understanding. He agreed that he did not see how it was possible to describe correctly what had occurred without the involvement of those who were direct participants.

> In any case, I am in the opinion that neither Weniger nor Assmann is in the position [to describe these events] because the War Diary and whatever other reports might exist will scarcely be sufficient. It [the writing] will remain a skeleton without flesh and blood.[82]

If the purpose of the two admirals had been to prevent Weniger from writing one of the official series, they succeeded. The remaining volumes of the *War in the North Sea* would not be published until 1937 (2) and 1965 (1) by Admiral Gladisch.[83] Perhaps as a result of the controversy described above, in 1934 Raeder demonstrated his firm intention to put an end to the quarreling over the history of the Imperial Navy. Henceforth, he directed that all naval writing would be coordinated through Admiral von Trotha. "Further, I have ordered that as long as I am *Marinechef* no publications concerning the war at sea (Fleet) can be issued which your Excellency is not completely in agreement with."[84]

Raeder's deference to Trotha was in part a recognition of Trotha's role as "founder" of the officer corps of the *Reichsmarine* and *Kriegsmarine*. Trotha also represented the pro-Tirpitz stamp that was necessary for the rebuilding of the German Navy.[85] Although Assmann claims that Tirpitz was "tabu" for Raeder "which not even the lightest shadow could fall upon" and an "idol" for Trotha, the motivation for Raeder's protection of the Tirpitz legend was closely tied to the navy's need for cohesion and sense of purpose.[86] That Raeder himself had an objective view of the Tirpitz heritage can be seen in his directions to Captain Widenmann who had been assigned the task of writing the official "History of the Imperial Navy 1871-1914."[87] In establishing "guidelines" for this study, Raeder indicated that Widenmann must thoroughly investigate the question of the top command of the navy under Tirpitz. Although Raeder stated that he acknowledged the justification that Trotha provided for Tirpitz's rejection of a strong leadership of the Imperial Navy, he did not agree with them "since the false organization . . . an error attributable to Tirpitz led to the poor leadership of the navy in war."[88]

Raeder's concern about Widenmann's treatment of Tirpitz illustrates his awareness that historical studies concerning the navy had both internal and external consequences that must be

considered in the context of the period. During the turbulent debates over the *Panzerschiff* building program, Raeder reacted strongly to criticism (or comparisons) of the prewar *Flottenbau*. The navy was particularly concerned about the new Defense Minister, Wilhelm Groener, a former General Staff officer whose postwar writings had been critical of the Imperial Navy. Groener's public statements since assuming his post also alarmed the navy.[89] Fortunately, as Raeder later officially reported to his officers, Groener's criticisms had been simply a "ploy" by the new *Reichswehrminister* to build his credibility so that he could better support the navy's rebuilding program in the Reichstag debates.[90]

Raeder also attempted to suppress anti-Tirpitz works that were outside the navy's control. In 1927, for example, he and Trotha had sought to prevent publication abroad of Emil Alboldt's *Die Tragodie der alten deutschen Marine.*[91] Listed in the "Enemy of the Navy" files, Alboldt had been a leading critic of Tirpitz and incorporated material in his book from the Reichstag Investigating Committee to prove how the evidence implicated the "highest military caste itself"—the naval officer corps. As if the familiar criticisms of the Imperial Navy were not enough, Alboldt argued in his foreword that the officer corps' failings in the World War were related to their political activities in the Republic and warned that they intended "to steer the old false course in the rebuilding of the fleet."[92]

The period's only serious challenge from the historical profession to the navy's conception of its past came from a student of Meinicke, Eckart Kehr. Given access to the naval archives, Kehr began his dissertation research on *Flottenbau* from the diplomatic-political perspective but the documents soon revealed the "influence of politics by economics and the social system" that was "especially intensive" in the question of naval rearmament.[93] His first article on the building of the Imperial Navy, wrote Kehr, sent this Ministry into a rage. "The *Herrenschaft* have 18 points which they object to. They want to forbid the article entirely and brought the matter to Gessler . . . ."[94] Gessler, however, ordered the publication released unconditionally which, according to Kehr, left "one group panting for revenge . . . and the other petty and hateful."[95]

The publication of Kehr's revised and expanded dissertation *Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894-1901* in 1930 did not, as expected, receive any praise from the naval publicists but, as probably directed by Raeder, they refused to become involved in any real debate with him that might give his ideas more circulation. As Kehr became increasingly more dogmatic and extreme, he became easy to dismiss as a revisionist rebel to his fellow historians and a "Red" to the military.[96] Ironically, the officers and naval writers had always claimed that the navy was closely involved with domestic politics and economic issues and privately read Kehr's book with interest.[97]

Even under National Socialism, with its strong emphasis on the military, the navy proved equally as sensitive to criticism. For Raeder, Hitler simply represented another personality like Groener, Schleicher, Brüning, and Blomberg who had to be "educated" in naval matters.[98] In 1937, Raeder suppressed one publication because "from political [necessities] and above all navy policy, it is unconditionally necessary to hold back all publications contra Tirpitz."[99] The work that apparently resulted in this decision was a history of the *Admiralstab* by Admiral Bachmann in which the author showed the weaknesses of the Tirpitz fleet building that affected the navy to its disadvantage in the war![100] This was simply too ill-timed and sensitive a topic to be openly discussed given the rebuilding of

Germany's navy under the Third Reich and considering Hitler's technical and strategic criticisms of the High Seas Fleet.[101] Raeder had worked hard to win Hitler over to the navy's conception of its long-range "World-Political" role and secure a large battleship building program.[102] Not wanting to have this book used by the navy's rivals in the battle for the major share of Hitler's rearmament program nor allow it to be used for generating dissent within the navy, Raeder ordered that the existence of this book was to be hushed up totally.[103] The Archive's chief, however was instructed to ignore neither the historical evidence nor other writings but "to collect all material for the distant future" because "in say 50 years it will be necessary to record our period correctly."[104] As the pace of the building quickened, Raeder also ordered that all divisions maintain records in order that they might be used for later historical studies.[105]

As the navy found itself unexpectedly in war, a bitter Raeder wrote:

> Today the War against England and France broke out which, according to the Führer's previous assertions, we had no need to expect before 1944 . . . . The surface forces . . . are so inferior in number and strength . . . that they can do do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are willing to create the foundations for later reconstruction.[106]

In this statement, Raeder not only affirmed the navy's determination to avoid the mistakes of World War I but that the Tirpitz dream of a *Weltflotte* must survive even another defeat.

After Raeder's resignation in 1943 and the shift of Germany to the defensive, the task of preparing for the reconstruction of German seapower began anew. In 1944, Widenmann was given guidelines to be used in writing "The Naval Policies of the Imperial Navy from 1871-1914" in which he was directed to emphasize the state-political and national necessities for a navy.[107] True to the tradition of German navalism, Widenmann was to consider seapower as a *sine qua non* of achieving *Grossmacht* status. The High Seas Fleet of World War I had not been built "out of whim or the serious convictions of individual leading personalities such as Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II" but had "sprung from a great people."[108] The slogan *Seefahrt ist Not* which had been the watchword of the Imperial Navy, the *Reichsmarine*, and the *Kriegsmarine*, was to continue in order to serve as the beacon for a future German navy.

Conclusion. For the navy, history served to record the great deeds of the past without embarrassment to those living in the present. Because of the importance of ideas to keep the "traumatized" officer corps intact and the sense of purpose high, the leaders of the navy did not hesitate to re-create selected events into myths such as the German victory at Jutland (Skagerrak) and the saving of German naval honor (scuttling the High Seas Fleet) at Scapa Flow. Unlike the army which did not have to justify its existence and without ships and with little political or public enthusiasm for a navy, the naval leaders and officers used historical studies as a substitute and a tool. The public debate over the prewar *Flottenbau* and the conduct of the war at sea represented Germany's unwillingness to accept the defeat of its armed forces in 1918 that had been "unconquered in battle" but betrayed by the homefront (the *Dolchstoss* theory). The bitter exchanges between the navy's former leaders and their supporters threatened the unity of the naval officer corps and endangered the course of the navy's rebuilding. To criticize or even closely investigate the prewar policies was to challenge and risk a confrontation with Tirpitz. The leaders of the navy and

particularly Erich Raeder realized that if Tirpitz was discredited, the navy would lose its tradition and be forced to rethink its historic and future role in national defense. The opportunity to break with the past and explore new directions and strategic alternatives was ignored in favor of maintaining a view of the future that included a large blue-water navy.[109] The fear of becoming a mere "coast guard" contributed to the sterility of German naval thought and planning. As the war games show, the navy proved incapable of resolving the historic "dualism" (*Handelskrieg* vs. the *Entscheidungschacht*) and still clung to the Tirpitz concept that Germany must develop *Bundnisfahigkeit*.[110] During the period of the navy's first major reconstruction efforts following the war (the *Panzerschiff*), the navy could not tolerate any criticism of its prewar policy that might invite comparisons or a closer examination of the strategic ambitions behind the new ships. This sensitivity persisted into the Third Reich until the closing years of the Second World War when, under the pressure of war, the "coordination" of the military into National Socialism was complete. Immediately following the total defeat of Nazi Germany, the debate began anew with the "pro-navy" historians maintaining the same vigilance that they had demonstrated in the interwar period for the pendulum swing for or against Tirpitz.[111] The study of German naval history itself has become a key topic in the revisionist debate over the continuity or discontinuity of German history from the founding of the Empire to the Third Reich. This debate, fueled by the accessibility of the naval archives, continues today with the same intensity and emotion as in the interwar period.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Keith W. Bird received his Ph.D. degree in military history from Duke University and his articles and reviews have appeared in many journals including *American Historical Review*, *Armed Forces and Society* and *Military Affairs*. His is the author of *Weimar, the German Naval Officer Corps and the Rise of National Socialism* and a forthcoming book on German Naval Bibliography. He is assistant professor of history and Director of the Continuing Education Division, University of Bridgeport.

NOTES

1. Alfred von Tirpitz, *Erinnerungen* (Leipzig: Koehler, 1919), p. 387.

2. *Ibid.* Cf. Erich Raeder, *Mein Leben* (Tübingen: Schlichtenmayer, 1956 and 1957). These two volumes were written by Erich Förste who organized—in the absence of documents—the reports and accounts of commanders and department heads. These were presented to Raeder for his reaction and approval before the final version was written. The story of the manuscript can be found in the Förste *Nachlass*, N328, *Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv* (BAMA).

3. The term "lilliputian navy" was used by Admiral (Ret.) von Levetzow, a close political confidant of Raeder and a central figure in the organization of rightist "national" movements in Weimar Germany in a letter to Guidotto Donnersmarck, 7 June 1928, Levetzow *Nachlass*, Box 7, Bd. 30, BAMA.

4. See Michaelis *Nachlass* 164/5, BAMA for the precarious state of the navy in 1928-30. "Bearer of Revolutions" is from Otto Gessler, *Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer Zeit* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958), p. 146.

5. For a discussion of the political struggles of the navy in the Weimar period, see Keith W. Bird, *Weimar, The German Naval Officer Corps and the Rise of National Socialism* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977). Because they admitted their responsibility in the naval mutinies, the navy put increased emphasis on leadership and discipline (*innere Führung*). See, for example, the postwar *Denkschrift* of v. Meerscheidt-Hüllessen (classified secret and personal) on the failure of the naval officer corps, H/M 1951/4, BAMA.

6. See Michael Salewski, "England, Hitler und die Marine," *Von Sinn der Geschichte* (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlad, 1976), cf. Werner Rahn, *Reichsmarine und Landesverteidigung 1919-1928* (Munich: Bernard und Graefe, 1976), pp. 233-246.

7. See, for example, Dr. True's remarks concerning AIIA 2057/32 Gkdos., "Denkschrift über den Flottenbau 1926-1939," III M 151/1, BAMA.

8. Cf. Theodore Ropp's comment on British strategic discussions in "Continental Doctrines of Sea Power," *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 454. Cf. the emphasis the Soviets put on history in Gorshkov's writings. Tobias Philbin, "Reflections on the Strategy of a Continental Commander: Admiral Franz Hipper on Naval Warfare," *Naval War College Review*, Fall 1977, p. 81.

9. See Theodore Ropp's paper, "German Sea Power: A Study in Failure," C.I.I.A. Sea Power Conference, 3 March 1972.

10. See Edward Wegener's "Selbstverstandnis und historisches Bewusstsein der deutschen Kriegsmarine," *Marine Rundschau*, June 1970, pp. 321-340. Cf. Michael Salewski's article (with the same title) that prompted Wegener's in *Marine Rundschau*, February 1970, pp. 65-88.

11. This paper is intended to serve as an outline for a larger work on the German Navy. The activities during this period can be compared with the activities of the RMA's *Nachrichtenbureau*. See Wilhelm Deist's *Flottenpolitik und Flottenpropaganda* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976).

12. Cf. Deist, p. 328.

13. For a description of these activities see Deist; Wolfgang Marienfeld, *Wissenschaft und Schlachtflottenbau in Deutschland 1897-1906* (Berlin-Frankfurt: Mittler und Sohn, 1952).

14. Deist, p. 102.

15. See Eckart Kehr's classic *Battleship Building and Party Polities* (Chicago: Historische Studien, 1930), p. 377.

16. See Volker Berghahn, *Der Tirpitz-Plan* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1971), pp. 177-178 for the influence of Mahan on the Imperial Navy.

17. See, for example, Bendix V. Bargen, ed., *Persönliches, Briefe, Reden und Aufzeichnungen 1920-1937* (Berlin: Marneck, 1938), p. 16. Also, Admiral Hollweg, "Das Versailles Diktat und die deutschen Seeinteressen," *Nauticus*, XVLL, 1923, pp. xvii-xxviii.

18. See the German translation of Jacques de Prevaux's article on strategic foundations of the German Navy which appeared in *La Revue Maritime*, 1938, and OKM Seekriegsleitung, K 10/2/88, BAMA.

19. Kehr, p. 409.

20. For the navy's place in Wilhelmian society see Gerhard Bidlingmaier, *Seegeltung in der deutschen Seeoffizierkorps* (Darmstadt: Wehr and Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1967), p. 81; Wahrhold Drascher, "Zur Sociologie des deutschen Seeoffizierkorps," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, October 1962, pp. 555-569; and Jonathan Steinberg, *Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battlefleet* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 36-46.

21. See Seeoffiziervereiningung Ostsee, Kiel, 26 May 1919, von Hornhardt to Püllen, Personalamt des RMA with *Notizen*, RM3/9653, BAMA.

22. See Reinhardt Scheer, *Deutschlands Hochseeflotte in Weltkrieg* (Berlin: August Scherl, 1920), p. 11. After the Kapp *Putsch*, Prince Heinrich of Prussia characterized the navy as *Misthaufen* but he would try to help and would be in contact with the shipyards in an attempt to support *Seefahrt*. Trotha *Nachlass*, 260 Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv Bückeburg.

23. See Bird, pp. 7-27. For the naval terms and their impact of the Versailles Treaty, see Alexander Meuer, "Die deutschen Marine zu Beginn der 80er Jahre and Heute.Ein Vergleich," *Marine Rundschau*, February 1926, pp. 58-66.

24. For the most recent debate concerning these issues see the collection of essays from the 1970 Kirchzarten conference on the Imperial Navy and *Flottenpolitik* in *Marine und Marinepolitik 1871-1914* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1972) especially Friedrich Forstmeier's "Der Tirpitzsche Flottenbau im Urteil der Historiker," pp. 34-53.

25. For the most recent discussion of the controversy over naval mutinies and their role in the navy's collapse see Bird; Holger Herwig, *The German Naval Officer Corps: A Social and Political History 1890-1918* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

26. See the description of the navy's opponents in "Innere Unruhen," RWM, "Feinde der Marine," II M65/8, BAMA.

27. See Bird, pp. 18-20. Adm. Magnus von Levetzow also was involved in organizing the officers against these attacks. See, for example, his letters to Krah (12 January 1930) and Raeder (10 November 1931) in Levetzow *Nachlass*, Box 7, Bd. 33 and 34, BAMA.

28. See Raeder, p. 158; *Feinde der Marine*, II M 65/8 BAMA. In a letter to Scheibe (*Nachrichtenbüro*), Admiral Hollweg requested new material in order to write the articles which

Scheibe had requested. Hollweg also complained that it was "really difficult" to get naval articles published in the press because there were other issues occupying public attention and, because of the red sailors, "everyone is quite happy if he hears as little as possible about the navy." Only something "really new" would be published, 28 March 1919, RM 3/9813, BAMA.

29. See Präsident des Reichsministeriums, 13 March 1919 to RMA (Signed Scheidemann), RM 3/9727, BAMA.

30. See Boy-Ed to Krah, 31 October 1926 (copy), Levetzow *Nachlass*, Box 6, Bd. 23, BAMA. For the navy's attitude toward monarchism see Bird, pp. 26, 27, 137-146. Trotha left instructions "to seal" his private papers on Tirpitz and the Kaiser, Trotha *Nachlass*, Bü.

31. Two other books were published in 1925 and 1926 (*Der Aufbau der deutschen Wehrmacht* and *Deutsche Ohmachtspolitik*). On 18 April 1927, Levetzow wrote to Scheer that Tirpitz's latest book had caused "much bad blood." For the typical attack on Bethmann-Hollweg (and reaction to the Tirpitz "campaign") see Hollweg to Capelle, 29 January 1926, Capelle *Nachlass*, N 170/3, BAMA.

32. Sometimes it became difficult to tell who was on whose side. See the debate over Admiral Hopman, *Kaiserin* Hermine to Levetzow, 8 March 1926 and Levetzow to Hermine, 13 March 1926, Levetzow *Nachlass* N239, Box 6, Bd. 21, BAMA.

33. See Admiral von Muller's letter to Dr. Philipp, Chairman of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee where he regretted that he had been forced to defend himself in the press against Tirpitz's "fabricated" attacks. *Die Ursachen des Zusammenbruchs* (12 volumes published by the Investigating Committee, Berlin 1919-1928), vol. X, pp. 345-346.

34. See the impact of this period on Raeder's administration of the navy in Raeder, p. 276.

35. *Rundschreiben des Prinzen Heinrich* (May 1927), Tirpitz *Nachlass*, N253/64-k 106, BAMA. See Keyserlingk to von Muller, 29 October 1929, Keyserlingk *Nachlass* N 161/10, BAMA.

36. *Rundschreiben.*

37. Schuster comments on *Legationsrats* Schwendemann lecture, 9 December 1931, II PM *Marineangelegenheiten*, Bd. 2, *Auswärtiges Amt*, Bonn. For Raeder's comments on Hitler's criticisms, see his letter to Levetzow, 26 October 1932, Levetzow *Nachlass*, N 239, Box 7, Bd. 35, BAMA.

38. See Gaines Post, Jr., *The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 256. The Fleet Commander, Oldekop cautioned against "allowing fantasy so much latitude in Baltic War games."

39. Tirpitz thought the "fever" would break after one to two years. Tirpitz to Trotha, 20 March 1919, Tirpitz *Nachlass*, N253/64-K106, BAMA. Trotha in a letter to Tirpitz argued that the German people did not "measure up to *Parlamentarismus*," 5 October 1919, Trotha *Nachlass*, A362.

40. Michaelis *Nachlass*, N164/5, BAMA.

41. *Ibid.* The Reichsmarine was, according to Michaelis, to serve as the "core" of a future High Seas Fleet.

42. See Saleswski, p. 165.

43. Carl Claussen, "Welche Vorschlage können gemacht werden im grossere Teile des Offizierkorps zu Führern zu erziehen?" *Marineakademie: Vortraggssammlung der Flottenabteilung, Vortrag Nr. 33*, II M57/33, BAMA.

44. *Ibid.* Cf. Wolfgang Wegener, *Die Seestrategie des Weltkrieges* (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1941), 2nd ed., pp. 82-83.

45. See Salewski, p. 166.

46. See Bird for the description and implications of the Lohmann scandal, pp. 180-189, 231-235.

47. See Anschreiben an den Adj. des Reichswehrminister, Kapitänleutnant Fricke von Abwicklungsgruppe B, 27 June 1928, Saemisch *Nachlass*, Bundesarchiv (BA).

48. See Auszug aus Denkschnift Kpt. z. See a. D. Frhr. von Meerscheidt-Hullessen von Admiral Schuster, III M 503/4, BAMA.

49. As quoted in Carl-Axel Gemzell, *Organization, Conflict, and Innovation: A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning, 1888-1940* (Stockholm: Esselte studium, 1973), p. 296.

50. See Admiral Meisel, *Zeugenschrifttum*, no. 1739, *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* Munich.

51. Trotha, "Gedanken über den Zusammenbruch," Levetzow *Nachlass*, N239, Box 4, Bd. 10, BAMA. Trotha in his "Flotte und U-Boot," 15 October 1917 insisted that the Imperial Navy was the most modern and democratic institution of the Reich. Its officers were from the broad *burgerliche* classes of society "free from every clique and class spirit [which marked] the old tradition of the army." *Nachlass* N155/4, BAMA. Cf. Herwig.

52. See Tirpitz to von Strosch (1898) that Germany's development at sea would "present a strong palliative against social democracy." Tirpitz, *Erinnerungen*, p. 52.

53. Scheer as quoted in the *Deutsche Marine-Zeitung* (Clipping in Levetzow's files dates 2 November 1924), Levetzow *Nachlass*, Box 5, Bd. 17, BAMA.

54. Rolf Güth, *Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches 1919-1939* (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard und Graefe, 1972), p. 95. Cf. Dülffer, *Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920-1939* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1973), pp. 183-184.

55. See Rahn, pp. 125-126.

56. See Walther Hubatsch, *Kaiserliche Marine: Aufgaben und Leistungen* (Augsburg: Augsburger Druckhaus, 1975), pp. 543-554. Twenty-three volumes were published, almost all of them by officers who had either held important positions or would later achieve leading posts in the navy. The series was divided into the following subject areas: North Sea, Baltic, *Kreuzerkrieg*, Commerce war-U-boats, Turkish theater, colonies, *Technik*. Of the 22 volumes originally planned only 19 were published before 1941. The rest were not published until the mid-1960s.

57. *Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918: Der Krieg in der Nordsee*, Bd. 1, KKpt. Groos (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1920), p. viii.

58. Güth, p. 96.

59. Widenmann *Nachlass*, N158/7, BAMA.

60. Rahn, p. 126. Hubatsch disagrees—see his *Kaiserliche Marine*, p. 544.

61. See Groos *Nachlass*, N165/2, pp. 30, 154, 169, also Michaelis *Nachlass*, N164 *(Erinnerungen*, Teil III).

62. See Tirpitz *Nachlass*, N253/46, BAMA. Cf. Gemzell, pp. 334-337. Tirpitz was also consulted on policy issues. See Lutzow to Behncke, 20 November 1920 concerning "war criminals," Behncke *Nachlass*, 173/1.

63. See Philip K. Lundeburg's article, "The German Naval Critique of the U-Boat Campaign, 1915-1918," *Military Affairs*, 27 March 1963, pp. 105-118 and Gemzell, as well as his earlier *Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien. Der Kampf für einen maritimen Operationsplan* (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1964).

64. See Otto Groos, *Seekriegslehren im Lichte des Weltkrieges* (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1919), pp. 74-75.

65. Boy-Ed to Scheibe, *Nachrichtenbüro*, 4 August 1919. "Allgem, Schriftwechsel," RM3/10379. Boy-Ed was later attacked by Tirpitz.

66. See Lundeburg, p. 117. Note Raeder's speech (3 February 1937) to the Wehrmacht, Foreign Office and Party Officials that submarines had not been decisive. They were important only in a secondary role. Assmann, however, disagreed as to the decisive possibilities of submarines in World War I. See Gemzell, *Organization*, p. 290.

67. See Wegener's complaint to Admiral Zenker, Gemzell, *Organization*, p. 267. Cf. Edward Wegener's judgment of the Tirpitz tradition, "Selbsverständnis," p. 322.

68. See Gemzell, *Organization*, p. 298. The debate over Gemzell's two books on the origins of the navy's Scandinavian strategy and Norway operations (1940) can be followed in the various publications (e.g., *Marine Rundschau*) and in Dülferr, and Saleswski's three volume work *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1919-1945* (Frankfurt-Main, Munich: Bernard und Graefe, 1970-75). The use of the historical evidence in the defense of Tirpitz and the struggle for a role of the postwar navy is an important topic which can be developed further. See Rahn for a guide to the navy's attempt to find a mission between myth and reality.

69. For the events surrounding Raeder's appointment see Bird, pp. 206-231.

70. See Dülffer, p. 184.

71. See Raeder's letters 10 July 1921, 16 August 1921, 10 September 1921, 13 November 1921, Tirpitz *Nachlass* N253/235—K46, BAMA.

72. Three October 1928, Tirpitz *Nachlass* N/253/235—K63, BAMA. Cf. Raeder's concerns in *Albricht Erinnerungen*, II M554/4, BAMA.

73. Eight October 1928, Tirpitz *Nachlass*, N253/235—K63, BAMA.

74. See Bird, pp. 219-220 for a description of the navy's campaign for the *Panzerschiffbau*. Cf. Wolfgang Wacker, *Der Bau des Panzershiff "A" und der Reichstag* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1959).

75. Twenty-five August 1928, Schleicher *Nachlass*, N 42/20, BAMA.

76. Levetzow to Donnersmarck, 19 March 1928, Levetzow *Nachlass*, Box 7, Bd. 29, BAMA.

77. See Assmann and Gladisch, "Aspects of the Naval War," NID 24/T.237/46. (Admiralty records, copy U.S. Navy, Dept. of Naval History) and Levetzow to Schulenburg, 7 June 1928, Levetzow *Nachlass*, Box 7, Bd. 30, BAMA.

78. Kurt Assmann, "Dr. h. c. Raeder und der Zweite Weltkrieg," *Marine Rundschau*, February 1961, p. 8. See Raeder's note to the naval archives (ca. April 1931) informing the officers to make sure that they singled out individuals who deserved merit instead of just one or

two (several former officers had complained that their actions had been overlooked). *Marinearchiv* (7741), II M503/1, BAMA.

79. Four May 1933, Levetzow *Nachlass* N239/94.

80. *Ibid.*

81. *Ibid.* At Nuremberg, Raeder called Assmann a "clever writer" but his volumes on naval warfare "were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned." *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XIV, p. 230.

82. Nine May 1933, Levetzow *Nachlass*, N239/94.

83. See Hubatsch, pp. 545-546.

84. Raeder to Trotha, 30 January 1934, Trotha *Nachlass* (131, Hintzmann), Bü.

85. See Raeder's action in restoring Trotha to the *active* naval officers list in 1936, Raeder to Trotha, 26 October 1936, Trotha *Nachlass*, NR. 37, Bü.

86. See Assmann, pp. 3-8 and v. Mantey to Keyserlingk, 7 October 1937, Keyserlingk *Nachlass*, N 161/10.

87. See Widenmann *Nachlass*, N158/7, BAMA. Apparently Raeder recognized the lack of an overall work on the basic strategical problems of the naval war 1914-1918 and wanted to write it himself. See Rahn, p. 126. Widenmann never completed this study because of Germany's defeat in 1945. Hubatsch can be said to represent this volume. See the Hubatsch-Widenmann correspondence 1945-1956 in the Widenmann *Nachlass*.

88. Widenmann *Nachlass*, N158/7, BAMA.

89. See Wilhelm Groener, *Lebenserinnerungen: Jugend, Generalstab, Weltkrieg* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Rupprecht, 1957), pp. 86-87. See Bird, p. 235.

90. Befehlshaber Streitkrafte der Ostsee to the Flottenkommando, 14 March 1928, PG 34404, Reel 43, *Selected Films of the German Naval Archives* (University of Cambridge and the University of Michigan).

91. See Raeder to Trotha correspondence (20 December 1927), Trotha *Nachlass*, Bü.

92. *Die Tragodie der alten deutschen Marine* (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesel-lschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927), p. XIII. See "Feinde der Marine," II M65/8, BAMA.

93. Eckart Kehr, *Der Primat der Innenpolitik*, p. 4. Note footnote 1 in "Die deutsche Flotte in den neunziger Jahren und der politsch-militärische Dualismus des Kaiserreichs," p. 111 which stated that the views of the author "sind völlig unabhängig von der Ansicht amtlicher Stellen."

94. Kehr, *Primat*, p. 5.

95. *Ibid.*

96. See editor's introduction (Gordon Craig), Eckart Kehr, *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. xix and Wehler, *Primat*, p. 9.

97. See Widenmann to Schuster, 11 April 1944, Widenmann *Nachlass*, N158/19. Widenmann felt the book was interesting but there was a danger that domestic aspects of naval development might be overemphasized at the cost of the more important issues of foreign policy.

98. See "Ansprache des Grossadmiral Raeder zur Neiderlegung des Oberkommandos am 30 January 1943," III M 1005/7, BAMA.

99. V. Mantey to Keyserlingk, 22 February 1937, Keyserlingk *Nachlass* N 161/10.

100. V. Mantey commented to Keyserlingk that the difficulties with Bachmann lay less with Raeder than Trotha and above all with Widenmann, 12 April 1937, Keyserlingk *Nachlass*, N161/10. Otto Schniewind to Förste, 16 March 1956, Förste *Nachlass*, N328/8, BAMA.

101. See Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), pp. 140, 247, 273-275, and *Hitler's Secret Book* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), pp. 125-126, 134-135. "In the end," wrote Hitler, "our fleet was only a romantic plaything, a parade piece that was built for its own sake."

102. See Assmann and Gladisch. Cf. Dülffer, pp. 204-555.

103. Assmann, "Raeder," p. 8.

104. Mantey to Keyserlingk, 22 February 1937, Keyserlingk *Nachlass*, N161/10, BAMA.

105. Bekanntmachung, B. Nr. 830 M allg., Berlin 17 March 1937 (signed Raeder), RM8/59, BAMA.

106. "Reflections of the Commander in Chief, Navy on the Outbreak of War, September 1939," *Führer Conferences in Matters Dealing with the German Navy* (Washington: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1947).

107. Schuster to Kiep, 9 May 1944 (copy), Widenmann *Nachlass* N158/24, BAMA.

108. *Ibid.*

109. See Salewski, "Hitler, England und die Marine," p. 169.

110. See Edward Wegener, p. 334. For the continuity of Bündnisfähigkeit in German naval planning see Holger Herwig, *Reichsmarine* and *Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1926).

111. See Hubatsch's warning to Widenmann about handling the request for assistance by a scholar (Hans Gatzke) who was planning to write on Tirpitz. Hubatsch was concerned that the pendulum was swinging towards a critical reassessment of Tirpitz and the prewar fleet-building program. Widenmann *Nachlass* N158/29. The debate continued in the fifties, sixties and seventies as evidenced by the articles in the *Marine Rundschau* (see the seven reactions to Salewski in the 1970 issues of *Marine Rundschau* and the 1972 Kirchzarten conference on the Imperial Navy which could be considered a debate over Berghahn's theories).

Terrorism does not depend on the existence of havens for terrorists but would not have been as prevalent nor extensive a phenomenon as it has been, absent those havens. This and the terrorist threat to world public order are generally agreed. Little else, not proscriptive measures nor even definitions, is agreed.

REFLECTIONS ON TERRORIST HAVENS

by

Robert A. Friedlander

> Any group of extremists, however justifiable some of their grievances may be, can thus, through hijacking of aircraft or kidnapping of foreign diplomats, receive international attention, remain unpunished, involve innocent people, and sow the seeds of international anarchy.
>
> Secretary-General U Thant[1]

"This has been a terrifying year."[2] Although intended to apply only to the domestic political scene, the observation of Italian Communist Party First Secretary, Enrico Berlinguer, can just as appropriately refer to the current state of international terrorism. On the one hand, the numerical trend of known terrorist activities appears to have taken a downturn. On the other hand, the level and intensity of terror violence have continued to escalate, notwithstanding an apparent reduction in the number of overall incidents. Terrorism in a sense has become commonplace throughout the world, so that an ordinary hijacking or bombing no longer has any really significant effect upon the audience at which terrorist acts are invariably directed. Consequently, there has been an escalation in the severity of terror violence in order to make it more dramatic and thereby to recapture the attention of the media and to be reimpressed upon the public imagination.

Four bloody events stand out during 1978: the kidnap-murder of former Italian Premier Aldo Moro;[4] the P.L.O. massacre of 34 tour bus passengers near Tel Aviv;[5] the Sandinista forcible seizure of the Nicaraguan National Palace;[6] and the murderous attack by

Rhodesian guerrillas upon a defenseless civilian airliner.[7] The latter two episodes must be considered "successful" in that the perpetrators made good their escape to havens. The Zimbabwean terrorist guerrillas seem merely to have returned to their home bases in Zambia, whereas the Sandinistas, as a result of negotiated concessions, were put on an airplane by the Nicaraguan Government and flown to asylum in Panama. In both instances, the element of haven was essential to the total success of the operation.

It is, admittedly, too strong to say that without havens there would be no terrorist acts. But it would be equally misleading to say that terrorism in either its past or present form would have been as extensive and as prevalent if havens did not exist. According to recent Central Intelligence Agency estimates, "62.8 percent of terrorist missions had elaborate escape plans built into them."[8] Many terrorists expect to survive, and the record shows that a large majority have achieved their goal.[9]

There are those who will argue that the Rhodesian and Nicaraguan incidents are not relevant and thus the assumptions above are erroneous as a legal distinction should be made between terrorists and guerrillas.[10] Others take a *contra* view, maintaining that terrorism is intrinsically criminal, and that international terrorism must by definition be an extraditable crime.[11] The quarrel is essentially definitional but one cannot hope to get at the problem if its essence is not understood. As with any legal analysis, there must first be some agreement over what is actually at issue.

Despite the global effect of terror violence during the past decade, and the innumerable studies, analyses, reports, and resolutions by social scientists, legalists, and even governments, there still is no generally accepted definition of terrorism and a legal definition, likewise, has yet to be formulated. But there is enough agreement among analysts to derive a manageable formula. Individual or group terrorism—as opposed to government or state terrorism—may be described as the use of force or the threat of force directed against innocent third parties for primarily ideological, financial, or psychological purposes. Terror violence, either international or transnational,[12] must include at least one of the following elements: (1) the act or series of acts must take place in more than one state; (2) the act or series of acts must involve citizens of more than one state; (3) the act or series of acts must be directed at internationally protected persons; (4) the act or series of acts must occur outside of an exclusively national jurisdiction; (5) the act or series of acts must be directed against internationally protected property. If one or more of these elements is satisfied, then the act or acts in question are no longer merely common criminality but rather international crimes affecting world public order.[13]

For every legal rule there is almost always an exception, and it is no different with restrictions upon terror violence. Aerial hijacking, or interference with commercial air transport, have been legally construed as internationally prohibited terrorist acts. The three major antihijacking conventions—Tokyo (1963), the Hague (1970), and Montreal (1971)—have criminalized attacks upon aircraft, passengers, and airport facilities, although many loopholes still exist and sanctions against both principals and accomplices are not yet compulsory.[14] Seizure of aircraft has invariably involved both the taking of hostages and the demand for haven, and escape for the perpetrators inevitably depends upon political asylum granted by a sympathetic receiving state. Small wonder then that "[t]he emphasis in anti-terrorism conventions is on extradition, with prosecution presumably the objective."[15]

A complicating factor is the controversial issue of political crimes. Here,

too, a uniformly acceptable definition is lacking.[16] Traditionally, the juridical standard relating to political crimes has developed out of *stare decisis* rather than being determined by statute, especially in common law countries.[17] The real significance of political criminality under customary international law lies in its exculpatory features *vis-à-vis* the extradition process. Among Western European and other civil law countries there has long been a tradition of granting asylum to political offenders. Beginning with the Belgian law of 1833, followed by the Franco-Belgian Treaty of the very next year, nonextradition of actors accused of political crimes became part of customary international law.[18] Anglo-American law, however, has been very restrictive in its protections. With minor deviations, Great Britain has offered haven only when the act in question has been an integral part of the revolutionary process. Canada has been far more rigorous, while the United States has relied solely upon treaties and conventions to define its role in extradition practice.[19] As far as political terrorism is concerned, the words of Secretary of State William P. Rogers before the U.N. General Assembly on 25 September 1972, clearly depoliticized terrorist acts:

> Political passion, however deeply held, cannot be a justification for criminal violence against innocent persons . . . [and] must be universally condemned, whether we consider the cause the terrorists invoke noble or ignoble, legitimate or illegitimate.[20]

Despite the general legal tradition that political criminality can constitute an excusing condition, one type of act *has* been widely accepted as an international crime. The so-called *attentat* clause, criminalizing murderous attacks upon heads of state or members of their immediate family, was incorporated into customary international law during the middle of the 19th century.[21] This exception to the exculpatory nature of political crimes received a statutory formalization 100 years later in Article 3 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition.[22] The protections granted to heads of state were broadened to include diplomats and other internationally protected persons first on a regional basis by the Organization of American States in 1971,[23] and then globalized by the 1973 U.N. Convention on Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, which at present is two ratifications shy of entering into force.[24] On 8 October 1976 the U.S. Congress enacted legislation implementing the U.N. Convention, proscribing violent attacks, murder, or imprisonment of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.[25] Thus, certain politically motivated offenders are now denied the claim of right to haven by international agreement, even though the proscribed offenses may be of a limited classification.

The politics of atrocity engulfing Western Europe in the early and mid-1970s[26] galvanized the European Economic Community into taking some form of remedial action. Beginning in June 1976, the member states of the E.E.C. undertook a program of cooperation and collaboration[27] that ultimately resulted in the adoption by the Council of Europe of a convention on the suppression of terrorism that negated the political offense exception for specifically enumerated acts of terror violence.[28] Although the convention was not tightly drafted and has yet to be ratified, and although the republics of Ireland and Malta refused to sign,[29] the fact that 17 European Governments had resolved to place limitations on haven for political criminals engaged in acts of terror violence has great significance for the future. The threat posed

to world public order by political terrorism, especially to pluralistic democracy, had at last been perceived and a line of proscription, however tenuous, was finally drawn.

Similarly, the world community was forced to adopt a more rigorous position on international criminality as a result of increased aerial hijackings and hostage seizures. With some reluctance, and under strong pressure from the International Federation of Airline Pilots Association (IFALPA), the U.N. General Assembly on 3 November 1977 agreed by consensus to condemn the unlawful interference with air transport and urged member states to take any and all means to combat such offenses. But the Assembly also criticized any unilateral actions directed against sheltering states.[30] On 22 July 1977 the Federal Republic of Germany submitted to the U.N. General Assembly a draft convention against the taking of hostages that stressed the long-established but rarely adhered to international legal norm of *aut dedere aut punire* (extradite or prosecute).[31] The West German proposal, as it came to be called, has languished in the General Assembly despite the celebrated Mogadishu incident. West Germany had originally come forward with its stringent suggestions in its capacity as member of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Hostages created by the Assembly on 15 December 1976.[32] In February 1978 the two working groups of the *Ad Hoc* Committee reported belatedly that they could not agree on a draft convention, foundering on the rock of national liberation movements.[33]

The U.S. position has been erratic at best, and often evasive, with executive and legislative branches assuming contradictory positions. "Terrorism, like piracy, must be seen as outside the law."[34] This statement by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger made before the American Bar Association Annual Convention in Montreal on 11 August 1975 sums up official U.S. policy during the Nixon-Ford administrations. Beginning with the U.S. Draft Definition on International Terrorism submitted to the U.N. General Assembly in 1973,[35] the U.S. Government attempted a mildly activist role to constrict air hijacking and to seek sanctions against those states that had either aided and abetted terrorist acts or provided haven to terrorist offenders. The Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses, signed by the United States and Cuba on 15 February 1973, eliminated the Cuban haven for hijackers of American aircraft.[36] Despite Prime Minister Castro's denunciation of that agreement on 15 October 1976, he has continued to enforce its provisions.[37] Also during that same year the American and Canadian Governments jointly proposed to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that commercial air service for countries providing terrorist havens be suspended. In 1974 the U.S. Congress passed an Anti-Hijacking Act that had authorized the President to do the same, and a similar resolution was voted by the Senate in 1976.[38]

Recently, however, the United States has seemed uncertain in its direction. On the one hand, the Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act, sponsored by Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff, as originally proposed was a stringent, even somewhat repressive document that provided for stiff penalties to be directed against sheltering states.[39] Conversely, the current version of the Senate Bill is a much watered-down, mild-toned statute that emphasizes reportage and official statements rather than punitive, self-executing measures.[40] The State Department now opposes automatic sanctions, and the Senate apparently has acceded to those views.[41] Even though the Bonn summit has raised doubts to the contrary, it would seem that the United States has not accepted the strong stance of Secretary Kissinger at

the American Bar Association 1975 Annual Meeting:

> If all nations deny terrorists a safe haven, terrorist practices will be substantially reduced–just as the incidence of skyjacking has declined sharply as a result of miltilateral and bilateral agreements. All governments have a duty to defend civilized life by supporting such measures.[42]

Given the cautious tentative approach of the Western democracies, the decisions taken in Bonn during July 1978 must be termed a major surprise. Seven heads of government representing Canada, the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan not only agreed to deny political haven to skyjackers, but also pledged themselves to cut off commercial air service with any harboring state.[43] At the same time they appealed to the world at large to do likewise, but so far that request has met with no apparent response. A followup session was to be held in the German capital by the seven signatory governments the next week,[44] but no further results have been announced. President Carter was especially enthusiastic, declaring their skyjacking pronouncement to be worth the entire trip.[45] Thus, the Bonn summit declaration presently remains a mere statement of principles, and unless implementing legislation is forthcoming, the antihijacking agreement is liable to be a symbol not of cooperation and coordination, but of bureaucratic obfuscation, enabling the Western nations and Japan to substitute a mirror image for harsher reality.

Serving as the chief catalyst at the Bonn summit was Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau.[46] Canada has manifested an increasingly hard line on the perpetration of terror violence. The passage of the Temporary Immigration Security Act in February 1976 gave to the Ministry of Immigration the power to deny entry into the country to any visitor that an immigration official believed might engage in terroristic activities. No reasons have to be given for that decision and no appeal will be granted.[47] The proposed revision of the Fugitive Offenders Act points toward mandatory extradition of terrorist actors.[48] Because of provisions of the Hague (1970) and Montreal (1971) antihijacking Conventions, as well as the still unratified Optional Protocol to the Single Convention on Narcotics (1972), the principle of extradite or prosecute has been incorporated into the Canadian Criminal Code. Moreover, if a particular crime has been proscribed by treaty, then the political offense exception cannot be invoked on behalf of the alleged offender.[49] Immediately following the Bonn summit the Canadian External Affairs Minister announced the creation of a new subcabinet position–Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security and Intelligence Affairs–whose duties would include developing programs and procedures aimed at combating the threat of international terrorism.[50]

The Canadian approach reflects a harder attitude toward terror violence and its advocates than the position taken by the great majority of the world community. Indeed, numerous commentators have claimed that the United Nations, and by implication international law, cannot effectively meet the challenge.[51] That the record of the United Nations is something less than distinguished cannot be gainsaid, but some things have been accomplished, however minimal, and the dangers of terrorism have at least been perceived.[52] Assertions such as international law "isn't set up to deal with terrorist activities"[53] are counterproductive at best, and often lead to diffidence and even despair. Therefore, the words of former Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, represent an effective antidote to the disease of inaction, for the alternatives, in reality, do violence

to the rule of law: *"We will continue* our efforts to translate into law the fundamental principle that terrorist behavior and victimization of innocent people are unacceptable means of solving problems."[54]

Exemptions granted by the United Nations to national liberation movements have compounded the difficulties and have literally given U.N. condonation to sheltering activities of haven states.[55] Both the Third World states and the Marxist world have broadly supported the principle that the end justifies the means. One contemporary observer of the Algerian scene has clearly, if not cogently, presented the anti-Western perspective:

> Is violence itself, whether political or not, a necessary catharsis to balance the scales between colonizer and colonized, between black and white, or is violence just as necessary in certain situations in which racial or colonial inequality will continue unless the worm has courage to turn.[56]

It is true that there are fewer states willing to provide haven today than at any other time within the last two decades. And those governments that have been the most prominent providers of refuge for perpetrators of terrorist acts have sometimes been forced to deny the authenticity of their actions.[57] The Permanent Representative to the United Nations of the Libyan Arab Republic even addressed a letter to the Secretary General on 21 August 1976 wherein he averred that the Libyan Government "does not approve of highjacking," and that the law of the Libyan Republic "stipulates that the perpetrators of such crimes shall be subject to the most extreme penalties."[58] The historical record, unhappily, speaks for itself.

Although the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the U.N. General Assembly has been debating the issue of state responsibility throughout this decade, and although there is sufficient legal precedent and international legislation already in existence to permit some sort of sanctions system,[59] a will to enforce has been conspicuously lacking. Little attention and no consideration were given to the proposal of former U.N. Secretary General U Thant for an international hijacking tribunal.[60] Despite the lessons of the past and the portents of the future, the world community appears to prefer Doublethink and Newspeak to safeguarding the innocent and maintaining a global rule of law. When the Republic of Panama offered haven to the Sandinista guerrillas, "[t]errorism, for the moment had won"; no matter how sincere the purpose or how noble the motivation of the terrorist actors.[61]

The last quarter of the 20th century is not only an age of great technological achievement, it is also a time of terror.[62] Eric Hoffer, the moral conscience of a brutal age, recently observed that "history is made not by the hidden hand of circumstances but by men."[63] To deny the lessons of human experience in the era of doomsday technology is to yield before adversity, succumbing to the frustrations of the passing moment. But the primordial issue is the survival of the innocent. Malfeasance and nonfeasance equally ignore Dante's warning from the depths of hell about the fatal consequences that must occur when "those, who sowing discord, harvest guilt."[64]

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Robert A. Friedlander earned his Ph.D. degree in history from Northwestern University and a J.D. degree from the De Paul University College of Law. He has written extensively on terrorism, human rights, and American foreign policy and is now Associate Professor of Law at the Ohio Northern University College of Law.

NOTES

1. Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Vol. VIII, U Thant, 1968-1971* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 471.

2. Christina Lord, "Rome," *European Community*, September-October 1978, p. 40:3.

3. See United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *International Terrorism in 1977* (Washington: 1978), and the comments of John Dillin, "Terrorist Activity Ebbs—for Now," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15 September 1978, p. 1:1, who notes that "international terrorism seems to move in cycles, and the current period appears to be a 'down' cycle."

4. See *Newsweek*, 27 March 1978, pp. 65-66; *ibid.*, 24 April 1978, p. 54; *ibid.*, 1 May 1978, pp. 34-35; *ibid.*, 8 May 1978, p. 44; and *ibid.*, 29 May 1978, p. 62.

5. *Ibid.*, 29 March 1978, p. 24; *ibid.*, 27 March 1978, p. 32.

6. *Ibid.*, 4 September 1978, pp. 30-31.

7. *Ibid.*, 18 September 1978, pp. 45-47.

8. Abraham Miller, "Negotiations for Hostages: Implications from the Police Experience," *Terrorism*, vol. 1, 1978, pp. 125, 132.

9. United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis* (Washington: 1976); *U.S. News & World Report*, 17 March 1975, p. 26.

10. See, for example, William T. Mallison and Sally Mallison, "The Concept of Public Purpose Terror in International Law: Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of Human and Material Values," *Howard Law Journal*, vol. 18, 1973, p. 12; J. Bowyer Bell, *On Revolt: The Strategies of National Liberation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 3-18, 179-191; Baljit Singh and Ko-wang Mei, *Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1971), pp. 42-44.

11. Cf. Georg Schwarzenberger, *International Law and Order* (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 219-234; M. Cherif Bassiouni and Ved P. Nanda, eds., *A Treatise on International Criminal Law* (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1973), pp. 490-500; Robert A. Friedlander, "Terrorism and Political Violence: Do the Ends Justify the Means?" *Chitty's Law Journal*, vol. 24, 1976, p. 240. M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 176-206, centers on moral issues. These, he claims, are questions "which the law gets at only imperfectly." *Ibid.*, at p. 183.

12. Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (New York: Wiley, 1977), pp. 173-174, takes issue with those writers who distinguish between transnational and international terrorism. His concern is well taken, but for purposes of this study, transnational will refer to nonpolitical, nonstate actors. Cf. J. Bowyer Bell, *Transnational Terror* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 4, 6-8.

13. The variety of definitions is almost as great as the variety of terrorist acts themselves. Cf. the following: *National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism* 3 (1976), hereinafter cited as *Terrorism Task Force* [1975]; Lord Gardiner, et al., *Report of a Committee to Consider, in the Context of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Measures to Deal with Terrorism in Northern Ireland* 25 (Cmnd. 5847); D. Carlton and C. Schaerf, eds., *International Terrorism and World Security* (New York: Wiley, 1975), pp. 50-58; Yonah Alexander, ed., *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), pp. 18-29; M. Livingston, ed., *International Terrorism in the Contemporary World* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 1-3. It is questionable as to whether the Guiana massacre was legally an act of terrorism, but the assassination of Congressman Leo Ryan certainly falls into the category of internationally prohibited acts. For a descriptive analysis of the events in Guiana, see especially *The Times* (London), 26 November 1978, p. 17:1; *The Observer* (London), 26 November 1978, p. 5:1; *Newsweek*, 4 December 1978, pp. 38-60.

14. Robert A. Friedlander, "Banishing Fear from the Skies: A Statutory Proposal," *Duquesne Law Review*, vol. 16, 1978, p. 283; Edward McWhinney, *The Illegal Diversion of Aircraft and International Law* (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1975); C. Emanuelli, *Les Moyens de Prevention et de Sanction en cas D'action Illicite contre l'aviation Civile Internationale* (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1974).

15. Alexander, ed., pp. 131-132.

16. Freda Adler and Gerhard Mueller, eds. *Politics, Crime and the International Scene: an Inter-American Focus* (San Juan, P.R.: North-South Center Press, 1972), pp. 91-95; Stephen Schafer, *The Political Criminal: The Problem of Morality and Crime* (New York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 1-55; M. Cherif Bassiouni, *International Extradition and World Public Order* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1974), pp. 375-385; S. Prakash Sinha, *Asylum and International Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 173-188.

17. Bassiouni and Nanda, eds., pp. 314-316; Robert A. Friedlander, "The Origins of International Terrorism: A Micro Legal-Historical Perspective," *Israel Year Book on Human Rights* (Tel Aviv: Israel Press, 1976), vol. 6, pp. 49, 54-55; G. La Forest, *Extradition to and from Canada* (Toronto: Canada Law Book Ltd, 1977), 2nd ed., pp. 61-65.

18. Lora L. Deere, "Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 27, 1933, pp. 247-250-251; Sinha, p. 20.

19. Friedlander, "The Origins of International Terrorism: A Micro Legal-Historical Perspective," pp. 55-56.

20. William Rogers, "A World Free of Violence," *Department of State Bulletin*, 16 October 1972, pp. 425-429.

21. Deere, pp. 252-254; Bassiouni and Nanda, eds., p. 316.

22. Reprinted in Bassiouni and Nanda, eds., pp. 409-416.

23. Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, O.A.S. Doc. AC/Doc. 88, rev. 1 corr. 1 of 2 February 1971; OAS/Ser. A/17; U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418, Annex V (2 November 1972).

24. A.G. Res 3166 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3166 (1973), reprinted in *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 68, 1974, p. 383. See especially, Louis M. Bloomfield and Gerald F. Fitzgerald, *Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons: Prevention and Punishment* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

25. 18 U.S.C. Sections 1111-1116, vol. 18, 1976, p. 878.

26. See Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (New York: Wiley, 1974); J. Bowyer Bell, *A Time of Terror: How Demoeratic Societies Respond to Political Violence* (New York: Basic Books, 1978); Walter Z. Laqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

27. *The Times* (London), 30 June 1976.

28. Council of Europe, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, November 1976, reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, November 1976, p. 1272.

29. Bell, *A Time of Terror: How Demoeratic Societies Respond to Political Violence*, p. 158.

30. Safety of International Civil Aviation, G.A. Res. 32/8, 32 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/8, 1977. Cf. U.N., Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1976-15 June 1977, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 2, U.N. Doc. A/32/2, 1977, pp. 34-37. See also Friedlander, "Banishing Fear from the Skies: A Statutory Proposal," pp. 283, 287-288.

31. Draft Convention against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 188/L.3, July 1977.

32. G.A. Res. 31/103, 31 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/31/430, 1976.

33. U.N., Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. GAOR 33, Supp. No. 39, U.N. Doc. A/33/39, 1978, pp. 5-16; also cited in *U.N. Chroniele*, March 1978, p. 32. France, surprisingly, offered the strongest condemnation, while Algeria—a frequent haven for hijackers—insisted upon excusing conditions for anticolonial and antiracist liberationists.

34. Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy* (New York: Norton, 1977), 3rd ed., p. 232.

35. See Thomas B. Franck and Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., "Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 68, 1974, p. 69.

36. U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7579 (1973). Canada signed an identical pact with Cuba on the same day.

37. *Chicago Tribune*, 26 March 1978, sec. 1, p. 42:1.

38. Friedlander, "Banishing Fear from the Skies: A Statutory Proposal," p. 287.

39. S. Res. 2236, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 *Congressional Records*, S17706, 25 October 1977.

40. S. 2236, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. [Committee Print], 19 May 1978. I am indebted to Mr. Louis G. Fields, Jr., Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State, for a copy of the current bill.

41. Information provided by Mr. Fields. See also Richard Bradee, "Congress Battles Terrorists with Bills," *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 16 August 1978, p. 12:2.

42. Kissinger, p. 232.

43. *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 26 July 1978, p. 7:1; *The World Jurist*, July-August 1978, p. 8. For a *contra* view, see the biting fictional rejoinder of Heinrich Boll, "Confession of a Hijacker," *The New Yorker*, 9 October 1978, pp. 42-43.

44. *Chicago Tribune*, 30 July 1978, p. 6:3. Further explanatory talks took place in Ottawa, Canada, during November 1978, but serious divisions arose among the seven participating countries over how the Bonn agreement was to be implemented. (Private information)

45. The *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 19 July 1978, p. 6:1. "Now," editorialized the *Globe and Mail*, the seven summit nations "must tell the world's airlines that they mean it."

46. The *Toronto Star*, 17 July 1978, p. 1:6.

47. The *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 26 February 1976, p. 11:5.

48. See editorial comment in the *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 23 May 1978, p. 6:2. The Senate version, however, would grant authority to the Minister of Justice to refuse extradition where the offender would be subject to capital punishment in the requesting state.

49. La Forest, pp. 32-33.

50. The *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 4 August 1978, p. 34:5.

51. Cf. Nicholas Kittrie, "Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Quest for International Agreement over Political Crime and Terrorism," *Year Book of World Affairs* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), vol. 32, p. 208; M. Livingston, ed., pp. 68-71; Bell, *A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Political Violence*, pp. 152-157, 165-166; Frederick J. Hacker, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time* (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 303-305, 340.

52. Robert A. Friedlander, "Terrorism and International Law: What is Being Done?" *Rutgers Camden Law Journal*, vol. 8, 1977, p. 383; Franck, "International Legal Action Concerning Terrorism," *Terrorism*, vol. 1, 1978, p. 187.

53. Letter from David Martin, Editor of *Student Lawyer* to author, 3 March 1977.

54. William Rogers, *United States Foreign Policy, 1972: A Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), p. 95.

55. See, for example, G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII), 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418, 1972, and the qualifying words attached to a later resolution of the same title on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair, and which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A. Res. 31/102 (XXXI), 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc. A/31/42, 1976.

56. Joan Brace, Book Review, *International Journal of African Studies*, vol. 11, 1978, pp. 288, 289. See also W.H. Smith, "International Terrorism: A Political Analysis," *Year Book of World Affairs* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), vol. 31, pp. 138, 155-157. The American legal view is definitely contra. See Comment, "Criminal Responsibility and the Political Offender," *American University Law Review*, vol. 24, 1975, p. 797.

57. See the instructive commentary of E. McWhinney, pp. 93-101.

58. 1 U.N. Doc. S/12191, 1976.

59. Cf. Richard Lillich and John Paxman, "State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities," *American University Law Review*, vol. 26, 1977, p. 217; Friedlander, "Terrorism and International Law: What is Being Done?"

60. U.N. Press Release, SG/SM 1333, September 1970.

61. "Those Cheers in Managua," *Chicago Tribune*, 26 August 1978, p. 8:1.

62. The phrase is that of Bell in *A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Political Violence*. The international linkage of terrorist groups is clearly, if not convincingly, identified by Claire Sterling, "The Terrorist Network," *The Atlantic*, November 1978, pp. 37-47. See also Ovid Demaris, *Brothers in Blood: The International Terrorist Network* (New York: Scribner, 1977). Although terrorist linkage is an international reality, the existence of a widespread, centrally coordinated terrorist network has yet to be proven in fact.

63. Eric Hoffer, "Works and Days," *Harper's*, October 1978, p. 78.

64. P. Milano, ed., *The Portable Dante* (New York: Viking Press, 1962), p. 148.

ASW is not a static problem and the U.S. Navy must continue to improve its capabilities. This paper, the original version of which was prepared by a student at the Naval War College as a requirement of the course, argues that we cannot afford to ignore the continued effectiveness of the helicopter as the heart of an efficient ASW system.

MANAGEMENT OF ASW SYSTEMS:

A LOOK AT ROTARY WING ASW

by

Lieutenant Commander Stepheu R. Arends, U.S. Navy

With Defense Department resources becoming increasingly scarce, congressional scrutiny becoming even more intense, and the public becoming increasingly apathetic about defense, military decisionmakers must devote careful attention to ensuring that our combat capability is optimized for each defense dollar invested. This study looks at one portion of the triple threat environment of today's aircraft carrier and its integrated air wing, the subsurface threat to our surface Navy especially within the naval strike force outer zone area, i.e., 90 nautical miles.

The Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, has stated that "The U.S. is a maritime nation. Much more than the Soviet Union, we depend on access to major air and sea lanes not only to acquire critical raw materials and engage in other peaceful pursuits, but also to protect our vital interests, forces, and allies overseas in wartime."[1] He further states (in his FY-79 Annual Report) that

> . . . one of the main functions of the U.S. Navy is to protect our merchant shipping from attack. In order to do so, we must concentrate resources on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and seaborne anti-air warfare (AAW) rather than on a major anti-shipping capability designed to interdict sea lanes that the Soviets would not use in wartime.[2]

Using these statements as a portion of the DOD's approach to achieving its objective of deterrence, Admiral Holloway, in his FY-79 CNO Report, said:

> The Soviets have the largest submarine force in the world and continue to improve its capabilities. Since the 1960s, *submarines armed with torpedoes and cruise missiles have presented the most severe threat to all naval surface*

> *forces* (writer's emphasis) and, with the other Soviet attack submarines, could present an extremely serious threat to western SLOCs in a protracted conflict.[3]

Because many other documents, studies, and news media articles[4] are replete with such pessimistic assessments of the Soviet Navy's threat, it is sufficient to state that the trends indicate that the Soviet Navy is emerging toward achievement of a worldwide mission of sea control and power projection. The subsurface threat becomes increasingly apparent when one is reminded that each Soviet cruise missile submarine carries from two to six times as many torpedoes as missiles. If these missile and torpedo submarines were employed not only against our naval forces, but also against our merchant shipping and replenishment forces, the results could be devastating. Therefore, the Soviet's and other potential adversary's submarine forces are a genuine threat to today's Navy, and the trends indicate that the Soviet Navy's capability is apt to continue to increase as its equipment becomes more and more sophisticated.

In view of this Soviet trend toward quantitative increases and qualitative improvements in their submarine force, antisubmarine warfare is and must remain among the very highest priorities for the United States. In order to enable the U.S. Navy to achieve not only parity with this threat, but to ensure deterrence through continued U.S. superiority in ASW, the U.S. Navy must continue to improve its ASW capability. But ASW systems must compete with many equally important defense programs for the limited funds needed to ensure this superiority. In addition to competing with other DOD programs, each ASW project must compete for adequate funding among other equally attractive ASW programs. So, how should a decisionmaker decide where to invest his ASW funds? Certain economic concepts of the business firm are applicable to such force planning decisions.

Complementarity of ASW Forces. Because the aim of the U.S. Navy's ASW forces is to deny the enemy the effective use of his submarines, how is this goal most effectively and efficiently achieved? Admiral Holloway states that

> the art of naval warfare is to employ surface, submarine and air forces in such a manner as to exploit the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each. This objective has led to the integrated operation of surface, submarine, and air forces operating together in mutual support with the common objective of gaining advantage over the enemy by enhancement of offensive capabilities and decreasing individual vulnerabilities.[5]

The achievement of this maximum effort is possible only through the application of the economic concept of complementarity. While no one will deny that aircraft, ships and submarines are all "effective" ASW systems, the proper integration of each of these oftentimes dissimilar systems will result in the attainment of maximum ASW capability: together they produce an integrated ASW capability greater than the sum of the individual ASW systems.

Allocating ASW Funds. Our Navy decisionmakers' tasks could be reduced significantly if each of the various ASW systems were substitutes for one another. If a linear relationship could be derived for ASW ships, aircraft and submarines, the weapon system that operates in the same medium as the threat (water) would have a distinct advantage over the others, i.e., the most effective. But the variables of resource allocation and cost have a dynamic effect on every DOD decision. The procurement and the operation of more

ASW SSN submarines is one alternative in gaining maximum ASW effectiveness, but cost and reaction time become limiting factors. The new 688-class SSN submarines significantly contribute to our qualitative ASW advantage but their cost prohibits mass production. It would be ideal if one could use quantitative linear programming to compare the cost and effectiveness of all ASW systems. Using that economic tool, the decisionmaker could then procure and operate the most cost-effective weapon system. In theory that may be possible but the results would be meaningless. It must be reemphasized that all of the U.S. Navy's ASW systems are complementary, not substitutes for each other. In different environments, against a variety of threats and when countermeasures are introduced, each ASW system has unique assets and liabilities.

As no direct linear relationship exists between complementary ASW weapon systems, how does a Navy or DOD decisionmaker allocate his continually scarce resources (dollars) among several alternative ASW programs? Funds cannot be allocated to the ASW platform based upon the persuasive ability of program advocates (salesmanship) or the "union's" (air, surface, submarine) lobbying effort. Resource allocation should be selected upon potential combat effectiveness and uncertainty/risk. This is an enviable goal, but how is it achieved? The economic principle of marginalism is but one proven tool that may be employed to assist the decisionmaker in allocating funds.

Air ASW Marginal Analysis. Initially, a problem exists in quantifying the current Measure-Of-Effectiveness (MOE) for the existing VP, VS, HS, and HSL weapon systems, as well as predicting the MOE of future systems (e.g., P-3C Update III, LAMPS MK-III, etc.). This determination of MOE for existing systems is especially challenging when one considers the differences in total capability of each weapon system. But it should be possible to correlate the relative size of the areas of uncertainty for each aircraft with the time required to execute a successful attack on the target submarine. The Navy's old FIXWEX (Fixed Wing ASW Evaluation Exercise) exercises and the present AIREM (Air Readiness/Effectiveness Measurement Program) exercises are programs used to assess air ASW weapon system effectiveness. It is apparent that the requirement exists for the Navy to measure the effectiveness of current systems both when employed independently and in a coordinated manner. Once a level of effectiveness is determined for each system, marginal analysis can be used to compare the cost of new equipment with the proportional increase in ASW combat effectiveness. Ideally, each expenditure for new ASW equipment/systems will produce an improvement in the combined ASW effectiveness of the U.S. Navy, remembering that each ASW system complements the others.

Helicopter Antisubmarine Warfare: Its Past. Helicopter ASW has been a proven system for many years with the tethered, variable-depth sonar as its primary sensor. The SH-34/SH-3 helicopters and the S-2 airplanes were an effective team in hunter-killer task groups of the 1950s and 1960s. As the CVS carriers met their demise, CVA attack carriers were converted into the multimission CVs of today. The sophisticated S-3A "Viking" has replaced the S-2G *Tracker*, the SH-2D/F LAMPS MK-I is in the fleet, and the SH-3 *Sea King* has undergone a significant number of modifications to meet changing challenges. The mission of today's SH-3H *Sea King* is to provide local ASW protection for the carrier, i.e., search, localization, classification and attack of submarines out to and including the second convergence zone (encompasses the naval strike force outer zone area).

The SH-3H retains its secondary utility missions that are similar to other Navy helicopters: SAR (search and rescue), medical evacuation, logistics support, mail delivery, etc.

The SH-3As of the early 1960s were configured with AQS-10 dipping sonar as their sole acoustic sensor. The SH-3D models of the late sixties increased the helicopter's endurance to 5½ hours and added the improved AQS-13A sonar. Later models of the SH-3D and the SH-3Hs of the 1970s received the latest AQS-13B sonar and the AQS-81 MAD (magnetic anomoly detection) equipment. In order to enable the SH-3s to employ sonobuoy acoustic information, the SH-3A/D/Hs of the mid-1970s sported a variety of data link systems. ALR-54 ESM (electronic surveillance measures) and LN-66 radar systems were also installed on the original SH-3Hs that were used during the interim sea control ship trials aboard U.S.S. *Guam* (LPH-9) in 1972.[6] Dipping sonar has remained the primary acoustic sensor for all models of the SH-3 for over 18 years.

During the mid-1970s an effort was made to quantify the value of the SH-3s aboard the CV to determine if the SH-3 mission could be adequately accomplished by other ASW assets—the SH-2F LAMPS MK-I helicopter, VP, or surface combatants. This reevaluation of HS effectiveness was prompted in part by fleet introduction of the new S-3A, which complicated the critical deck loading of all CVs. CVA skippers were also accustomed to having the embarked helicopters perform the missions of combat SAR, plane guard, mail/cargo delivery, etc. ASW was perceived by many to be the responsibility of the surface ships in company with the CV. But, as "War-At-Sea" exercises dramatically demonstrated after the end of the Vietnam conflict, CVs were especially vulnerable without an effective local air ASW system. These exercises and the CNO-directed reevaluation of HS effectiveness reemphasized the value of the SH-3's ASW systems; they could consistently detect and destroy submarines within the missile-firing radius surrounding the carriers. The failure of other air ASW units to detect these exercise submarines (simulating *Foxtrot, Echo II, Charlie* and *Victor* Soviet submarines) serve as a grim reminder that sonobuoys alone will not suffice. Covert ASW operations were also in vogue at that time and HS squadrons recorded an impressive number of confirmed detections in the high noise environment of the carrier task group. In locations with high ambient noise (e.g., the Mediterranean) and high reverberation shallow water conditions (e.g., amphibious landings), the SH-3's dipping sonar proved its effectiveness. Acoustic sonar detections confirmed by MAD led to a high rate of success for the SH-3s. When the SH-3s were fitted with the MK-46 hover-launch torpedo capability in the mid-1970s the helicopter fire control solution was simplified, bringing the HS successful attack score to an impressive level. The SH-3's previous performance has been qualitatively recorded (e.g., cruise reports), but supporting quantitative data is unfortunately of minimal value owing to the lack of standardized methodology/analysis.

HS Today. With this level of performance, why did the CNO direct a restructure of HS squadrons in March 1977? "Fiscal constraints" were cited as the reason for reducing the HS squadron UE (unit equipage) from 8 to 6 helicopters commencing in FY-78. If the SH-3 weapon system was so effective, why the reduction in forces? Why is there no follow-on airframe programmed to replace the aging SH-3 helicopter? Why was the HSX program terminated? Why is the HS squadron so casually dismissed from all discussions of the development of new aircraft carrier/VSTOL employment? Systems

analysis and other economic concepts seem not to have been sufficiently or properly used in substantiating the effectiveness of the present HS weapon system. Systems analysis should not be used to support the program advocate's parochialism, but quantitative economic concepts and comparisons should be used to support the expenditure of funds on future HS concepts. As with all weapon systems, there is some risk in advertising the present effectiveness of the SH-3. If present effectiveness is determined to be low, program opponents will be able to state that the system is not worth the cost. If present effectiveness is determined to be high, these same opponents can criticize improvement programs as not being necessary.

Today, one of the most formidable problems for the CV is the missile-firing SSGN that is usually undetected by other than HS units until it is within missile-firing range. When the CV's inner zone is threatened by an SSGN, its only option is to try to outrun the submarine, its missiles, and its torpedoes. Passive VP, VS, hull-mounted SQS-26 surface ships, and even TASS/TACTASS ships are ineffective in such high noise conditions but the SH-3's active sonar and prompt attack capability are most effective in keeping a threatening submarine submerged, thereby preventing the submarine from obtaining a refined fire-control solution. Submarine skippers have been quoted as saying that the ASW system most difficult to break contact with is the sonar-equipped SH-3, even with the submarine employing countermeasures. These capabilities have been subjectively voiced for several years but each "opinion" has failed to curtail cutbacks in HS forces. One reason for these continual budget reductions has been the highlighting of known system deficiencies, while failing to recognize the weapon system's proven performance. Astute salesmanship by fellow ASW communities has been highly successful in obtaining the necessary funds for their systems. But salesmanship will not suffice; quantitative plus qualitative analysis should be used in making these decisions. Again, proven performance reduces uncertainty and must be used in making a rational decision when allocating resources.

The most restrictive liability for the SH-3 has been its inability to navigate accurately and reliably. This is of paramount importance in coordinated ASW prosecutions. The recently completed OPEVAL (Operational Evaluation) on the SH-3H ASN-123 Tactical Navigation (TACNAV) system quantitatively proved that this handicap has been overcome at minimal cost.[7] The HS aircrew now has a real-time display of the tactical situation, thereby facilitating the tactical decisionmaking process. As a result of this OPEVAL, all future SH-3Hs will be outfitted with the ASN-123 TACNAV. Another restriction on the effectiveness of the SH-3H has been the relatively small area of uncertainty that the helicopter could search. Even with MCJR (multichannel jezebel relay) or AKT-22 data link, the SH-3s have been limited because they must remain in line-of-sight with the CV for sonobuoy acoustic data link. Another limitation has been the time needed to convert an initial "trigger" contact from another ASW unit into a successful attack. The AQS-13E/Sonar Data Computer (SDC) has just recently completed TECHEVAL (Technical Evaluation) and has shown that this on-board acoustic processor can overcome these limitations. This capability to process its own sonobuoys is now being demonstrated during the OPEVAL aboard a LANTFLT ship. Working in conjunction with the S-3A, the VS/HS test team will operationally quantify the SH-3H's ASW capability of protecting the CV task group. Benefits should include a reduction in the response time from the initial detection to target kill, which is crucial in the event that an attack on

the CV is imminent. With both TACNAV and the SDC, the SH-3H will be able to localize submarines more quickly and within a much larger area of uncertainty. The SH-3H's navigation and acoustic/nonacoustic detection capability with TACNAV and SDC is a significant hedge against data link interruption or RF jamming on the sonobuoy VHF frequencies.

Rotary Wing Aircraft of the 1990s. The Navy's current inventory includes 256 H-3 and 95 SH-2 LAMPS MK-I ASW helicopters. The Navy recently informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that it could restructure the SH-60B LAMPS MK-III program to save $401.2 million, thereby preventing the total cancellation of the $3.9 billion program.[8] The Navy expects to continue with 12 CVs in commission into the 1990s with dozens of new DD-963 ASW destroyers and FFG-7 ASW frigates entering the fleet. A careful analysis of the Soviet submarine threat and the proper allocation of funds among competing ASW systems demands that the Navy's decisionmakers use the most cost-effective alternative in satisfying the ASW Mission Element Need Statements (MENS) and the fleet's operational requirements.

Applicable economic decision tools should be employed to determine optimal ASW decisions in the future, with particular emphasis on reducing uncertainty. Because rotary wing technology has improved consistently over the past 30 years, the helicopter is the one ASW platform known to be able to be integrated with other ASW systems for optimum total ASW effectiveness. Proven aircraft performance should be included in any analysis to determine whether and when future VSTOL aircraft will be substitutes for current helicopters. In both the immediate and far future, rotary wing ASW will continue to complement other ASW systems. Economic efficiency and maximum ASW combat effectiveness will concomitantly be achieved by the Navy when these complementary ASW systems are operated in a coordinated mode.

The Navy is investing a record amount of funds on such ASW systems as the P-3C Update III's new IBM digital acoustic processor called "Proteus," LAMPS MK-III, improvements on the S-3A, new surface ASW combatants, SOSUS improvements and towed hydrophone arrays.[9] Each of these programs is vitally important to prevent stagnation in our ASW posture. Vice Admiral Waller warns that " . . . our problem will never be totally solved. ASW forces can never expect to gain the upper hand completely."[10] The Navy must continue the effort to ensure ASW superiority, but this should not be done at the expense of sacrificing current effectiveness, nor cause us to take unnecessary risks. The continual budget constraints applied to the HS community are sacrificing current combat effectiveness (e.g., UE reduction from 8 to 6). These budget reductions in both HS R&D and operating funds are providing additional funds for competing ASW programs, but may lead us into a trap. That crevasse is the predominant reliance on deployable, expendable acoustic detection systems (sonobuoys) that may make existing and even future passive acoustic systems such as "Proteus" obsolete within a decade. Active ASW systems should not be sacrificed to gain improved passive capabilities, especially when deception and countermeasures oftentimes render passive systems ineffective. The same can be said about the Navy's overwhelming reliance on future VSTOL technological achievements. Let us not sacrifice currently proven effective ASW systems and aircraft in our search for "something more."

The SH-60B LAMPS MK-III is a modern rotary wing weapon system capable of ASW, ASST (Antiship Surveillance and Targeting) and utility

missions. The SH-60B's ASW and ASST systems are "state of the art." A low risk and low cost modification of the planned SH-60B sensor suite could retain the invaluable tethered, variable-depth active/passive sonar for acoustic prosecution of threat submarines in the high noise inner zone that surrounds the CV. This is especially attractive from a cost-effectiveness viewpoint as new sonobuoys (DICASS, ERAPS, etc.) are very expensive, expendible sensors; they cannot be retrieved or the hydrophones raised as can a helicopter's sonar transducer, and each has unique acoustic capabilities in different acoustic environments (deep, shallow, high noise, etc.). If procurement funds are not sufficient to permit a modification of the current SH-60B ASW/ASST suite, the proven effective and reliable TACNAV and SDC systems could be installed in the SH-60B airframe thereby retaining the sonobuoy processing and downlink command function for the new command activated buoys. Tests are underway at the Naval Air Development Center to evaluate the improved AQS-18 tethered sonar that began as a U.S. Navy project (AQS-13D) and was later purchased by the Federal Republic of Germany. This improved version of the basic AQS-13 style sonar includes 1,500 feet of cable vice 450 feet, an improved passive detection capability, and other improvements to increase its effectiveness in both shallow and deep water. It has also been specifically designed to counter the Soviet's quiet diesel submarine threat. Because of weight/space restrictions in the SH-60B, it is anticipated that a portion of the MK-III avionics suite will have to be removed in order to incorporate the sonar system. The fact remains that whatever the avionics suite is for the HS variant of the SH-60B, a common aircraft for both HS and HSL squadrons will greatly reduce logistics support, reduce life cycle costs, and enable the Navy to reap the benefits of the contractor's learning curve, i.e., lower unit cost. It is possible that the LAMPS MK-III is the perfect choice to fill the CV's ASW requirements of the 1990s as the aging SH-3s are retired. Congressional scrutiny of the MK-III program can be expected to be even more intense, so the lower unit cost should be attractive to those decisionmakers.

The U.S. Navy will probably always have some sort of SAR/logistics rotary wing aircraft aboard its CVs until the last CV (small, medium, or large) is decommissioned. VSTOL "A" will not be a substitute for the plane guard/utility helicopter. A new utility helicopter could be procured to replace the SH-3. This option, however, would severely reduce the CV's combat capabilities at a time when the Soviet submarine threat continues to grow. Every aircraft in the CV's air wing must contribute to the CV's mission—not merely passive, defensive protection, but the ability to wage a successful, offensive war at sea. The S-3A cannot be retrieved from its outer zone missions if the CV is to survive in the face of the Soviet missile threat (surface tattletales with missile-firing SSGNs). An ASW and ASST capable rotary wing aircraft is required for the CV of the future. The sensor suite is available, and the aircraft is undergoing final development—the SH-60B with the improved AQS-18 tethered sonar.

Spinoffs. Lessons learned from our allies (U.K., Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, etc.) as well as from the Soviet's continued emphasis on tethered sonar-equipped helicopters (Hormone "A" and "B" aboard *Kiev*) give additional credibility to the above recommendation. An additional benefit of incorporating a new helicopter with VDS (variable depth sonar) into the CV air wing of the 1990s is the capability to disperse these valuable air assets to other air-capable ships. With its autonomous capabilities, it could be tactically

embarked aboard dozens of service force and amphibious ships, as well as aboard surface combatants that will have open decks. Assets from HS squadrons could also be embarked in MSC (Military Sealift Command) ships for harbor sanitization and convoy protection during nonmobilization contingencies or war. (The "ARAPAHO" project proposed deploying Reserve HS detachments aboard MSC and merchant containerized ships.) With its integral tactical navigation system, tethered active/passive sonar, sonobuoy processing capability, MAD, radar, ESM, and the improved MK-46 Neartip air/hover launched torpedo, the HS helicopter could easily satisfy a large variety of ASW/ASST missions. Dispersal of these HS helicopters may be one method by which the Navy can attempt to meet the challenges presented by the NATO resupply mission. There is no need for the Navy to wait for a technological breakthrough in VSTOL R&D. Almost all of the primary and collateral tasks envisioned for the VSTOL Type A can be accomplished with a rotary wing aircraft with much less risk, uncertainty and cost. Aircraft speed, of course, will probably always be a limiting factor for rotary wing aircraft. The route leading to VSTOL Types "A" and "B" has been chosen by the Navy, but let us not forget that other systems are complementary, especially the rotary wing helicopter.

Summary. In view of the increasing Soviet submarine threat, severe budget constraints, and inflation, innovative ideas are required to enable our Navy to meet the challenges of the future. Lest we become overly optimistic or dangerously complacent, the Navy's decision-makers must assess the ASW capabilities of our present systems objectively, and then make some very astute, difficult decisions. Renewed emphasis should be placed on the complementary nature of all of our current ASW systems. Increased coordination, C^3, and genuine dialogue between participants will necessarily lead to an increase in overall combat effectiveness. Decisions on R&D expenditures must be seasoned by threat and technological predictions along with an accurate assessment of the risk required. Procurement and full-scale development decisions for future ASW systems must be based on the results of realistic operational testing. Adversaries of the U.S. Navy possess a very potent submarine capability and the challenge must be met with more than "Yankee Ingenuity." That "something more" is dedication to endeavors that minimize risk while delivering the most operationally effective and operationally suitable weapon systems to the fleet. Helicopters and VDS are proven systems that, when mated together, give the Navy an effective ASW system that will help us meet the challenges of the 21st century.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lieutenant Commander Arends was commissioned in 1968 after graduating from St. Mary's College, Minnesota. Prior to entering the present class of the Naval War College he served as Helicopter ASW (HS) Operational Test Director in VX-1 at NAS Patuxent River. He has published articles in *Naval Aviation News* and *Campus* and was the author of the OPTEVFOR Tactics Guide for the new TACNAV-equipped SH-3H helicopter.

NOTES

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Quoting a Japanese view of a "regrettable but understandable decline in American determination and willingness to take a direct role in preserving peace and maintaining the status quo" in Northeast Asia, this paper, originally prepared as a Naval War College student elective requirement, considers the options available to Japan and their significance to U.S. national interests.

THE PORTENTS OF SIGNALS:

U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

by

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Harvey, Jr., U.S. Army

A changing world reflects and is reflected in the Northeast Asian region; the bipolarity of the United States and the U.S.S.R. of the fifties and sixties has evolved into a multipolar situation involving the national interests of the United States, U.S.S.R., China and Japan. The systemic stability of this multipolarity is, of course, fundamental to regional order, but it is also key to a larger world order. The relations between the United States and Japan are fundamentally critical to systemic stability. Heretofore, relations of the two nations generally have been characterized by cooperation and a mutually advantageous security arrangement. This relationship is beginning to alter. Japan's perceived security problem and her economic welfare are generating signals that portend a modified foreign policy. Moreover, U.S. signals, to the Japanese, seem to forecast a redefinition of purposes and commitment in Asia. The signals seem to announce a drifting apart of the United States and Japan.

U.S. Retrenchment. Japan has been the cornerstone of U.S. containment policy in Asia since 1948. The U.S. policy and guarantee of security for Japan have been embodied in the "Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States." The treaty, in essence, promotes cooperation between the two nations, and in addition to stipulating a U.S. guarantee of Japan's security, implicitly provides the so-called "nuclear umbrella" for Japan. As a sort of *quid pro quo*, the treaty also provides for U.S. use of facilities and bases in Japan for the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East."[1] So long as the provisions of the Mutual Security Treaty have remained credible, Japan has felt confident in the commitment of its guarantor.

Containment as a policy in Asia is now outmoded and the Japanese sensing of a number of events has indicated to them a change in U.S. commitment and resolve. The beginning of a changed U.S.

policy was sensed in the articulation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969.[2] The new doctrine spoke of a reduced U.S. involvement in Asia and the expectation that Asian nations would do more for their own defense. Although the subsequent Nixon-Sato Communique seemed to reaffirm the solidarity of U.S.-Japan security arrangements, the Japanese began to have doubts.[3]

The almost simultaneous events of the "Nixon shocks" in 1971 rocked the very foundation of U.S.-Japanese relations. The question of loyalty was raised when Nixon announced his China trip without any prior consultation with or notification of the Japanese Government. It was, to the Japanese, an act of bad faith. Matters were further exacerbated when Nixon announced suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold and the imposition of a 10 percent surtax on most imported goods on 15 August 1971. This was also done without consultation or notification.

While the "Nixon shocks" were in the realm of loyalties, events of the Vietnam war began to raise questions about the U.S. resolve to honor Asian defense commitments. One Japanese observation was that "The U.S. abandonment of South Vietnam was a rude awakening to the emergence of the era of American retrenchment."[4] Vietnamization and U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam were harbingers of an even greater retrenchment from U.S. involvement in Asia. The denouement of the Vietnam episode, the ultimate failure of the United States to support South Vietnam in its final cataclysmic days, projected an image of U.S. foreign policy that bode ill for U.S. allies in Asia. The strength of U.S. resolve came under close scrutiny and questioning.

Almost simultaneously with the pullout from Vietnam, the United States undertook a number of other actions regarding military structure that signaled even greater disengagement from Asian affairs. The U.S. security assistance role was being redefined and a reduction of Military Assistance Group (MAG) personnel was initiated in U.S. organizations assigned to the 17 Asian/Pacific allied nations. While some reduction could be construed as striving for efficiency, the reduction of U.S. personnel in Taiwan could be viewed as nothing less than a gradual withdrawal. As the MAGs were being reduced, the U.S. Army disestablished its major headquarters in the Pacific, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), and changed an Army four-star billet to a two-star billet. Again, although this was an efficiency move, the image projected could be interpreted as retrenchment.

While the MAG reductions and headquarters disestablishment could be quite readily rationalized as organizational efficiency moves (although the Taiwan reduction must have been the most disquieting), President Carter's announcement on 9 March 1977 that he intended to withdraw American ground forces from South Korea within 4 to 5 years could have had nothing but the most profound effect on Japanese confidence in the guarantees of the Mutual Security Treaty. Although subsequent actions and announcements to review the withdrawal action have mitigated the initial effect, troop withdrawals are indeed taking place.[5]

Early in 1978 considerable publicity was devoted to the Administration's articulation of its defense policy in the document entitled "Consolidated Guidance." As publicized, the document enunciated a preponderant NATO-first defense commitment of U.S. forces. The rather widespread publicity and leaks of the import of the putative defense policy must have caused concern among the Japanese.

Attempts have been made to mollify Japanese concerns by official policy statements. Secretary of Defense Brown gave a policy address to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles on 20 February 1978 in which he em-

phatically stated that the United States was a Pacific power "with vital interests and solemn commitments in the region."[6] During his trip to Asia during May 1978, Vice President Mondale also reaffirmed the U.S. commitment.[7]

Notwithstanding the pronouncements of U.S. leaders, altered regional circumstances attendant with U.S. force reductions portray a diminished commitment. The Japanese view is of an era of U.S. retrenchment and reappraisal of its international commitment in the face of a multipolar balance of power. The decline of U.S. military strength, enhanced Soviet power, particularly naval capabilities, and the decline of relative U.S. economic strength leaves the Japanese with one conclusion: there is a "regrettable but understandable decline in American determination and willingness to take a direct role in preserving peace and maintaining the status quo."[8]

Economic Divergence. Economic cooperation, once a hallmark of U.S.-Japanese relations, has become a source of concern and growing friction. The signals emanating from the clash of two aggressive economic giants suggest an ultimate divergence of interests.

The economic miracle of Japan is well known and, to be certain, it was a plank of U.S. policy to encourage the Japanese recovery with aid, a free trade policy and defense assurances. The phenomenal Japanese growth was certainly because of a national industriousness but, more tangibly, national policy direction to industries and strong protectionist measures against foreign competition by restricting imports and foreign capital investment contributed in no small part.

The very nature of the trade policies of the United States and Japan, free trade versus protectionist, has caused the growth of an enormous U.S. trade deficit and resulted in friction between the two nations. Despite agreements over the years and Japanese assurances to reduce the trade imbalance, the U.S. trade deficit has continued to grow. The September 1978 trade surplus was the fourth largest ever and it closed the Japanese semiannual period with a record surplus of $10 billion. The September surplus was $2.11 billion and reversed a trend toward improvement.[9] This occurred despite an agreement with the United States in January 1978 to cut tariff walls and quotas.

The perception of U.S. business interests is that Japanese government subsidies, restriction of imports, and Japanese "dumping" on U.S. markets cause U.S. industries difficulty in competing in their own home markets.[10] Another U.S. view is that the process of dismantling and relaxing controls and regulations has been too long and too slow.[11] Related to the trade agreements, the American perception is that U.S. business is all but shut out of Japanese markets. There are very few signs that promises are being kept. Assistant Commerce Secretary Frank Weil has said that restrictions have been replaced by a mentality of the Japanese businessman, inculcated over 100 years, that "I shouldn't import."[12] Moreover, despite the view that in terms of official policy Japan is about as open as other OECD member countries, Japanese customs and complicated distrubution system make trade extremely frustrating for U.S. business interests. More significantly, the perception is of an existence of a policy of exclusion.

The dire situation of the trade deficit has led to virtual threats by U.S. government officials. On 8 November 1978 Secretary Schlesinger warned the Japanese about the implications of this year's trade surplus that will be some $17.5 billion. He compared this with the deficit of $19 billion for *all* the OPEC nations together.[13] And Frank Weil of Commerce warned that, if Japan "cannot bring some balance, it will be inevitable for the U.S. to protect its market."[14]

The paradox of the Japanese economic success is that it is transforming traditional trading partners into adversaries. Pressures are beginning to bear upon Japan to diversify its economic markets and expand its import market. One analysis suggests that Japan divert a measure of its resources to improve the domestic economy, which has been relatively neglected in comparison to the industrial economy and trading market.[15] In essence, Japan is faced with the dilemma of maintaining its economic growth and world status while at the same time ameliorating the frustrations and dissatisfaction of its major trading partners.

Counterbalancing Interests and Decisions. The options available to Japan to protect its basic national interests of security and economic well being are three: (1) maintenance of the status quo, (2) diversion of emphasis to domestic economy, and (3) expansion of its markets to other nations and increase defense expenditures (independence and rearmament).

Maintenance of the status quo is the easiest course but it is seen as being ultimately damaging to the economy because it would generate U.S. and European protectionist measures. Such a policy also could lead to serious disenchantment by the United States with a consequent further retrenchment and debilitation of the U.S. defense "umbrella." Development of the domestic economy is viewed as too costly and would slow down economic growth so dependent upon export trade. Development of other export market regions offers a long-range solution that also defines a more independent foreign policy and a gradual shift away from dependence on U.S. markets and defense.

The altered Asian political circumstances have encouraged Japan to cultivate regional markets and develop more realistic defense measures. The evidence seems inescapably to signal the reorientation of Japan more towards the East. Contrary to the attitude of the sixties and early seventies, Japan now perceives a growing threat from the U.S.S.R.[16] This fact, along with current international economic pressures and evidence of U.S. withdrawal, has stimulated Japan to play *their* China card.

Japan and China concluded a $20 billion trade pact on 16 February 1978, whereby China will purchase three Japanese steel plants, and the accompanying technology, in exchange for the sale of coal and other resources.[17] Japan and China also ratified a peace and friendship treaty on 23 October 1978 that ties the two nations even closer together for regional interests.[18] To be certain, China's renascent interest in international affairs has made all this possible, but the Japanese evidently are capitalizing fully on the opportunity. Moreover, Japan is not excluding opportunities for eventual trade with the U.S.S.R., notwithstanding the anti-hegemony clause of the China treaty that was pointedly directed at Russia. Japan had business conferences with Russia beginning 7 December 1978.[19]

A more dramatic change in Japan's course can be found in the evidence of

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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Japan's growing defense efforts. The most recent defense budget proposal calls for an expenditure of ¥ 2 trillion (GNP is approximately ¥ 200 trillion). This represents an increase of 12.3 percent from the FY 78 budget and could make Japan the seventh biggest spender on defense after the U.S.S.R., United States, China, Germany, France and Great Britain. The nature of the defense expenditures for more destroyers and modernization of the current destroyer fleet provides evidence of greater self-reliance and less dependence on the U.S. 7th Fleet.[20] Once anathema to Japanese national attitudes and governmental policy, a stronger defense arm is now meeting with acceptance and encouragement–along with an attendant growing nationalism.[21]

A review of the available evidence strongly suggests that a combination of the international stimuli found in altered circumstances along with Japanese perceptions of U.S. retrenchment and their own security problem, in addition to trade problems, dictate a change in Japanese national imperatives.

A reorientation of Japanese priorities indicates a drifting away from the close ties with the United States. This conclusion suggests the need for further analysis of the questions of how far the drift will go; implications for regional multipolarity; and, finally, the significance to U.S. national interests.

NOTES

1. *Defense of Japan*, Report by Japanese Defence Agency, 1976, p. 34; Fred Greene, *Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 35-36.

2. Hideake Kase, "Northeast Asian Security: A View from Japan," *Comparative Strategy*, Nos. 1 & 2, 1978, p. 96; James H. Buck, ed., *The Modern Japanese Military System* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), pp. 199-216.

3. Greene, p. 38. The Nixon-Sato Communique of 21 November 1969 provided for the reversion of Okinawa, proclaimed the maintenance of the Mutual Security Treaty in its present form and included a statement by Sato that the security of Korea was essential to Japan's own security.

4. Kase, p. 97.

5. *Facts on File*, 1978, p. 301. Secretary of Defense Brown, in a Tokyo press conference, 10 November 1978, said U.S. forces will be reduced to 12,000-14,000 people by the end of 1982.

6. *Facts on File*, p. 126.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 360.

8. Kase, p. 95.

9. *Japan Times Weekly*, 21 October 1978, p. 2.

10. John J. Nevin, "Can U.S. Business Survive Our Japanese Trade Policy?" *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1978, pp. 165-177.

11. James C. Abegglen, "Facing up to the Trade Gap with Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978, p. 147.

12. *Time*, 13 November 1978, p. 92.

13. *The New York Times*, 8 November 1978, p. D5.

14. *Japan Times Weekly*, 14 October 1978, p. 3.

15. Herman Kahn's new book, *The Japanese Challenge* (not yet in English), as reported in *Newsweek*, 30 October 1978, p. 54.

16. *Defense of Japan*, pp. 10-30.

17. *Facts on File*, p. 103; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 March 1978, p. 40.

18. *Japan Times Weekly*, 28 October 1978, p. 1; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 November 1978, p. 10.

19. *Japan Times Weekly*, 28 October 1978, p. 9.

20. *Japan Times Weekly*, 2 September 1978, p. 1.

21. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 June 1978, pp. 35-44; Buck, pp. 219-230.

The nation benefits from the existence of the Navy, even in absence of war, but a fuller, more coherent, realization of those benefits is possible if they are included in the considerations and deliberations leading to the structuring and operation of the Navy.

THE WAR OF UNENGAGED FORCES—

SUPERPOWERS AT SEA

IN AN ERA OF COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE

by

Commander Russell L. Madison, U.S. Navy

Introduction. In this age, the terms "war" and "peace" do not suffice to describe the complex realities with which the statesman and the soldier must grapple. "Unengaged force warfare" is a concept that transcends this difficulty and allows us to examine the critical challenges that face our nation today. The most active frontier in unengaged force warfare at present is at sea, and it is here that the eventual outcome of unengaged force warfare may well be decided.

As a great power, the United States has a choice for the future. Our Navy can be required to keep planning and operating as it has, under the assumption that this planning and operating is both efficient and sufficient, or that assumption can be questioned. Is the Navy really efficient? Or can it better maintain the peace while retaining constant or improved wartime readiness? And do our present capabilities for war match the tasks of war? No matter how efficient the capabilities are for certain missions, if the Navy lacks overall combat readiness, the economy is false. Numerous studies dwell on certain wartime deficiencies,[1] and the most acute receive the most attention—as they should. But there are other, less direct, threats that should also be considered.

The Soviet strategy in unengaged force warfare postpones the decisive battle and chooses to confront the West with a series of small-risk maneuvers—a policy of encroachment that risks minor setbacks for the small gains that can eventually accumulate to satisfy long-term goals.[2] Soviet maneuvers in search of such "small risk" opportunities have today led the Soviets to sea, and confront the West with a worldwide challenge that is both diffuse and difficult to fully identify. At least part of this challenge is the indirect attack on U.S. influence. U.S. strategy does not set a

high priority on countering expansion of Soviet influence that erodes the relative U.S. position of influence in the world. While no shots have been exchanged, new perceptions of the implications of Soviet naval capabilities have replaced old perceptions of unchallenged U.S. naval superiority at sea in war or peace.

By far the most disturbing aspect of this situation has been the failure of the United States to view this as a serious problem. This vulnerability can be defended by forces properly structured and maintained—this task should be included among our other critical warfare tasks to ensure that the forces needed for this task are viewed as central, and not peripheral, to the needs of the nation. For the United States, engaged force warfare is the *raison d'etre* for naval forces, but we should not let ourselves become so mesmerized by certain sea control and power projection missions that we fail to provide either for required combat readiness or for protracted peacetime competition.

That this is necessary, now more than ever before, results from both a contracting Navy and an expanding threat. Many of the tasks that we could confidently carry out on an ad hoc basis with a more robust and rendundant force, we must now either plan for explicitly or abandon. While our basic mission has not changed, our capability to undertake derivative tasks is becoming increasingly circumscribed. "Naval presence" is an example of one such derivative task. Although the U.S. 6th and 7th Fleets have taken on an important presence mission, this is being done possibly at the expense of their military missions. In "The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare" the two missions are seen to be related.

Successful combat capability is essential and it must be insured before all else. But a capability cannot be substituted for a strategy. The former says only that if we get into a shooting war we will win. The latter must consider the broader problems of using those capabilities to achieve U.S. objectives without recourse to war—or, if war comes, bringing it to a conclusion that is acceptable to the United States at the lowest possible level of violence. A constraint, increasingly binding, is that these things be done as economically as possible.

The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare addresses these broader problems. To a combat foundation we add concepts of presence, credible threat, perception, and influence. This leads to "The Efficient Program," in which it is suggested that naval capabilities might be restructured or created to better produce the benefits we seek.

Several examples are given of programs, deployments, and forces that do (or could) contribute to the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy in war and peace. In addition to sharpening our focus on the tasks of war, establishment of a legitimate peacetime task for the U.S. Navy is recommended. A comprehensive, coherent political-military strategy is called for. Regional analyses of naval warfare tasks in pursuance of explicit political and military objectives is seen as the key to an adequate and efficient Navy.

Framework for Peacetime—the Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare. The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare is supported by five axioms; the first defines its benefits.

Axiom 1. Benefit in unengaged force warfare is the achievement of a political objective.

Political objectives are formulated in various ways, and can often be achieved by other than naval means. A list appropriate, but not unique, to naval means in peacetime might include:[3]

- Supporting friends and clients;
- Coercing enemies;

- Neutralizing similar activities by others;
- Advertising one's seapower;
- Training and improving Allied navies;
- Encouraging other navies to take a burden off U.S. Navy; and
- Exerting a more diffuse influence in politically ambiguous situations in which even one's own objectives may be uncertain.

When naval means are employed as a political tool or element of foreign policy, the concept of presence must always be considered. Naval presence is not a simple concept; its meaning has been compromised by overuse and underprecision until today it means essentially anything one wants it to.

Adm. James L. Holloway III, when Chief of Naval Operations, provided a definition of naval presence when he pointed out the key elements that would make such presence effective:

> The effectiveness of naval presence cannot be considered separately from war-fighting capability. In order to encourage friends, deter enemies, or influence neutrals, forces deployed to crisis areas must possess a war-fighting capability .... To be effective in the presence role, naval forces must reflect a readily perceived capability for carrying out the implied threats.[4]

It is illuminating to examine the operative elements of Admiral Holloway's definition for in addition to combat capabilities, essential to wartime roles as well as peacetime presence, he cites two additional attributes unique to the peacetime mission:

- Threat must be credible;
- Capabilities must be perceived.

These attributes are the bases for the next two axioms of unengaged force warfare.

Axiom 2. Credible threat, in unengaged force warfare, requires conventional offensive military capabilities.

If the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States is not already an incredible proposition, it is rapidly becoming that. When the United States can no longer credibly threaten the first use of nuclear weapons to achieve political objectives then we confront the reality that any use of nuclear weapons will occur only after actual war begins, and then only if the Soviet Union chooses to provoke that use. In this context, nuclear weapons are not relevant to the "small risk" challenges of the Soviet Union in unengaged force warfare.

What conventional capabilities are relevant to unengaged force warfare? This question is answered by:

Axiom 3. Perceived capabilities are the only relevant capabilities in unengaged force warfare.

Combat capabilities are clearly necessary in war; but as long as engaged conflict is avoided, the battle is fought in the arena of world perceptions and the outcome is constructed by men in terms of the predicted outcome of putative battle. In this battle of perceived capabilities, observe Hoeber and Schneider, "... an imbalance can increase the danger of a Hobson's choice for the United States between hostilities and concessions under diplomatic coercion by the Soviet Union."[5] Actual combat capabilities are related to perceptions, and are frequently the very substance of those perceptions. Yet it is the perception itself, and not the capability, that counts in unengaged force warfare.

As navies come to rely more and more on "black box" technology and other less-visible elements of war, there is a growing possibility of gross divergence between perceived

capabilities, which contribute to power in the absence of actual combat, and actual combat effectiveness. Specifically, can the U.S. Navy defeat in this battle a 6,000-ton Russian ship (described as a cruiser), bristling with radars and electronic equipment, and crammed with multiple guns, surface-to-surface missiles, antiaircraft missiles, and antisubmarine rocket launchers, with an 8,000-ton destroyer, clean of line, deploying one gun, a missile launcher, and a helicopter?[6]

And what of the Soviet *Kiev*-class carrier? Though judged inferior to U.S. aircraft carriers in traditional combat roles,[7] *Kiev* is highly successful politically; it adds strength to perceptions of a growing "blue-water" Soviet Navy.[8] In marked contrast to the carrier building program of the United States, more *Kievs* are under construction, and a follow-on class is likely. In coming years, as *Kiev* and her sisters become increasingly numerous on the world's oceans, and U.S. forces increasingly scarce, the Soviet Navy will emerge the de facto winner in yet another battle of the War of Unengaged Forces. It matters little what the wartime purposes of these ships may be.

"In time of peace," observes naval strategist James Cable, "a superior warship on the spot can achieve results not obtainable in other ways and without regard to the purpose for which the ship was built. What counts is the existence of the Soviet Navy, not the original motives of its builders."[9] This does not suggest designing ships to frighten rather than to fight: few things would be more ludicrous than a seagoing equivalent of the Potemkin village. There will always arise those occasional extreme situations in which force must actually be applied or resisted to achieve specific objectives. If the Potemkin fleet has not been exposed until this point, it surely will be exposed in such a situation.

The incalculable political losses to a nation thus exposed would far exceed any dollars that could possibly be saved through the "facade" strategy. For the United States an "adequate" level of perceived capabilities has generally meant enough to maintain a stable international framework within which orderly change and growth can occur. Actions that threaten the stability of the system must be discouraged (or penalized). The loss of perceived capabilities would lessen the ability of the United States to maintain such a system and would ultimately limit the nation's access to system benefits.

In extreme situations, in which perceptions are tested, engaged conflict can be viewed as a mechanism for adjusting perceptions to capabilities. If the outcome is favorable, improved perceptions will allow policy to become more assertive—or less acquiescent. Conversely, if the outcome is unfavorable perceptions of capabilities will be reduced, and policy will be more constrained. Mechanisms other than engaged bilateral conflict can also shape perceptions.

Limited wars and a variety of regional conflicts have allowed nations, including the Soviet Union and the United States, to project some perceptions of combat capability far beyond the battlefield. But how is this done for capabilities that are not demonstrated in battle? Harder yet, how is this done when there is no battle? The Soviet Union seems to have considered this problem and deals with it in a variety of ways, one of which is propaganda.

The Soviet Union supports an enormous propaganda program that has as one objective manipulation of the perceptions of target nations or groups to bring about desired action (or inaction). The catechism recited—sometimes implicitly—by the Soviet leadership is that, through an inevitable and irreversible world process—the continuing change in the "correlation of forces" in Russia's favor[10]—the United States must fall militarily behind the Soviet Union. This repetitious Soviet chant has strong

effects on Western perceptions: concessions made to the Soviet Union in SALT, for example, are sometimes explained by the argument, "... if it were not for this Agreement the Soviets would increase their margin of superiority to some even larger extent."[11]

The naval refrain in this chant has become Gorshkov's oft-quoted dictum, "Sooner or later they [Americans] will have to understand that they have no mastery whatsoever of the seas. The flag of the Soviet Navy today flies proudly over the oceans."[12] This quote appears often in Western publications. It is featured in the U.S. Navy's official and widely circulated primer, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*[13]--but far from becoming a rallying point for effective U.S. response as was undoubtedly intended, the claim seems to have met with some feeling of inevitability in the West.

Soviet media have persistently compared favorably the strength of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, the 5th Escadra,[14] with that of the U.S. 6th Fleet; and the strength of the Soviet Navy to the strength of the U.S. Navy. In contrast, the United States has no coherent peacetime naval philosophy or objective. If there is a persistent theme, it is the message of decline in American naval power transmitted by the American media and official Navy statements. Edward Luttwak assesses the effects of these processes:

> Whatever the imperatives of self-denigration imposed by the Congressional appropriation process, it is obvious that this official stance of the U.S. Navy must intrude on third-party perceptions of the (naval) balance of power. In the absence of full, or in many cases, any, technical knowledge, third-party political leaders will be influenced, as will public opinion, by what the media tell them.
>
> ... The more sophisticated observers will discount the latter to some extent, mindful of the particular political circumstances that prevail in the United States, but even so, the message of American naval decline will nevertheless intrude on their perceptions ... America's friends and clients are discouraged and intimidated by the presumed adverse trend in the balance of naval power; her enemies, on the other hand, are encouraged to believe that they may harm American interests with impunity.[15]

These problems are often ignored by the United States with a certain ethnocentrism. When the problems are not ignored, proposed solutions often appear to be inconsistent with the overarching U.S. principles of free speech and fair play, and the solutions are not accepted. The basic problem remains:

How can the United States, while maintaining war capabilities, most efficiently and effectively improve world perceptions of those capabilities during times of peace?

In discussing perceptions, Luttwak referred to effects on America's friends and clients as well as her enemies. This suggests an important distinction between engaged force warfare, in which the only target is the enemy, and unengaged force warfare. This distinction is made explicit in:

Axiom 4. The targets of unengaged force warfare are:

- Your friends and neutrals;
- Your enemies;
- Yourselves.

What means does the United States have of influencing the perceptions of these groups?[16]

Influencing Friends and Neutrals. U.S. naval activities frequently affect the perceptions of friends and neutrals. Such activities include:[17]

- Joint and combined operations and training;

- Deployments, operations, and exercises that give media, naval professionals, and invited dignitaries an opportunity to witness U.S. capabilities firsthand;
- Mine clearing;
- Carrier air shows,
- Marine amphibious demonstrations.

These and similar activities can be readily carried out in a way to enhance perceptions of U.S. combat capability. None of these activities has an explicit "perceptions" objective, but all do support or could be modified to support such an objective. At the same time, care must be taken to avoid damaging perceptions of U.S. naval capabilities unnecessarily.

Influencing Enemies. Many of the previous activities that influence friends and neutrals would affect adversary perceptions of U.S. naval power and capabilities. Charles Peterson illustrates how the Soviet Union has exploited one such activity, the fleet exercise, in a way seemingly designed to influence the perceptions of others;

> The fleet exercise, like the port visit, is a time-honored instrument of policy; but the Soviets have given it new dimensions. Nothing quite like *Okean* in 1970 or *Okean*-75 five years later had ever been witnessed before; and if statements by Western military leaders are any indication, both exercises have had important effects on Western perceptions of Soviet naval power. As a demonstration of a great power's global reach, the word-wide, coordinated naval "maneuver" is a Soviet innovation, the successor to the round-the-world cruise of Theodore Roosevelt's day.
>
> Because it more closely resembles what the Soviet Union's adversaries might actually be faced with in a shooting war, it also has a greater effect on their naval planning. On a smaller scale, simulated missile strikes on nearby U.S. carrier forces in periods of international calm have, by dint of their effect on these targets, widened the vocabulary of action language available to the U.S.S.R. for signalling during crises.[18]

Influencing Ourselves. The effect of perceptions on ourselves, and the influence these perceptions have on how we design, build, and even operate our Navy, have far-reaching consequences. Luttwak referred to this when he expressed concern that seepage of public relations attitudes into the thought and disposition of the U.S. Navy might have damaging consequences; and he prophetically suggested that this might give rise to a defensive orientation inconsistent with the vital role of the Navy. "In the latter context," he observed, "strategic nuclear forces and land-based deployments are indeed defensive and reactive, and only the U.S. Navy can provide an offensive element in what would otherwise be an unblanced defense-only posture."[19]

The professional training and operational experiences of Navy officers over the courses of their careers are probably the greatest determinants shaping their perceptions of U.S. naval capabilities. Such programs as the Atlantic Tactical Command Readiness Program[20] provide training in strategy, operations, tactics, and capabilities. Various other programs,[21] exercises, and operations emphasize tactical training in realistic threat environments, and contribute to our own perceptions of our capabilities. Such training produces not only the readiness benefits by which such programs are justified, but perceptions benefits that are largely intangible.

These activities—affecting friends and neutrals, enemies, and ourselves—all

contribute to how U.S. naval capabilities are perceived in the world. Perceptions are important in unengaged force warfare, and up to a point, with constant capabilities, greater influence can be achieved by improving perceptions. The final problem of peace in The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare is returning to a condition of peace, from a prior condition of war.

War Termination. Unengaged force warfare is interrupted by violent conflict, but always resumes after the battles end. After the initial battles, a great deal more is known about the enemy's strength than before the war. As fighting continues, its purposes change—as do the forces required to achieve those purposes. After the final battle, it is the threat of what is to come, more than the damage already done, that determines the combatants' powers of coercion over one another.

While damage already done does determine how much additional damage an enemy might be willing to endure, it is the surviving capability of the attacker to inflict that additional damage that is relevant. Restating an earlier axiom slightly, we obtain:

Axiom 5. Surviving capabilities are the only capabilities relevant at war's end.

How perceptions of U.S. naval capabilities might be improved to contribute to U.S. power and prevention of war have been discussed. Providing for the required residual capabilities at war's end requires another approach. We can begin by identifying those capabilities and resources that, after engaged force warfare ends, will contribute the most to war termination negotiations. This approach is unconventional in that we are beginning with a desired ending, and working backwards toward an optimum beginning. The effort should give additional important insights on what our prehostility force requirements really are and what the strategy for using these forces should be to ensure that the desired posthostility forces survive.

A strategy of preserving with certainty a portion of our power projection force might be recommended, realizing that after a great war, land-based air forces would be scarce or nonexistent. Sea-based air forces might have far greater influence over events through being preserved for purposes of coercion during war termination negotiations, than they would have had through use and expenditure earlier in the war.

Provisions to retain a postwar sea control capability might also be considered; particularly when noting the buildup in forward-deployed, highly mobile, offensive weapons poised against NATO in ratios far more overpowering than faced by the Allies in the days preceding Dunkirk.

Evidence exists[22] that the Soviet Union has both the forces and capabilities necessary for implementation of a limited naval withholding strategy in the event of war with the United States. The point cannot be made strongly enough that in the absence of adequate U.S. residual capabilities, *Kiev* and the remainder of the Soviet general-purpose Navy could exercise sea denial and exert psychological pressure possibly decisive and certainly deleterious to U.S. interests in war-termination negotiations.

If plans and programs can be modified to be more supportive of the political role that naval forces play in peacetime, and if naval forces can be designed or deployed to be even more usable as instruments of political influence, then how should these be done? The answer is given in two parts: the first part discusses the present program, the second part discusses ways we might modify the present program to achieve a more efficient program.

The Present Program. Present force planning is based on two concepts: deterrence and combat.[23] Naval

mobility and ability to project conventional power on land is not now being exploited in our overall deterrence strategy. Our combat capability is being more and more fitted to the requirements of a single NATO war scenario. A third concept, influence, eludes definition and escapes attention. Influence is slippery. The fundamental difficulty is that influence is a nonobservable—we see and measure only claims to influence.

A second difficulty is that techniques of influence are very much dependent on whom we are trying to influence. What might impress a Third World country may not impress the Soviet Union. The potential military capability represented by a hidden missile-equipped submarine might influence the leadership of a totalitarian society in important ways but have no influence on the less-elite elements of an emerging African nation.

In time of peace, influence tends to dominate international political behavior; but we do not know enough about the linkage between military capability and influence. Even without physical contact, influence can be as potent as cannon shot.

For the United States, influence is not a factor we consider in justifying naval force levels—naval forces are calibrated to limited views of deterrence and combat. It would be rather remarkable if a Navy structured mainly for nuclear deterrence and NATO war is the best Navy for all seasons. The best the United States can hope to do now is to have forces that, in the aggregate, will influence the right people, in the right way.

When dealing with peacetime uses of naval power, studies usually begin by analyzing previous peacetime uses of naval power. Unfortunately, such studies are limited to considering only those cases in which that power has been used in some observable way, and cannot consider cases where the existence of that power alone made unnecessary its use. The problem of peacetime use of naval power, with its ambiguities, its subleties and nuances, and its subjective measures, is a "soft" problem and for the most part analytically intractable. Engaged force warfare, in even its most violent moments, is the more certain problem to deal with analytically.[24] We avoid the soft problems of unengaged force warfare altogether by assuming that violent conflict is a "worst case," and arguing that planning to fight worst cases will be more than adequate for all other cases. This critical assumption has already failed and the final judgment of history may be that planning adequate for fighting war was inadequate for preventing or terminating war, or for protecting worldwide U.S. interests in peacetime.

Studies of the peacetime uses of naval power are frustrated not only by an inability to look below some arbitrary, observable threshold, but also by the fact that the uses that are observed are not true images—they are only reflections of pragmatic applications of that power. Forces used in reaction are ad hoc; they almost always will have been designed for a specific wartime mission, with crews and staffs trained for that mission. This design and training process aids in achieving maximum combat efficiency in war but it can serve us poorly in other situations.

In crises during peacetime, decisionmakers will generally be required to use these forces in ways dictated by their wartime design. Under increasing stress, decisionmakers will focus on immediate rather than long-term consequences, and will have a tendency to apply learned wartime routines and standard procedures that may be inappropriate to new circumstances.

It is not surprising to find historical studies of the peacetime uses of naval forces revealing little of the full range of uses actually available. The question of

using (much less building and operating) naval forces in a nonreactive mode, in new ways not related to combat, really never comes up. Peacetime's unique needs, as well as those in common with war, should be considered; and those combined needs should be reflected in the way we build and operate our Navy.[25]

The attack carrier specifically, and the Navy in general, have utility not only in actual battle, but they have utility at every level of competition and conflict in unengaged force warfare as well. We often forget that the greatest contribution of carriers and Marines in this postwar period has, like NATO, been that of preventing the crises and catastrophes that did not happen. To praise the value of these forces in terms related to crises that do occur, like calculating the numbers of these forces "required" on the basis of crises that could occur, overlooks this central point.

Aircraft carriers, the multifaceted centerpieces of our general-purpose naval forces, with their awesome seapower capabilities, are becoming increasingly difficult to justify on the basis of what they do in war: memories of past wars are becoming less vivid, and views of future wars are uncertain or ambiguous. Analyses that limit examination of the uses of naval forces to the most threatening or analytically tractable cases, or exclude contributions outside of certain artificially constructed categories, fail to discover the full range of contributions made by naval forces in unengaged force warfare.

Assigning small or negligible values to the contributions made by naval forces in unengaged force warfare makes it difficult or impossible to justify the existence of forces for such purposes, and also reduces the incentive for using any other forces for these purposes. This places the United States at a disadvantage in competition with a Soviet adversary whose values are different from ours, particularly if the relevant values of those whom we wish to influence are similar to those Soviet values.

The Efficient Program. The efficient program must provide naval capabilities calibrated to warfare tasks; and the tasks must be consistent with overall U.S. political objectives. The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare presented a number of peacetime political objectives—supporting friends and clients, coercing enemies, advertising one's seapower, and others. There are also wartime objectives:

- Rapidly and effectively responding to crises;
- Maintaining clear force superiority at the point(s) of crisis, in the face of a Soviet buildup;
- Minimizing vulnerabilities at other points that might be threatened by Soviet military force.

Without a comprehensive political-military strategy it is almost impossible to articulate how these various objectives of peace and war should be weighted or ordered. But even without such a strategy, the concepts of unengaged force warfare can help us to achieve some peacetime objectives by the way we structure or operate some of our combat forces.

We might want to ensure, first, as we meet the various objectives of war, that adequate perceptions of these capabilities also exist. There are many ways to do this. Worldwide exercises offer one means of demonstrating many of these capabilities on a global scale. Smaller exercises might demonstrate how we act to minimize certain naval vulnerabilities. In 6th Fleet exercises, for example, U.S. aircraft carriers might be routinely withdrawn from the Eastern Mediterranean, and augmented for a later return. This would condition nations including the Soviet Union to view such initial actions as possibly signaling a higher level of resolve and readiness in crises, and

would avoid giving a false impression of abandonment.

There is another, more vital, thing that we should do to minimize vulnerability. To minimize vulnerability the United States must be able to capitalize fully on advanced technology. And we must be able to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. For the Navy, for example, to reduce the threat to U.S. carriers—thereby enhancing the survivability and credibility of the West's conventional deterrent capability—both the Aegis system and cruise missile system developments could be accelerated. Cruise missiles, armed with conventional warheads, could be widely deployed and instantly available to reduce two key threats to U.S. carriers.[26]

- Soviet Backfire bombers, while on the ground; and their runways.
- Soviet submarines, while in port; and their bases.

This last point offsets a "surge" advantage the Soviets are often assumed to possess owing to their practice of keeping a relatively large percentage of their naval forces in port.

Ship numbers and types, operating patterns, and command flexibility should be designed with both NATO and non-NATO contingencies in mind. In the event of NATO war in central Europe, the Navy's contribution is seen more and more as one of sea control in the North Atlantic—and current capabilities are beginning to reflect this thinking. A more efficient strategy might require improving U.S. naval capabilities to threaten worldwide Soviet military vulnerabilities as a deterrent to war; and in the event of war, attacking these vulnerabilities to bring about war termination more quickly.

In vital areas outside NATO, where our policies are sometimes tentative and indecisive, we may have an equal if not greater need for a strong, flexible Navy. It may also be an area in which perceptions play the greatest role; yet it is in just such areas where we find our capabilities stretched most thinly, and our reserves most marginal. A comprehensive political-military strategy would identify such areas, and would be a necessary first step towards establishing the required U.S. presence. Reasonably frequent naval deployments, with excursions designed specifically to highlight that presence, should be an early result of such a strategy. The deployments should be publicized, and the strength of the naval forces should be respectable. Aircraft carriers and our most modern surface combatants should be sent.[27]

A comprehensive political-military strategy would help to ensure that U.S. policies and naval capabilities are complementary at all points where the interests of the United States and the interests of the Soviet Union clash. A region-by-region analysis, at each point of intersection, would then be possible in which we could examine our combat readiness in each warfare task relevant to that region. Where deficiencies are discovered policies might be changed, or capabilities improved, to prevent later losses. Regions that should be examined today include:

- NATO's Flanks—northern, Baltic, Mediterranean;
- Western Pacific/Northeast Asia;
- Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf;
- South Atlantic.

With continuously changing political conditions in which technological advances continually alter military capabilities equations, no fixed formulas are possible. We must handle the present threat, and provide for future security efficiently. Striving for an efficient program is a task that has to be tackled afresh every day and each day's challenge requires new maneuvers.

Conclusion. The distinctions made in discussing activities and forces needed to prevent war, to fight war, and to end war, are artificial in one sense: for planning purposes war/nonwar is a

continuum. As we plan for deterrence, we must also plan for failure of deterrence; and as we plan for war we must plan for termination of war. The activities and forces that exist for one need affect the calculations for other needs. For example, the same capabilities that influence allies prior to war also work to retain those allies during war and later.

In a practical sense, though, these distinctions are very real for the U.S. Navy is becoming more task-specific, and more objective-oriented. We have the choice of adding to the tasks of nuclear deterrence and sea control the tasks of unengaged force warfare, and letting these combined tasks generate Navy resource requirements; or we can attempt to do all things on a budget based on nuclear deterrence and sea control alone.

We need to look at both peace before war and peace after war and ensure that vital U.S. objectives in each are identified and provided for. Widening our mission to include these peacetime objectives will require developing some new means of accomplishment. This might require increases in some forces, and different designs or deployments for others. Our strategic nuclear forces, for example, were built more for political/deterrent purposes than combat ones and we only now may be paying the price. New or modified procedures for recommending, gaining approval for and implementing programs with political objectives will have to be developed.

The objective is to win the war of unengaged forces. Comprehensive political-military planning for this objective will produce greater benefits during times of peace, and will retain undiminished the essential capabilities for victory in the event of war.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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NOTES

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1. A majority of this literature is classified; one influential study is F.J. West, Jr., *Sea Plan 2000* (cited in Dirck Halstead, "The Navy Under Attack," *Time*, 8 May 1978, pp. 14-24). James D. Hessman, "Sea Plan 2000," *Sea Power*, May 1978, pp. 26-28, cites differences between Sea Plan 2000 and the DOD Consolidated Guidance memorandum sent to the services for use in future force and budget planning. The Consolidated Guidance focuses on the NATO Central Front and reduces the Navy's shipbuilding programs. The long-range shipbuilding plans in the Consolidated Guidance would give the Navy between 400 and 450 ships at the turn of the century. Sea Plan 2000 develops three future force alternatives of 439, 535, and 585 ships by the year 2000.

2. R. Strausz-Hupé, et al., *Protracted Conflict* (New York: Harper, 1959).

3. Hedley Bull, "Sea Power and Political Influence," *Power at Sea I, The New Environment*, Adelphi papers, no. 122, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 6.

4. James L. Holloway III, *CNO Report—Fiscal Year 1979 Military Posture and Budget of the United States Navy* (Washington: Dept. of the Navy, March 1978), p. 14.

5. Francis P. Hoeber and William Schneider, Jr., *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), pp. 1-2.

6. Edward N. Luttwak, Studies in International Affairs Number 23, *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 43.

7. James W, Kehoe, et al., "U.S. Observations of the *Kiev*," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, July 1977, pp. 105-111; Ulrich Schulz-Torge, "The *Kiev*: A German View," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, July 1977, pp. 111-115; and William R. Hynes, "The Role of the *Kiev* in Soviet Naval Operations," *To Use the Sea—Readings in Seapower and Maritime Affairs* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), pp. 324-328.

8. Michael MccGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," *Soviet Oceans Development*, Committee Print, 94th Congress (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1976), p. 90; Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 180, expands on a concept introduced by MccGwire in discussing "surplus," and the flexibility that this quantity gives the Soviet Navy with *Kiev*.

9. James Cable, *The Soviet Union in Europe and the Near East: Her Capabilities and Intentions* (England: Southampton University and the Royal United Service Institution at Milford-on Sea, 1970), as quoted in Norman Polmar, *Gorshkov: A Modern Naval Strategist* (Falls Church, Va.: Lulejian and Associates, 1974), p. 127.

10. MccGwire, p. 99.

11. Donald G. Brennan, "When the Salt Hit the Fan," *National Review*, 23 June 1972, p. 6-F. These concessions may have been based more on Henry Kissinger's assessment of U.S. public opinion in an era of post-Vietnam retrenchment; nonetheless there was a consensus that Soviet might was increasing, and a hope that SALT would slow the process.

12. Sergei G. Gorshkov, speaking aboard the cruiser *Kirov* at Navy Day celebrations, Leningrad, 30 July 1967; quoted in Donald W. Mitchell, *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 517. Other translations of this quote have become more popular, see note 13.

13. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, 3rd ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 1978), p. 3: "The flag of the Soviet Navy flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later the United States will have to understand it no longer has mastery of the seas." This version, with slightly different emphasis, first appeared in Lawrence W. Martin, "Strategy of the Southern Oceans," *World Survey*, No. 11 (London: Atlantic Education Trust, November 1969), p. 3, where it was attributed to Gorshkov on some unspecified occasion "last year."

14. In the Soviet Navy an escadra is one notch below a fleet in rank. For analysis of the Soviet 5th Escadra see Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., *The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, March 1976); Stansfield Turner and George Thibault, "Countering the Soviet Threat in the Mediterranean," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, July 1977, pp. 25-32.

15. Luttwak, p. 45.

16. Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., Professional Paper No. 190, *European Perceptions and East-West Competition* (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1977), provides an analytical framework for systematic assessment of perceptions of various elements in the system of East-West competition.

17. Representative programs listed. Others, and discussions, in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *The Use of Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings Institution, December 1976), chap. II; Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (New York: New York Times Book, 1976), pp. 128, 466-467, 468 and 141; Charles C. Peterson, "Showing the Flag"; Dismukes, et al., chap. 3.

18. Peterson section titled "Exercises as Demonstrations," in Michael MccGwire, et al., eds., *Soviet Naval Influence—Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York: Praeger, 1977), provide numerous examples and case studies of Soviet naval forces being used to support foreign policy objectives.

19. Luttwak, pp. 45-46f.

20. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., "CINCLANTFLT on Tactics," *Surface Warfare*, September 1977, pp. 10-13.

21. Individual training, team and ship training, at sea training, staff training, and other program elements discussed in "Tacticians—Seaman to Admiral," *Surface Warfare*, September 1977, pp. 2-7.

22. Hamlin A. Caldwell, Jr., "The Ocean Bastion Theory of Soviet Naval Operations," unpublished paper, Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 1975; Bradford Dismukes, "Roles and Missions of Soviet Naval General Purpose Forces in Wartime: Pro-SSBN Operations?" Professional Paper 130 (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1974); and John J. Herzog, "Perspectives on Soviet Naval Development: A Navy to Match

National Purposes," in Paul J. Murphy, ed., *Naval Power in Soviet Strategy—Studies in Communist Affairs*, v. 2 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978), pp. 37-55.

23. According to law, "The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea," U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., *U.S. Code, Title 10—Armed Forces*, 1970 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971), v. 2, p. 1649.

24. One of the most important underpinnings of any study is the measure of effectiveness (M.O.E.) chosen by the analyst. The M.O.E. is the common denominator used to measure and compare the various outcomes of a study, as inputs or variables are changed; and it is used to compare the results of one study with other studies, experiments, and exercises. These comparisons become the basis for decision. Without a measurable, quantifiable M.O.E. which can measure to what degree the (real) objective is achieved even the most careful analysis is unlikely to be very influential in the decisionmaking process.

Peacetime studies have thus far failed to discover a truly satisfactory M.O.E. and due to the nature of the problem it is unlikely that they ever will. Wartime studies, on the other hand, have a panoply to choose from: "numbers of ships sunk," "exchange ratio," and "weapons effectiveness," are three from a study I am currently involved in—there are many, many others. *Naval Operations Analysis* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), defines M.O.E.s; *Means of Measuring Naval Power with Special Reference to U.S. and Soviet Activities in the Indian Ocean* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974) lists several M.O.E.s appropriate to naval forces.

25. Edward Wegener, "Theory of Naval Strategy in the Nuclear Age," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1972, pp. 190-207, offers a model for a theory of maritime power in nonwar. Other articles discussing the "new" maritime environment include Geoffrey Kemp and Harlan Ullman, "Towards a New Order of U.S. Maritime Policy," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1977, pp. 98-114; Worth H. Bagley, "Sea Power and Western Security: The Next Decade," Adelphi papers, no. 139, 1977, pp. 1-49, particularly "A Programme for the Future," pp. 35-39; and John M. Lee, "United States Military Roles in a Period of Resource Scarcity," in B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., *War, Strategy and Maritime Power* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1977), pp. 325-350.

26. The DOD is evaluating the use of cruise missiles in conventional warfare; the feasibility was demonstrated recently, when a reconfigured Tomahawk cruise missile laid down an accurate pattern of submunitions on a runway target. Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "New Applications Eyed for U.S. Cruise Missiles," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 26 June 1978, pp. 17-18.

27. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "Soviet Strategy and U.S. Counter-Strategy," in Bruce Palmer, Jr., ed., *Grand Strategy for the 1980s* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 51.

Most discussions of Soviet projection capabilities view those capabilities only with respect to direct or immediate U.S. interests--interdiction of SLOCs, for example, is a common and very important theme. This paper invites a wider view, a North American as opposed to the commonly more narrow U.S. view, and draws attention to other areas that might see Soviet naval involvement of their expanding capabilities.

SOVIET PROJECTION CAPABILITIES:

A VIEW FROM NORTH OF THE BORDER

by

C.G. Jacobsen

The 1960s and 70s have seen the emergence of significant Soviet distant power projection capabilities, air and naval. While the original impetus for their development was strategic and defensive, at least in the case of the new naval means, it is clear that distant state and client interests, Third World presence requirements, have today become a major developmental determinant.

The emergence of the Red navy from a coastal defense formation to a force of global strategic importance unfolded through the 1960s and early 1970s. There were two original rationales. The most important was strategic, defensive. There was a need to counter the threat to the homeland posed first by U.S. carrier-based nuclear-armed aviation (since the mid-1950s), later and more dramatically by the Polaris/Poseidon fleet of strategic submarines. Subsequently, with the developing of a Soviet sea-based strategic capability, the defensive requirement for forward deployment came to be supplemented by an offensive dictate. (This offensive dictate could of course also be seen as defensive if one adheres, as most do, to the tenets of deterrence theory.) Early submarine-launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs, had limited range. It was a technological restraint that was seen by Washington to require forward deployment in the Mediterranean and especially the Norwegian Sea. Moscow was faced with analogous deployments in the western Atlantic or of securing the surge potential to suitable firing positions of forces deployed beyond their natural firing range. The latter alternative was preferred. The support vessels required for surge protection were procured.

The situation changed in the early 70s. The Soviets began to deploy their long-range *Delta*-class SS-N-8 (and later SS-NX-18), submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of hitting "San Diego, California, Quito, Recife, Mozambique, Indonesia and Hawaii from the haven of the Kola inlet."[1] The still modern *Yankee* class was also scheduled to receive improved range missiles.[2] Older SLBM submarines began to be phased out. Developments were obviating the need for surge capabilities, and for the protection thereof. A similar trend towards home water basing could be discerned in U.S. procurement of the long-range *Trident* system, scheduled for consequential deployment in the 1980s.[3] Midocean ASW (antisubmarine warfare) and counter ASW capabilities, the never perfected but hauntingly plausible threat against the sea-based deterrent (crucial to prevailing strategic perceptions), were becoming redundant.

This is reflected in the changing composition of the Soviet strategic fleet, charted below. As will be seen, its dramatic growth tapered off after 1968, when numbers of hunter-killer submarines began to be contracted markedly. Through the mid-1970s the continuing growth of the SLBM "offensive" strategic submarine force only just sufficed to offset the diminution in numbers of attack submarines. So also with surface vessels, the numbers of which stagnated after 1968. One should note that all major Soviet surface combatants have ASW designations. On the other hand, the fact that numbers have steadied does not reflect on quality. It could be argued that quantitative stagnation or, in some cases, contraction, has been more than offset by qualitative improvements. But it should be noted that qualitative improvements have been catholic, focusing on the amalgam of needs associated with distant sea control ambitions; at least until very recently they did not noticeably favor ASW requirements.

With the apparent easing of the defensive requirement for a high seas fleet, of the need to defend against the ocean-based threat *per se* and to defend the seagoing deterrent, there appears to be emerging a greater Soviet capacity for sustained distant operations of a more general nature. Moscow is procuring capabilities that invite the entertainment of limited command of the sea notions. This may be related to the trends in Soviet strategic literature towards increased interest in concepts of intervention and increasing stress on the Navy's role as defender of state interests abroad.[4] In the former case there may be room for debate whether expressed interests were causal, or whether they are post-facto rationalizations, whether such have in fact been an abiding consideration in the shaping of the fleet's growth, or whether they reflect the search for a new *raison d'etre* for emerging and future capabilities at a time when the old justification may be being undermined.

As concerns the protection of state economic interests, however, there can be little doubt that this is a role or function with deeper roots. Although perhaps secondary to the strategic imperative, it was clearly an early consideration of substance. Since the late 1950s, and especially through the 1960s there was a dramatic growth in distant Soviet merchant shipping, fishing and other ocean wealth exploration and exploitation activities.[5] By the late 1960s Soviet "ocean development" endeavors reached to every major expanse of the world's seas; of particular interest to this analysis: "blanket coverage" might be said to have been established in northern waters. The U.S.S.R. had developed the one condition, distant ocean financial interests, that has traditionally been seen to justify and even demand protective naval potential.[6]

Furthermore, while her existence might not yet depend on the inviolability of trade routes to the same

extent as did that of traditional maritime powers, in view of the reality of greater residual self-sufficiency in most basic resources, it had come to depend on the inviolability of ocean wealth extraction prospects. The harvesting of fish, crustaceans, krill and algae had come to constitute an important part of the nation's protein intake. It had become an increasingly indispensable supplement to the output of still problem-plagued agriculture. And its excess capacity was becoming an increasingly important source of foreign exchange, a source of disproportionate value to a nonconvertible currency nation. The harvesting of ocean and ocean floor mineral and energy potentials, while perhaps of lesser immediate urgency, was similarly associated with superficially disproportionate promise, owing to the severity of the geophysical and climatological restraints hampering the full exploitation of land prospects. And the value of excess production exports of these products was of course also at a premium, because of the very fact of its being convertible.[7]

Soviet "civilian" fleets clearly serve an auxiliary military function. Their character is determined by the Soviet proclivity towards military-civilian integration, where optimal. This proclivity is a function of the all-embracing part-Clausewitzian Soviet concept of strategic power, a concept that sees economic, military, political and other levers of power as explicitly intertwined and interdependent; no component has absolute worth, but gains relative weight through a calibration of domestic and external circumstances and requirements.[8] Admiral Gorshkov's testimony that Soviet civilian fleets are regarded as part and parcel of Soviet naval might[9] should therefore occasion no surprise.

Moscow's civilian fleets provide reserve naval transport and intelligence monitoring capacity; they "survey and mark future battle fields"; they play an important role in the distribution and control of underwater devices of strategic import; and they perform a significant role in the perfecting of command and control means and practice. To the extent that their inherent capabilities and normal deployment patterns allow them to satisfy routine naval requirements at minimum cost to their other tasks they are so assigned.[10]

But the point is that under normal peace conditions, free of such tension requirements as exemplified by the Cuban crisis of 1962, the capabilities and tasks of the civilian fleets are only correlated with military requirements to such an extent as is possible without seriously jeopardizing their nonmilitary endeavors. Not only are the civilian functions cost-effective (even such marginal efforts as the Capelin fisheries off Labrador, unprofitable to Canadian fishermen, become economical in the context of a Soviet-type economic system), but they have become vital to the satisfaction of the standard of living commitments upon which the nation's establishment has chosen to stake its legitimacy.[11]

The fact that Soviet distant ocean financial interests have not only been established but may be said to have acquired crucial importance for domestic prospects is rarely fully appreciated by Western analysts. The flow of responsibilities between the civilian and military fleets is no longer (and perhaps never quite was) a one-way street. Calculations of Soviet naval designs must take cognizance of the reality that the Red navy of today has a significant new responsibility qualitatively distinct from those hitherto presumed to underly its modus operandi.

With this in mind it is possible to conceive of at least two scenarios in North American (Canadian)-claimed waters that might see Soviet naval involvement. One relates to Canadian fisheries' jurisdiction in the event of a recurrence of the Soviet crop failures of

the early 1970s, especially should such a repeat coincide either with climate-caused harvesting shortages in the West or else with politically motivated restrictions on Western agricultural exports. Under such circumstances Moscow might well consider the protein potential of a dramatic increase in Grand Banks fishing, bursting the seams of International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) quotas, to be vital—in the stark dictionary sense of the word. Is it likely that existing international agreements would deter her under the hypothesized circumstances? Would it be plausible to expect challenge from the rather meager enforcement means at Canada's disposal if Soviet naval elements were to provide protection to the fishing fleet? Would it be plausible to expect Washington or other third powers to intercede? The continuing lack of an International Law consensus on either the principle or the particulars of unilaterally declared extensions of coastal states' rights beyond the traditional territorial seas (viz., the 200-mile economic zones) creates an additional element of uncertainty.[12]

The other scenario concerns Canadian Arctic Ocean waters and beds. A few facts stand out. Neither the U.S.S.R. nor the United States have fully sanctioned Canadian sovereignty claims. Canadian surveillance is of questionable efficacy (as indicated a couple of years ago in the case of the Polish "yacht" *Gdynia* when search efforts failed to determine its location and indeed failed to determine even if it was in fact in Canadian waters at all).[13] And there are analysts who doubt whether recent procurement decisions promise consequential improvements for the late 1970s and the 1980s.[14] Canadian scientific and exploratory endeavors in these areas have also been scant—whether one talks of geological or biological surveys to seek to locate and determine the extent of resource concentrations; of surveys of such factors that affect operational efficacy as salinity, currents, water temperature (and seasonal and other variations thereof), etc.; or of resource wealth extraction technology, be it related to alimentary, mineral, nodule or energy spheres.[15] Canadian law enforcement means in these regions are equally questionable, with few suitably trained forces and limited equipment of relevance. Meanwhile it is clear that the scientific endeavors of the U.S.S.R. (and the United States) in Canadian-claimed Arctic waters and ocean floors have been far more extensive than those of Canada.[16] They are also uniquely advanced in Arctic wealth extraction technologies. Finally, they both have more relevantly trained and equipped military personnel.

It may not be too remote to suggest that the superpowers have or will soon have the capacity to establish northern ocean floor wealth extraction operations without Canadian knowledge, a prospect with obvious common-law ramifications. Their ability to defend such installations upon discovery would of course have similar juridical consequences. The point must be made that a Soviet initiative along these lines might not have to be pioneering and thus possibly disruptive to the Washington-Moscow equilibrium, but might conceivably be able to rest on U.S. precedent(s)—in light of current American Law of the Sea positions in general; American attitudes to Canadian northern claims in particular.

Visions of the Red army marching across Canadian Arctic islands do indeed appear rather far-fetched. But the same cannot be said of certain ocean or ocean-floor scenarios, especially when under ice and beyond the certifiable inspectoral concern or capacity of the claimant power. Both superpowers carefully distinguish between respect for Canadian Arctic island suzerainty and considerably less accommodating views on Canadian claims over Arctic seas and seabeds.[17] The latter are treated as

more dubious than say, Norway's Svalbard associated claims. Because Canada has not established the same presence in the more northerly reaches of her claimed sovereignty as has Norway, a point of some international law significance, she could be said to be at a double disadvantage.

In the southern hemisphere also one can now conceive of Soviet economic requirements dictating Soviet military engagement. The mentioned krill harvesting off southeast Africa, for example, entails an investment of such intrinsic scale, potential and importance as could not be dispensed with without domestic dislocations.[18] In the unlikely event of Soviet inability to ensure continued access to Mauritian or other conveniently located repair, supply and replenishment facilities, there would be a major incentive to assertive action.

Still, while the possibility of economically dictated military embroilments cannot be ruled out, such embroilments are unlikely.

What may be more important is the early 70s trend in Soviet doctrine towards a more catholic, embracing definition of state interests. This has been treated elsewhere; so also has the corresponding but nevertheless startling fact that the naval duty to "protect state interests," the task of "peacetime naval diplomacy," now ranks immediately behind the priority task of protecting its own strategic potential–and ahead of the earlier priority requirement of grappling directly with NATO's strategic fleets.[19] The point is that the increasing trend to identify Soviet interests with Third World contingencies and the assertive willingness to pursue and protect these interests inevitably entail a requirement for improved interventionary potentials.

The corollary Soviet stress on the ability to establish and defend distant lines of communications has also been dealt with elsewhere.[20] But there is one element that deserves mention here, and that is the consequent need to offset the countering capacity of U.S. carriers, on the supply routes, and on the locale in question:

> The removal of attack carriers from the first echelon of the reserves of strategic forces in a general nuclear war in no way excludes their wide utilization for resolving important tasks. The command of the U.S. Navy recognizes at least three of them. Firstly, seaborne aircraft remain in the forefront of tactical aviation in LOCAL WARS; secondly aircraft carriers are an integral part of the forces that guarantee "MASTERY OF THE SEA"; and thirdly, aircraft carrier formations are an irreplacable instrument in "GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY," providing a military presence where this is needed in peacetime.[21]

By the early 70s Moscow had standardized "anti-carrier task groups":

> The core of Moscow's Third World diplomacy of force lies in its capabilities for countering U.S. carrier task groups. These capabilities seem to be organized in what we refer to as anti-carrier task groups, each typically consisting of a cruise-missile submarine, a couple of torpedo attack submarines, a surface-to-surface missile ship and a surface-to-air missile ship.[22]

And Moscow appeared until recently to be content with the potency of her counter:

> Although capabilities continued to improve, Soviet investment since 1970 in countering the carrier has not been as intensive as in previous periods . . . .[23]

In 1977, however, the number of Soviet attack submarines jumped noticeably, past the peak that had been established in 1968 (see below). The timelag since the early 70s enunciation

of doctrinal interest in greater interventionary-type commitments, needs and requirements suggested that the increase might be attributed to attendant prospects of greater "lines of communication" demands. Moscow was clearly not intending to revert to the near-futile aspiration of the 60s, general "combat against the enemy fleet." And there was no evidence of Soviet dissatisfaction with her ability to guarantee the survival of her strategic fleet, and hence allow for the option of withholding.

There were other possible reasons for the 1977 spurt in numbers of attack submarines. One was contemporary American advocacies for additional carriers, although it must be said that U.S. budgetary and political realities always appeared likely to squeeze such aspirations. Another plausible Soviet motive lay in sales of attack submarines to Third World clients, and possible expectations that these would increase.[24] Finally, there was the modernization drive, the appearance and deployment of new improved vessel types. To the extent that the latter considerations operated one would expect the numbers bulge to deflate or at least stagnate under the effect of sales and the phasing out of older submarines. In other words, the bulge might prove to be an aberration.

However, if the late 70s bulge proves not a hiccup of planning, but the signaling of a trend, then the "leadtime" (research and development time lag) consideration outlined above would indeed appear to be most logically compelling.

It is appropriate here to return to the original thrust of our inquiry, the question of the changing character of the navy. The focus will be on the Soviet Northern Fleet. It is preeminent among the Soviet fleets. The reason is partly geopolitical, in that it is the only one of the three "western fleets" that has access to open seas. This uniqueness was appreciated from the first days of the Soviet regime, and remained a constant policy consideration through the first four decades of its existence. Since the late 1950s, strategic considerations have provided additional rationales for and hence further cemented Soviet perceptions of the crucial nature of the Northern Fleet.

These considerations led to a Soviet decision to assign all its western-based strategic submarines, and in fact a very large portion of her overall number of strategic submarines, to the Northern Fleet (with the residual being assigned to her Pacific Fleet). The following figures are based on a composite of sources.[25]

	Northern Fleet 1950-68-73-75-76-77	Baltic 1950-68-75-77	Black Sea 1950-68-75-77	Pacific 1950-68-75-77
Strategic SLBM armed subs				
—nuclear	0 14 34 38 44 56	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 6 11 16
—diesel	0 21 16 15 15 15	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 14 8 8
Attack subs w/torpedoes & cruise missiles				
—nuclear	0 18 27 28 30 31	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 10 12 12
—diesel	0 13 16 16 16 16	0 6 2 2	0 0 1 1	0 3 9 9
Attack subs w/torpedoes				
—nuclear	0 10 22 26 32 34	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 5 6 7
—diesel	30 105 72 55 40 55	135 63 74 83	40 40 44 48	110 62 46 46

	1950	1968	1975	1977
Total Attack Subs	315	335	319	344
Total Attack and Strategic Subs	315	390	391	439

Note: Exact 1975-77 distribution is not known; the breakdown above reflects the presumption that 1968-75 distribution trends have continued. There is one exception to this pattern. For shorthand purposes the 75-76 net retirement of 15 diesel attack-torpedo submarines is ascribed solely to the Northern Fleet, where previous attrition had been the most marked; the 77 increase in newer models of the category is described as reestablishing 75 numbers in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, foci for earlier contractions, with the residual added to the other fleets in accordance with past growth rates.

SALT I permitted the U.S.S.R. up to 62 "modern" ballistic missile submarines. As Moscow has already deployed some 34 *Yankee* and 26 *Delta I* and *II* vessels, totaling 60, it is clear that she views the older shorter missile range classes as *Hotel* and *Golf* as excluded from the calculation.

1968-77 saw the nuclear percentage rising from 21 percent to over 58 percent in the Northern Fleet, from 19 percent to 36 percent in the Pacific Fleet. The newest category, the formidable *Delta*s, were at least initially allotted only to the Northern Fleet. The qualitative favoring of the Northern Fleet (and to a lesser extent of the Pacific Fleet) is further evidenced by apparent priority call also on newer diesel categories--Baltic and Black Sea increments obscure transferals of older types.

Numbers of attack submarines began to decline in 1968, and continued to contract until 1976 (a reflection of the deemphasis of the task of "combat against the enemy fleet"). Until the mid-70s the rapid growth in numbers of strategic subs only barely balanced the withdrawal of attack numbers. The consequential 1977 increase in attack submarines is hence quite arresting. The increase would seem to transcend the sea-control requirement of northern "withholding." It clearly reflects the stress on distant "state interests" and the concomitant requirement to be able to protect "lines of communication" and to assert localized sea control.

The privileged position of the Northern Fleet in the procurement of strategic submarines and in the allocation of the more modern elements of the hunter-killer fleet finds echo in surface fleet trends—although here to a less marked extent.[26] The surface fleet is, on the whole, far more evenly distributed among the four base areas. Still, if one focuses on larger modern units capable of sustained distant operations, then the north does appear advantaged. The trend in numbers of modern cruisers, for example, is indicated by the fact that the Northern Fleet was allocated four of the nine units completed between 1968 and 1975. Overall, its complement of such units grew from five in 1968 to ten in 1975 (the increase included also one of older vintage), as compared, for example, to a growth from seven to ten for the Pacific Fleet. The Northern Fleet has not yet been assigned permanent carrier capability, but while the two helicopter carriers have remained based in the Black Sea they have frequently visited the northern complex, and the new *Kiev* V/STOL carrier prolonged the visit(?) initiated when it sailed north from its southern launching area in the fall of 1976. From 1976 to December 1977 *Kiev* participated in northern maneuvers as an apparently integral component of that fleet.[27] One does not know of permanent basing dispositions for either this carrier or for its two sister ships now being completed, but the Northern Fleet would likely be involved.

There was a clear break around 1968 in surface fleet distribution patterns. Between 1950 and 1968 the number of Soviet destroyers had increased by 34; nearly half (15) had been assigned to the Northern Fleet. Since 1968, however, northern numbers stagnated, in fact decreasing (from 24) to 22 in 1973, at a time when overall navy totals rose slightly, from 104 to 106 (the beneficiary being the Baltic). But the disfavoring of the Northern Fleet on the destroyer issue was more than made up for by the increasing privilege it was accorded after 1968 in the assignment of larger ships. That privilege is emphasized by a consideration of qualitative

trends, specifically the ratio between missile-armed and conventional cruisers. By 1975 the Northern Fleet had acquired a far higher proportion of missile cruisers than other fleets (seven of its ten cruisers were in fact missile ships). It is indicative to note that it had six of the ten *Kresta*-class cruisers in the Soviet Navy, i.e., 60 percent (its seventh missile cruiser was of the even newer *Kara* class; yet another unit of this type appears to have been added by the end of 1976—and one may presume current and prospective numbers to reflect similarly disproportionate allotments from the ongoing production rate of one a year).[28] This difference between trends in larger and smaller ship categories in the Northern Fleet is further testified to by a consideration of smaller escort and coastal defense ships. In these categories the Northern Fleet was second only to the Black Sea Fleet as late as 1973. By 1975 its complement of these types had shrunk from 36 to 31, putting it behind the Baltic Fleet, and not far ahead of the Pacific Fleet (whose numbers had also contracted, from 32 to 27).[29]

It is thus clear that the favoring of the Northern Fleet, while definitive, has also been discriminating and not universal. Among surface vessels it is in the category of larger modern ships capable of sustained distant operations that northern preeminence stands out. And it is of course this surface category that we are concerned with when speculating on future Soviet potentials in such areas as the northwestern Atlantic (—or the South Atlantic).

The qualitative if not quantitative trend has clearly been to assign to the Northern Fleet the greater part of what appears to be an increasingly traditional offensive capability. While it may have peaked in overall numbers, the Soviet Navy appears to be in the process of transforming itself into a very different, and potent animal.[30] The focus for that transformation is the Northern Fleet.

It is now some years since NATO commanders first questioned their ability to penetrate the Norwegian Sea in the event of a conflict.[31] Today Moscow may have succeeded in acquiring or be procuring an ability to establish local sea control in areas far further afield.

> The Soviets have been sending their highly sophisticated Delta-class 14000 ton nuclear submarines, armed with SSN-8 missiles (range: nearly 5000 miles), ever deeper into the Arctic Sea. Says Willy Ostreng, research associate at the Norwegian Arctic Research Institute: "For the first time the Soviets have direct access to the high seas, even if under ice, without having to go through international straits. From that area they can shower any part of the U.S. with nuclear missiles." NATO naval forces, moreover, find it difficult to detect Soviet subs under the constantly shifting ice.[32]

It also appears that the U.S.S.R. might at the same time be minimizing whatever residual efficacy Western barrier aspirations (across the so-called "GIUK gap") might retain against those of her subs that still suffer from range restrictions and therefore need closer-to-target firing locales. Soviet capabilities now flank traditional bottlenecks, and can encroach on the nominal defense areas of scantily prepared Canadian and NATO Arctic defense forces: "the Danish Ministry of Defence now believes that Soviet subs can passage between Ellesmere Island and Greenland and, furthermore, that Soviet submarines . . . station themselves under Arctic ice."[33]

One presumes that the Ellesmere Island-Greenland passage and other potential passages through Canada's Arctic Islands can be closed to hostile traffic. But such closure presupposes a warning time that might not be

warranted by the suggested predispositioning. And there is the point that the submarine element in question might in fact not find it necessary to transit through the potential "chokepoints"– the "Canadian basin" might serve as a fine standoff locale for "Yankee" SLBMs.

Whether for strategic purposes in the northernmost reaches or for other "state interests" and designs in the southern hemisphere, Moscow must be acknowledged to have acquired the capacity to establish control over limited areas of her choosing. In a sense the very recognition of the futility of more embracing aspirations has entailed significantly improved prospects for more circumscribed actions. On the other hand, as some of these more restricted, more manageable/controllable steps can be hazarded in times of relative peace, their accumulation may prove of far greater potency than could have been ascribed to earlier policies.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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NOTES

1. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1977/78* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1977), p. 119.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
3. There is, of course, a dichotomy here: the *Trident* missile was designed to have the requisite range to be fired from protected home waters, thus obviating the potential threat of hostile ASW; yet while some analysts have pursued the logic of the missile with suggestions ranging down to cheap anchored concrete platforms, decisionmaking bodies chose instead to fund the mammoth *Trident* submarine whose sophistication and consequent expense was a direct corollary of a design intended to challenge that same potential ASW. Hence "the Trident controversy . . . . "
4. Carl G. Jacobsen, *Soviet Strategic Initiatives: Challenge and Response* (New York: Praeger, 1979), especially chap. 2.
5. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, *Soviet Oceans Development* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1976), pp. 257-285.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, chapter on "The Civilian Fleets."
8. Carl G. Jacobsen, *Soviet Strategy, Soviet Foreign Policy* 2nd ed. (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1974); see also Jacobsen, "Soviet Military-Party Relations . . . ," Carleton University *Current Comment* series, No. 10, 1976, pp. 3-13.
9. *Pravda*, 25 July 1976.
10. See "The Civilian Fleets" chapter in *Soviet Oceans Development*, and *Jane's Fighting Ships 1977/78*, p. 117.
11. Senate Committee on Commerce.
12. For Soviet attitudes, see e.g., S. Pavlov in *Pravda*, 12 February 1976, p. 4, or I. Gorev in *Novoye Vremya*, 12 March 1976 (p. 2 in English ed. *New Times*), and *Council of Ministers' resolution* of 24 February 1977.
13. See, e.g., J. Best in *The Ottawa Journal*, 10 September 1975.
14. Note, e.g., *ORAE E-M.P.* No. 4, Canadian Department of National Defence, Ottawa, February 1978.
15. Information based in part on telephone interview with G.D. Hobson, Director, Polar Continental Shelf Project, Ottawa, 17 February 1977; and on letter from same dated 26 April 1977.
16. The wall map in the office of the Director of the Arctic and Antarctic Institute in Leningrad which charts the impressive array and scope of Soviet scientific endeavors in the area makes Canada's corresponding programs appear rather puny.

17. See e.g., Canadian Press story "Soviets on islands claimed by Canada" in the *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 June 1976.

18. Senate Committee on Commerce.

19. See chap. 2 of author's forthcoming *The Strategic Posture of the U.S.S.R.; The Evolution of Soviet Theory and Capability as Concerns Intervention in Distant Areas* (New York: New York University Press, 1979).

20. *Ibid.*, chap. 4.

21. R. Tumkovskii, "Present and Future Strike Carriers," *Morskoi Sbornik*, July 1974, pp. 95-99; also, e.g., V. Evseev, "Amphibious Forces of the Navy," *Morskoi Sbornik*, September 1974, pp. 96-100.

22. James M. McConnell, "Doctrine and Capabilities," chap. 1 of forthcoming book sponsored by U.S. Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, Va., pp. 1-21.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-22.

24. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1977/78*, p. 117, notes, e.g., Foxtrot-class sales to Libya.

25. J.F. Skogan, *Sovjetisk Flaateoppbygging i Nord* (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs), November 1976); *Jane's Fighting Ships 1950/51* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950); *1973/74* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973); *1975/76* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1975); *1976/77* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1976); *1977/78* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1976); and *1977/78* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1977); and James L. Moulton, *British Maritime Strategy in the 1970's* (London: Royal United Services Institution, 1969), (1968 figures are culled from this source). Somewhat different (current) figures are provided by International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1977-78* (London: 1977). The composite figures presented should thus not be viewed as absolute; they are approximations, portraying the consensus of best-available data.

26. *The Military Balance 1977-78.*

27. See, e.g., coverage in *Time*, 27 June 1977, p. 22; or "Soviet Aerospace Almanac 1978," *Air Force* magazine, March 1978, p. 67.

28. Skogan and *Jane's Fighting Ships 1977/78*, p. 690. (Continuing *Kresta II* production rate is similar, while that of *Krivak* destroyers is 4 per year) see *Jane's Fighting Ships 1977/78*, pp. 691, 696.

29. Skogan.

30. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1976/77*, p. 121; and see e.g., *Kara* cruiser description, p. 702.

31. See *The New York Times*, 1 November 1971.

32. *Time*, 27 June 1977, p. 23.

33. CBC Report from London NATO Conference 6:30 p.m. Atlantic time, 10 May 1977.

SET AND DRIFT



SEEING OTHERS AS WE SEE OURSELVES: MISSIONS FOR THE *KIEV*

by

Harlan B. Miller

"O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us,
to see oursels as others see us!"

Robert Burns, "To a Louse" (1786)

The gift Burns sought remains as elusive as ever, and most of us rarely see ourselves as others see us. While this is no doubt regrettable in its effects on humility, it contributes immensely to peace of mind. However, the converse of the gift, the ability to see others as we see ourselves, is very widely distributed. As individuals, we assess the actions of others in the light of our own and assume, in the absence of extensive contrary evidence, that other people have the same goals we have and will choose the same sorts of means to attain those goals.

The effects of this natural tendency are neither uniformly good nor bad. Quite often the aims and intentions of those we deal with *are* much like our own, but quite often they are not. When this tendency leads us astray, we may be wholly unprepared to deal with the other party's actions, as they stem from intentions we have never even considered.

Navies share this human tendency. When the thinkers of a navy (commanders, planners, intelligence types, etc.) think about actual or potential enemy navies, they naturally think of them as similar to their own service, having roughly similar goals and intending to attain these goals in roughly similar ways. It is hardly news that this can be very dangerous. One of the points of the "enemy capabilities, not enemy intentions" slogan is that one is more likely to discover unexpected threats by asking what a force is capable of doing than by asking what the enemy plans to do with it. There are at least three reasons why it is wiser to rely on estimates of capability than on predictions of intention: (a) mistakes about intention are more likely because, as a rule, deception and security are easier jobs; (b) it is much easier to change one's plans than to change one's hardware; and (c) predictions of intention almost always rest on the assumption that the enemy is sane, and this shades imperceptibly into the assumption that he thinks as we do. The last of these reasons is, of course, another version of

the subject of this essay. Alas, it is not escaped by emphasis on capabilities instead of intentions, for one never considers all the possible enemy capabilities, and so must decide which capabilities are worth considering. This can only be done on some assumption of rationality, which brings back a chance for the tendency to operate.

As a particular case study of the perception of one navy of the aims and means of another, consider the U.S. Navy's estimates of the missions of the Soviet ship *Kiev* (and her sisters). If successful, this discussion will both illustrate the operation of the tendency to see others as we see ourselves and contribute to the assessment of the role of the *Kiev* class.

The missions that we (henceforth, "we" is the U.S. Navy) first think of for a large ship with an angled flight deck are those of the attack carrier: strikes against major targets ashore or afloat. But *Kiev* is no CV, she has no catapults, no arresting gear, her flight deck does not even extend to the bow. Even more important, her complement of aircraft is too small, and the capabilities of the aircraft too meager, to bear serious comparison to any U.S. CV. *Kiev* wouldn't stand a chance toe-to-toe with any of our carriers, provided (a) that she doesn't cheat by using some surface-to-surface weapon in those big tubes on the forecastle, and (b) that the *Forger* aircraft isn't replaced by something much closer to the F-14. So we can discard the attack carrier role for the *Kiev*. (Right?)

The Soviets call *Kiev* an "Antisubmarine Cruiser" and this ASW mission certainly fits into one of the ship-mission categories our own experience has dictated. *Kiev* is both a scaled-down and souped-up CVS. She is a scaled-down antisubmarine carrier because her aircraft are relatively few and (at least apparently) no match for the S-2, much less the S-3, as far as ASW capability is concerned. But she is souped-up when compared to the last U.S. CVSs in that she has hull-mounted detection and attack capabilities (bow and variable-depth sonars for detection, at least three weapons launchers: MBUs, SUW-1, torpedo tubes, and perhaps a fourth ASW weapon in those big tubes). ASW is certainly a mission of this ship.

Another possible mission is participation in amphibious operations, either by providing air cover (a CVE role), or by carrying troops and landing them by helicopter (an LPH role) or, more plausibly, by a combination of these. The Soviets have a wide variety of helicopters available for amphibious lift and ground-support missions, and the *Forger* could certainly prove useful in ground-support, air-defense, and reconnaissance roles in a landing operation. Conducting and supporting amphibious warfare are thus plausible missions for *Kiev*.

A third plausible mission is antiair warfare in defense of a task force or area. *Kiev* has *Forger* fighter aircraft with pylons and (presumably) electronics that could handle a variety of air-to-air missiles. The *Forgers* are backed up by SA-N-3 missiles for medium-range defense, then by SA-N-4 point defense missiles, by the 76mm guns, and finally by the 25mm Gatling guns. This is surely a major AAW capability, especially for the smaller ASW task forces made possible by *Kiev's* hull-mounted ASW equipment.

Kiev's significant ASW and AAW capability leads to the fourth mission, that of "sea control" in areas of less-than-maximum threat. *Kiev* is a fine sea control ship in the sense that she is the biggest kid on the block as long as the really big boys are busy elsewhere. This is a capability not to be sneezed at as long as the United States has no more than 12 to 15 of the "really big boys."*

*Even if *Kiev* is no match for one of our CVs, she may well be more than a match for anything less than a CV. If we find ourselves playing a matching game in which we must counter each *Kiev* with a *Nimitz*, we will lose either economically, militarily, or both.

The fifth mission is presence. *Kiev* is an impressive ship, gold lettering and all, a big ship with many visible weapons—and visible weaponry is impressive.

There are, then, at least five missions ascribable to *Kiev*, missions that naturally occur to us inasmuch as they parallel missions of our own. If we yield to the tendency to see others as to see ourselves, this completes our assessment of *Kiev*'s missions. To go further is to try to perceive missions that do not correspond to our own. There are at least two distinct ways of making this attempt: (a) by studying the utterances of the (potential) enemy for announcements or hints, and (b) by imaginatively placing oneself in the enemy's shoes.

In Admiral Gorshkov's "Navies in War and Peace" series, the ninth article* points out that, despite building over 1,100 submarines, the Nazi Navy

> was unable to achieve any more. One of the main reasons for this was that the submarines did not receive any support from other forces, and above all, from the Air Force, which would have been able both to carry out the reconnaissance for the submarines and destroy ASW forces .... The effectiveness of German submarine employment was considerably reduced for these reasons. (p. 61)

Gorshkov believes then that the effectiveness of German U-boats was reduced by the lack of aid by other forces. The German submarines deployed from the Bay of Biscay and the North Sea without adequate air or surface cover, and many of them were caught quite near their bases. "[D]espite the exceptional threat to submarines by ASW forces, the German Naval Command did not conduct a single operation . . . directed at destroying these forces." (p. 58)

If we assume that Gorshkov intends to avoid the German mistakes, what sorts of forces will help his submarines get out of the Baltic and Norwegian Seas (his equivalent to the Bay of Biscay)? Soviet Long-Range Aviation and Naval Aviation can provide part of the support his submarine forces need, and small task forces built around a *Kiev*-class ship can be very valuable in this role. Thus, a sixth mission—anti-ASW warfare, or AASWW.

Kiev's opponents in this role would be our ASW forces, submarine, surface and air. Her capabilities against submarines have already been mentioned. The combination of her hull-mounted weapons and the *Forger* should be able to overwhelm any U.S. ASW surface force that lacks a carrier. The *Forger* should be able to handle any carrier-based or land-based ASW aircraft. Our P3, in all its versions, has no air-to-air defenses whatever.

Kiev is so well suited to the AASWW mission that one might well suspect that the designers had such a mission in mind.

Turning now to imagining ourselves in the shoes of the *Kiev*'s owners:

> A major new threat has appeared with the capitalist development of the cruise missile. Treacherously exploiting their lead in some areas of technology, the imperialists and their lackeys are building missiles that can be launched from ships, aircraft or submarines well beyond the boundaries of our great Socialist motherland and fly at high speed at a low altitude to their targets. As the Western press puts it, these missiles will fly in "the nap of the earth," down the valleys, just above the treetops, thus making their detection and destruction very difficult. We of the Soviet Navy can, however, do something about this, for we can prevent the launching vehicles from closing

*Naval Institute *Proceedings*, September 1974.

our coasts, and thus either destroy them or force them to launch at a greater range. When the launch vehicles are submarines or surface ships, this can be handled by our well-established ASW and antisurface plans, but new provisions must be made to counter cruise missiles launched by aircraft. For this mission, comrades, *Kiev* and her sisters are nearly ideal. The Americans plan to launch cruise missiles from B-52s and perhaps from modified civilian aircraft, and against these the *Forger* and the follow-on aircraft we have under development should have a good chance of success. Even if we cannot destroy the launching aircraft, we should be able to force them to launch the missiles at a greater distance from land. This itself will be a great accomplishment for we can then attack the cruise missiles themselves as they fly over the sea. As compared to the land, the sea has no "nap."

While, of course, love for the Socialist motherland is our only reason for preparing for this mission in her defense, it is not to be forgotten that much progress has been made in raising the Navy towards its proper place in the Soviet Armed Forces by sharing the strategic deterrence/strike missions with the Strategic Rocket Forces. Our SSBNs have had a major role in putting us where we are today. With *Kiev* we can share the air defense of the homeland with *PVO Strany.** This will further contribute to the proper appreciation of the Navy's part in the defense of socialism.

If a course of action makes sense to our enemy both tactically and in the light of bureaucratic self-interest, we had better take it seriously. Our exercise in imagination thus yields another mission for *Kiev.*

Neither of these missions is one we assign to our major surface ships, and neither is considered as long as we see the Soviet Navy as we see ourselves.

What is called for when we estimate the capabilities of potential enemies is to think of everything without being diverted by the implausible. There are, after all, capabilities that we need not plan to counter. *Kiev* could sail up the Mississippi, ramming bridge supports as she goes, and fire on Memphis with her 76mm guns. That is a capability, and it would inflict damage upon the United States but it is so manifestly suicidal, and the damage it inflicts upon us is so slight, that we can safely dismiss it. To think of everything that one should without wasting time on the implausible is a counsel of perfection. In practice, we will be well served by tolerating the waste of time on a dozen implausibilities, or even a hundred, if that is the cost of uncovering an unsuspected but plausible option of our potential opponent.

Postscript:

Probably one factor that has contributed to our failure to perceive all the capabilities of *Kiev* has been the conviction that she is but a stopgap, a temporary step on the way to the full-sized carrier. For surely, some of us believe, the Soviets, being rational men, can see that the full-sized CV is the true queen of the seas. It has proven surprisingly difficult to convert Congress to the faith we assume we share with the Soviets.

*Air Defense Forces—one of the five armed forces of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. (The other four are: Navy, Ground Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Long-Range Aviation.)

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND UNCERTAINTY

by

F.M. Snyder

Whoever coined the phrase "command and control" really understood psychology. By joining together two such active, forceful words, he created a term that one responds to positively—unless it is being used by someone senior in the chain of command. The perception of command and control as an active process may underplay the important aspect of uncertainty, but is closer to truth than the myth that command and control is somehow an exercise in processing data. In reality, command and control is a system for *decisionmaking,* where the decisionmaker is at some distance from both the phenomena on which his decision is based, and from the people who must carry it out.

For most commanders a "good" command and control system is one that starts where he happens to be standing on the ladder of command, and extends downward; command and control systems that extend upward hardly seem as necessary or desirable. Different perspectives present different views of function and utility. It is the purpose of this paper to provide some insight into command and control systems from a general perspective, so that the reader can appreciate the relationships between command and control and other aspects of naval warfare.

Three characteristics of military command and control are fundamental to its appreciation:

- The FUNCTION of command and control is to direct the application of force.
- The METHOD of command and control is to reduce uncertainties so that commanders can take action.
- The IMPORTANCE of command and control is that it enables commanders to apply force at the right place, at the right time, and in the right amount, or, alternatively, to prevent force from being applied at the wrong time, at the wrong place, or in the wrong amount.

The paramount decision in command and control is the decision to engage the enemy (or if engaged, to disengage), followed in importance by the decision to commit the reserve force. During wartime, most decisions to apply force are tactical, and they are made closer (both physically and organizationally) to the scene of action than strategic decisions made at the highest level in peacetime or at the commencement and termination of hostilities. Although the *function* of a command and control system is to direct the application of force, it can be employed usefully to do other things; and because force is applied so rarely in peacetime, there is wisdom in exercising a command and control system for other purposes so that it will function properly when it is needed. Yet if a command and control system becomes optimized for a function other than directing the application of force, it might perform poorly—or not at all—when the time comes for action. The right balance is somewhere between a command and control system that is never exercised and one that may have become distorted by too much exercise for other purposes.

The reduction of uncertainty—the *method* of command and control—is a prerequisite to intelligent action. The commander who initially orders an action, the commander who carries it out, and the intermediate commanders have to cope with uncertainties before they can act at all. Uncertainties of two kinds need to be resolved: What is actually happening? How are events likely to be affected by available courses

of action? Consideration of either question implies the resolution of a prior uncertainty—what mission is to be accomplished? To the extent that a commander is uncertain about what he has been directed to do, command and control has failed just as surely as if real-time information were unavailable. Although command and control would appear to be primarily a matter of receiving reports and pumping out orders, it is fundamentally an "uncertainty-reducing," decisionmaking process.

The *importance* of command and control can best be appreciated by considering the penalties for its failure. In a tactical engagement, failures in command and control may prevent the commander from bringing all his resources into action, or from applying them efficiently and effectively. As a result, an engagement may be lost. In a strategic situation, on the other hand, failures in command and control may mean that a great strategic opportunity is lost, or that the level of hostilities has been escalated unnecessarily. In a tense international situation there is no margin for error in targeting, timing, or amount of force, so extraordinary measures are taken to avoid failure of command and control.

What does a command and control system consist of? Each command and control system (and theoretically there is one for each commander) has two inputs (directives and information), two outputs (orders and reports), and two internal processes (situation assessment and the generation of directives and reports). In addition to command facilities and intervening communications links, a command and control system also includes such elements as doctrine, training, and rules of engagement—whatever helps reduce the uncertainties that will exist at each level when it becomes time for decision and action. It is important to note that decisions are made throughout the chain of command. At the top, decisions are about what is to be done; further down, decisions are about how and when to do it. Lord Nelson's frequent discussions with his unit commanders and commanding officers were clearly an element in his command and control system. The mix of static components, rules of engagement and doctrine and dynamic components—direct communications and interactive access to computers, will vary.

Command and control systems tend to be simpler whenever the number of situations requiring decision are few, and the repertoire of responses to each situation is limited. Complexity increases in proportion to the number of situations and the number of responses. A command and control system for strategic warfare is larger but simpler than one for tactical warfare that must cope with a much greater number of possible situations and courses of action.

There are also variations in styles of command and control. It is possible to imagine a rigid command and control system that prescribes specific actions for each anticipated set of circumstances, but should circumstances arise that have not been anticipated, action is prohibited without reference to higher authority. Alternatively, one can visualize a much looser command and control system by which authority is delegated to commanders to take whatever actions in their judgment contribute to the achievement of their broad objectives, and to inform higher authority of their actions only "after the fact." It is also possible to visualize a command and control system in which commanders at all echelons share the same information and the same directives, and in which it is presumed that reasonable men at any echelon, given the same facts and the same objectives, would most likely take the same actions.

It is not the intent here to argue the merits and demerits of various com-

mand and control philosophies, but only to stress that alternative philosophies are possible, and that command and control systems supporting different command philosophies can be optimized differently. It is possible today to design data processing systems that match a command and control style. It is no longer necessary to design a system around giant computers, yet opportunities to match systems to style are not likely to be exploited very soon, because most command and control experience has been with large computers, and furthermore there is a view that commanders somehow exercise proprietary rights over information at their disposal.

Where uncertainties exist, commanders at different echelons may try to share their current estimates of the probabilities of the enemy's intentions, of the relative likelihood that alternative courses of action would contribute to different mission objectives, and even of the relative weight they give to each objective. In the past, these estimates have generally been communicated by the use of words. In the future, it will be possible to share these estimates by quantitative or even graphic means.

Because a command and control system is inherently a process for making decisions, to evaluate its quality may be difficult without evaluating the quality of the decisions themselves—a controversial (and perhaps imprudent) thing to do. Yet one characteristic that might be measured without prejudice to the commanders involved is time. In theory, a command and control system can ultimately reduce or even resolve any uncertainty—given enough time. There is, moreover, a presumption that timeliness is useful. A system that informs a commander of the status of his forces, the disposition of his enemy, or the probable result of alternative courses of action with a time-late of only 5 minutes is presumed to be a better system than one that provides him the same information after an hour. A commander needs the facts and projections on which to take reasonable action, but he needs them in time to take effective action. In general, the rate at which uncertainties continue to be reduced as time elapses after an event is such that the product of elapsed time and unresolved uncertainty remains more or less constant and—for a given level of difficulty—becomes a system characteristic. The smaller this product, the better the system. The system designer tries to reduce this time-uncertainty product by identifying the factors that contribute to it.

The time-uncertainty model suggested above can also be useful in thinking about the command and control system of one's enemy, whose command and control system is less useful whenever it takes him more time to resolve a particular level of uncertainty. One is encouraged both to add to an enemy's uncertainties and to take any action that lengthens the time he must take to resolve them. Injecting uncertainties to confuse an enemy's command and control system has the effect of increasing his system's time-uncertainty product.

Unfortunately, some of the most critical uncertainties that must be resolved are created by the command and control system itself. To the extent that a commander must rely on reports for information, he faces the uncertainty that the situation as presented to him has either been distorted in the reporting or has changed in the meanwhile. To the extent that he cannot himself take the action he is directing, he faces the uncertainty that his directives will be misunderstood or even disobeyed, or will be so long delayed in delivery that his directive will have no practical effect (as the JCS found out when they tried to reposition *Liberty* in 1967).

While the principles that govern command and control systems remain rela-

tively unchanged, technology is changing the way that such systems actually work. Technological changes in telecommunications and computers are modifying command and control systems by improving the means of communicating over great distances, by enhancing the means by which a commander absorbs and assesses the existing situation, and by facilitating the means by which he projects and assesses the probable effects of alternative courses of action. Such technological changes result largely from the application of advanced transmission systems and digital computers, but also from a deeper understanding of the nature of information and how it is communicated.

Telecommunications is in the midst of a conversion from analog to digital format, from systems designed to carry the human voice to systems designed to transmit digital bit streams. Until recently, most forms of communication were fitted into some fraction of or multiple of the bandwidth required for a human voice. Even the fleet broadcast and major ship/shore circuits have for years consisted of 8 or 16 teletype channels organized to be transmitted in the same radio frequency space required to carry a single voice channel.

There is a special symmetry about systems that communicate information. For every step of the process, there must be a corresponding step at the other end that has the opposite effect. Every encryption must be decrypted, every transmission must be received, every conversion must be reversed. Despite the greater use of digital systems to facilitate both the correlation and transmission of information, a commander--as originator or recipient--speaks and perceives in analog form. Because modern cryptographic systems rely on the addition of two digital bit streams--one representing the information, the other a cryptographic key stream--the human voice must be converted from analog to digital form to be encrypted and from digital to analog form after it is decrypted.

In general, to employ digital computers it is necessary to convert information from analog to digital form at input, and from digital to analog form at output. Many of the problems encountered in command and control systems are related to these conversions. Who bears the burden for them? Until computer systems are developed that enable computers to accept human voice input directly, the commander or his staff must make the conversion by typing, formatting, or otherwise disciplining the information so the computer can deal with it.

The contrast between the analog and digital approaches to display can best be seen in clocks and watches. The hands of the clock may tell us at a glance how much of an hour remains, but the display of the digital clock leaves no doubt about (what the clock believes to be) the nearest minute. In a financial report, colored graphs can give a sense of proportion while detailed tables of numbers fix exact amounts with presumed precision. Unfortunately, the danger in relying too heavily on displays is that there is no easy way for them to reflect whatever uncertainties lurk in the data. The digital world is based on the definite presence or absence of information, and therefore displayed data may imply a level of certainty that is not justified.

This paper has had two special themes: that a command and control system is useful to the extent it helps commanders (at whatever echelon) reduce or resolve uncertainties; that some uncertainties are created by the command and control system itself, particularly when information is changed in fundamental form--from analog to digital or vice versa.

Machines can be programmed to take specific actions in specific circumstances, but in an ambiguous or

uncertain situation, a man must intervene so that action will be taken. In warfare, that man is the commander. He knows that he will always have to act in the face of uncertainty, but he would do well to be in little doubt about the capabilities and limitations of the system that is supposed to help him reduce those uncertainties—his command and control system.



PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS

Barnaby, Frank, ed. *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives.* London: Taylor and Francis, 1978. 371pp.

Van Cleave, William R. and Cohen, S.T. *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination of the Issues.* London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1978. 119pp.

The employment of tactical nuclear weapons has been a stepchild in Western military studies since the beginning of the sixties. In U.S. doctrine, a shift away from theoretical consideration of tactical nuclear warfare coincided with the enunciation of the strategy of flexible response and the decision to install a new locking system on American weapons in Europe. From the NATO perspective, both decisions undercut the belief in automatic recourse to nuclear weapons in European conflict. The topic of tactical nuclear weapons was revived forcefully in 1977 by the debate over DOD proposals to modernize American stocks. Controversy centered on what was popularly called the neutron bomb. *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives* represents the effort of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute to deal with many of the issues raised by the debate, as well as to present concerns that are more European than American in nature.

The value of the SIPRI volume lies in three areas. First, the book provides coverage of diverging opinions on a range of issues associated with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. For example, one author may argue convincingly that the firebreak between nuclear and conventional weapons is inviolate (which is the real heart of the debate) and that improvements in tactical nuclear weapons will make it more likely that the firebreak will be crossed. Another counters, equally logically, that it is possible to separate strictly strategic and tactical nuclear forces and to do so without diminishing the value of either. A similar balance of opinions is also achieved on the issue of efforts to control or limit tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; alternative proposals are included with discussion of what levels of tactical nuclear disarmament are feasible.

The second value of the SIPRI book is that it clearly spells out the ambivalent attitude towards tactical nuclear weapons held by the European community and the dichotomy between American and European views. Essentially, the European position is a contradiction between the desire to use tactical nuclear weapons to preserve the American commitment (for those who accept them as part and parcel of deterrence) and the overwhelmingly negative reaction to the prospect of actual use of the weapons in European territory. The dilemma of the European position and the inevitable difference between American and European perspectives are inescapable facts if NATO is to produce a coherent doctrine of tactical nuclear warfare. That doctrine cannot be exclusively American if it is to be accepted and credible.

Finally, the results of the SIPRI conference (of which this book resulted) lay to rest some of the conventional wisdom concerning tactical nuclear weapons that perhaps has been less wise than conventional. For example, the first chapter, setting out the history of tactical nuclear weapons, closely questions the assumption that Western analysts have operated with a correct assessment of the Soviet tactical nuclear threat. Given the almost total absence of hard data, the author notes that "the judgements of Western authors most often seem to be derived from a group of extremely limited and cryptic Soviet statements, from which many analysts seem to be able to obtain far more meaning and clarity than the original statements contain." As a result of this marginal information, categorical statements concerning what the Soviets have in their tactical nuclear stockpiles, where these weapons are, and for what purpose they are assigned, are not valid. Nor is the existence or nonexistence of a Soviet doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons proven. Any attempt to encourage the formulation of a NATO position on tactical nuclear warfare must recognize this gap. Creating a doctrine to counter an ambiguous threat is difficult at best; it is nearly impossible if the ambiguity is not recognized.

A second example of laying conventional wisdom to rest concerns the performance of enhanced radiation weapons (or whatever name is chosen)—that is the falseness of the assumption that they are almost identical to conventional weapons. The designation "mini-nukes" or "clean" weapons is misleading. Initial collateral damage from low yield or enhanced radiation may be considerably less than that from conventional weapons or from larger yield fission weapons. The "advantage" of such weapons is that they achieve a high kill by initial radiation rather than by blast. However, in order to achieve this result the weapons actually cover proportionately wider areas with delayed radiation effects than do conventional nuclear weapons. "Mini-nukes" is therefore a misnomer whose use could lead to incorrect judgments in the policy planning process. The dispelling of such common myths is a significant contribution of the SIPRI book.

The major challenge to the SIPRI book is likely to be a philosophical one in that the volume begins with the statement that tactical nuclear weapons should be eliminated. Such an opening could well put off the reader who recognizes the futility of bemoaning a technological development: the weapons exist, it remains to decide how to incorporate them or limit their use. Beyond this philosophical stumbling bloc, the reader should find considerable value in the detailed and readable history of tactical nuclear weapons provided by the book, and in its concluding presentation of opposing solutions.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: an Examination of the Issues ranges less widely over the issues than does the SIPRI book. In fact, this book may be mistitled in that it is not truly an examination of the issues, but a presentation of one side of the case. The central theme is that the United States lacks a doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons and needs to develop one. Much of the authors' argument is drawn from precisely the assumptions that are challenged by the SIPRI collection: the existence of a Soviet intention to use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (based on Soviet citations that are apparently so limited that the authors are frequently forced to reuse them) and the relative "cleanness" of discriminate enhanced radiation weapons. The authors note that there are differences of opinion concerning these "facts" but are still willing to use them as the basis for later arguments. In this sense, the Van Cleave and Cohen book would serve better as a chapter in a larger collection than as a separate

work. Structurally, the volume could fit as a chapter if the repetitions that characterizes each section were eliminated. Finally, in terms of content, there is a gap between the problem posed and the solutions offered. The authors focus on the lack of theory, but the concluding section on alternatives merely restates the need for a doctrine and shifts to consideration of some very specific nondoctrinal proposals, such as dispersal of forces and the introduction of VSTOL. These solutions do not parallel the theoretical questions presented throughout the book.

Neither the Van Cleave and Cohen book nor the SIPRI collection should be regarded as a final answer to where tactical nuclear weapons do or do not fit in modern arsenals. The merit of both is that they may stimulate other studies on the issues raised.

RENITA FRY

Baugh, Daniel A., ed. *Naval Administration 1715-1750.* London: Navy Records Society, vol. 120, 1977. 523pp.

Collinge, J.M., compiler. *Navy Board Officials 1660-1832 (Office Holders in Modern Britain,* vol. 7). London: University of London, Institute of Historical Research, 1978. 152pp.

These two volumes are essential reference works for the student of English naval administration in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Professor Baugh's work is a selection of 437 documents that illustrate the most challenging administrative problems that faced the Royal Navy in a 37-year period of peace and war. The documents are carefully selected to stand by themselves as illustrations of a specific period and at the same time to complement works already in print. Most notably, this collection documents Professor Baugh's own well-known study of *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton, 1965). There is much to be said for using the two volumes together. They are basically organized around the same categories, and the introductions to the different sections in the collection of documents provide some modification to his earlier judgments. In an additional short selection of material about Naval Stores and Timber, Baugh makes some important comments that modify or clarify several points in R.G. Albion's pioneer study, *Forests and Sea Power* (Harvard, 1926). Although there are a large number of documents on the subject of colonial naval stores, the documents printed here illustrate several points that have been previously overlooked. In particular, they complement the useful book by J.J. Malone, *Pine Trees and Politics: The Naval Stores and Forest Policy in Colonial New England 1691-1775* (University of Washington, 1964). Baugh's collection of documents makes a major contribution to our understanding of naval history and carries on the series of Navy Board papers that the Navy Records Society has published: *The Sergison Papers* for the period 1692-1702 and *Queen Anne's Navy* for the period 1702-14. Taking the three volumes together, one may see the manner in which the wartime procedures of 1692-1713 were consolidated and institutionalized by the middle of the 18th century.

Michael Collinge's work carries on the lists of Modern British Office Holders begun by J.C. Sainty. In 1975, Sainty published *Admiralty Officials 1660-1870,* a list of officials who served in the immediate office of the Lord High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty. The men in that office were at the top of the navy's bureaucracy and were concerned with appointments, promotions, assignments and fleet operations under the direction of the cabinet. Collinge's work, like Baugh's, focuses on the administrative side that was dominated by the Navy Board, an

office that complemented the work of the Admiralty and dealt with naval pay and accounts, buildings, navy yards, repair and construction. Collinge has arranged his work into two major sections. The first lists each office under the Navy Board, and in an introductory paragraph discusses the development of each particular office and its area of responsibility, with an account of attempts to reform it, wages and salaries paid. Under each of these headings, a chronological listing is given with the dates of each official's service. The second major section of the book is an alphabetical listing of the officials who were employed at the Navy Board with their titles, dates of employment, and documentary source of that information. Through this structure, Collinge authoritatively covers the Navy Board's existence from its reconstitution under Charles II until its duties were merged with the Admiralty in 1832. Perhaps the most well-known individual in this list is Samuel Pepys, who was Clerk of the Acts at the Navy Board at the time he was writing his *Diary*.

Collinge has made a particularly valuable contribution and we hope that he will complete the job by giving us further volumes to clarify our understanding of naval affairs in this period. We still need to know more about the office of Treasurer of the Navy, resident officials at out-ports in Britain and abroad, The Victualling Board, The Transport Board, The Commissioners of Sick and Wounded Seamen, and The Prize Office.

Both these volumes make major contributions to naval history at a time when historians have only recently begun to turn from a narrative of battles to a systematic analysis of the bureaucracy and the quality of the administration that supported the fleet at sea.

J.B. HATTENDORF
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Oxford

Burns, James MacGregor. *Leadership*. New York: Harper & Row, 1978. 530pp.

Writing the definitive book on *Leadership* is no mean feat. James MacGregor Burns has met the challenge with disarming energy and covers the waterfront in this doorstop pedagogical work that ranges from purely theoretical to practical in a balanced, thoughtful way. Whether one agrees with Burns' thesis or not, few could fault his carefully researched and documented attempt to develop a general theory of leadership. A political scientist by education and temperament, Burns chooses the behavioral approach to his analysis of leaders and polities of the world, past and present.

The study of behavior has revealed some commonality of needs among disparate peoples and cultures for countless years. Maslow articulated the universal nature of these needs in a popular and generally accepted foundation of motivation theory. In Burns' words, "Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers." Such a definition springs from the study of new findings and concepts in psychology that Burns contends are the keys to understanding leadership. To support this proposition, several leaders (Gandhi, Lenin, and Hitler) are subjected to an extended psychobiographical autopsy that explores the roots of their leadership styles in an historically interesting yet not entirely convincing way.

Burns constructs two complementary concepts of leadership—transactional and transforming. The former connotes exchange of something valued. It can be "economic or political or psychological in nature." Good will, favors, bargaining chips, and quid pro quos support this

style of mutual back patting. Such leadership lies at the heart of our democratic form of government and has a powerful influence despite its lack of moral conscience.

Raising "the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led" is the ultimate goal of transforming leadership. Gandhi is Burns' archetype for the leader with the vision, the presence, the imagination and the example to whom people of all walks of life eagerly respond. Mao is another; Woodrow Wilson and FDR don't make the cut.

When all the sententious fat is rendered from this idea of leadership's moral force and moral obligation, it makes good sense. George Washington's injunction seems to bear out the concept of transforming leadership: "It should be the highest ambition of every American to extend his views beyond himself, and to bear in mind that his conduct will not only affect himself, his country, and his immediate posterity; but that its influence may be coextensive with the world, and stamp political happiness or misery on ages yet unborn."

Leadership concludes with several chapters that tie the theoretical to the practical and that offer general prescriptive advice for practicing transforming leadership.

For all its strengths, there are some weaknesses in the book. Thomas Mann's edict, "In our time the destiny of man presents its meaning in political terms," aside, *Leadership* is poorly titled. Except for isolated instances, Burns supports his entire theoretical calculus with examples from political life--what about us in uniform? Burns claims that his theory is universal in application, that leadership for the politician, the teacher, the coach or the military man reduces to the same formula. If it's that simple, why is there such a strong and acknowledged need for leadership? Burns' examples of transforming leadership are so sparse that even as a theoretical concept, its usefulness is limited. The gulf between the transactional and transforming leader is too great. There seems to be no middle ground. Few people in positions of leadership can remain in these transactional or transforming molds forever—their shadows are not as sharply contrasted as Burns would have us believe. The gray area in between, "contingency leadership" if you will, is where I believe most leaders spend most of their time, with frequent uneven migrations to both extremes. Warren Bennis describes this gray area in other terms: "The challenge is not for an omnipotent, omniscient 'man on a white horse'" but a fallible, somewhat idealistic individual who can reach the stirrups. That man is somewhere on the transactional side of Burns' transforming leader.

J.P. MORSE
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Coleman, John S. Jr. *Bataan and Beyond.* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1978. 210pp.

John Coleman's book affords an interesting view of the experiences Americans were forced to endure both as fighting men on Bataan and as prisoners of the Japanese. The book's main value, however, lies in its accurate depiction of the brutal physical and mental punishment inflicted upon Americans by their Japanese captors; punishment most civilized minds find difficult, if not possible, to comprehend.

Prior to the recapture of the Philippines, almost all American POWs were packed into the holds of "hell ships" and transported to prison camps in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, or Manchuria to perform slave labor. Many failed to survive the voyage but those who did found living conditions in their new camps as foul as those in the Philippines. In many they were worse.

The prisoners, to a man, suffered from malnutrition and various diseases

uncommon in the United States (scurvy, pellagra, beriberi, gynecomastia, avitaminosos, and others). Nevertheless, they were quickly forced to work like animals in unsafe mines, on docks, in railroad yards, factories, and shipyards. Harassed and degraded at every turn by brutal guards, they were always undernourished and inadequately clothed to stave off the cold of winter. They rested their emaciated bodies not on beds, but on rough boards--usually covered by a thin straw mat.

The grievously ill received little or no medical attention, and some were subjected to crude, often gruesome experimentation by Japanese doctors and medics. Brutal beatings for infractions of outrageous rules or trumped-up charges were the order-of-the-day. Men too sick to work were often beaten because they couldn't work. Sick men who tried to work rather than face ruthless guards in camp were beaten because they couldn't keep the pace.

It is little wonder then that of about 24,000 Americans of all services (mostly in their late teens or early twenties) captured in the Philippines, more than 13,000 died as Japanese prisoners. Of the roughly 11,000 Americans who survived to be repatriated, more than 5,000 have since died, most from the residual effects of prisoner of war experience.

There have been very few published accounts of Japanese work camps because those who survived them are, for one reason or another, incapable of writing about them or find such effort too depressing to recall. Coleman, however, paints a shocking picture of Yodogawa Bunshaw, one of many such work camps, where he was confined for 8 months. There is no exaggeration here and, difficult as it may be to believe, there were other work camps that were worse; few, if any were better.

Because Coleman is not a professional writer, it is unfortunate that the publisher did not see fit to edit his work. As a result, *Bataan and Beyond* lacking literary polish and style, often becomes tedious. Its main fault lies in the overabundance of Coleman's personal exploits that, at times, seem a little "tall" as stories go. Nevertheless, his account of conditions existing in Japanese POW camps is consistent with the facts, and should be of historic interest.

WALTER G. WINSLOW
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Harrod, Frederick S. *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 276pp.

To a Navy that alternately rejects and embraces a systems analyst's dehumanized methods, Harrod's work comes as an important example of how balanced, objective historical study can illuminate present naval problems by examining their past roots.

In his work, Harrod deals with a longstanding and complex problem of the Navy: the nature and maintenance of the enlisted force. He relies on an impressive range of sources to document his work, one of which is U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. A perusal of its contents since its first publication in 1874 demonstrates that recruiting, training, preventing the desertion of and retaining high-quality enlisted men has long been a problem of the U.S. Navy. Harrod examines this dilemma in a crucial era--1899-1940. It was a period in which traditional seaboard sources no longer supplied the fleet with men who were familiar with the sea and when the Navy was embarking on both quantitative and qualitative material expansions.

In 171 pages of text, Harrod deals with "The Old Navy," the character and life of the men of the "New Navy," their recruitment, training, changing rate structure, recreation and welfare, naval justice and the officer-enlisted relationship. With a terse, almost antiseptic prose, he marshalls extensive and

exhaustive research in a truly scholarly effort.

The problems of recruiting, promises of attractive duty and prospects for retention that plague today's Navy have their analogies in the period Harrod discusses. He analyzes these processes and offers insights into their importance. In an appendix of 13 tables, he delineates an interesting demographic picture of the enlisted force of the period. He also touches on the Navy's assessment of race relations and how racial policies were perceived and implemented in the fleet.

In its broadest sweep, Harrod's work has implications for naval leadership. Any man, officer or enlisted, who has served in the fleet can recall "white-hats" whom he admired, trusted and respected. He can also recall others who were less inspiring. Harrod speaks of both sorts.

A reading of *Manning the New Navy* will supply the officer and senior petty officer with a vantage point from which to view past personnel problems and from which to draw current inspiration for practical leadership.

LAWRENCE C. ALLIN
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Hutchinson, Martha C. *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. 178pp.

Among the more mundane results of the political terrorism problem has been the large number of popular and scholarly books published to meet the public's interest, as well as to fulfill certain imperatives of a free economic system. Anyone familiar with the literature dealing with terrorism could successfully predict the contents of a stereotypical book-length treatment of the problem. Included would be obligatory chapters treating the IRA, the PLO, the Cypriot EOKA, the Tupamaros, and the concluding chapter would cite evidence indicating terrorist cooperation across national boundaries and across organizational lines. Naturally, the closing page or so would consist of a bit of prognostication on the prospect of nuclear terror. Several of the general works are quite competent, refreshingly provocative and informative—perhaps to the extent that they deviate from the stereotype—sadly many are not. Among the best might be cited J. Bowyer Bell's *A Time of Terror,* Anthony Burton's *Urban Terrorism,* Edward Hyams' *Terrorists and Terrorism,* and Paul Wilkinson's uniquely analytic *Political Terrorism.*

What is lacking at this point are systematic, in-depth treatments of specific terrorist campaigns. For it is only through the exhaustive (and unfortunately, exhausting) study of the many ways in which terrorism has manifested itself that the (dis)utilities and (dis)incentives for political terrorism can be comprehended. The surfeit of terrorism books does not include a great number of such extensive treatments. Not that it is hard to understand why, given the paucity of evidence, the clandestine nature of the terrorism enterprise, and the shortcomings of the researchers (e.g., linguistic). There are however a few notable works in the vanguard of this approach. Noteworthy works include Jillian Becker's study of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, *Hitler's Children;* Bell's study of Jewish terrorism in mandatory Palestine, *Terror Out of Zion;* and finally John Cooley's impressive and valuable study of the fedayeen (Palestinian terrorists), *Green March, Black September.*

Thus, it is with great anticipation that Martha C. Hutchinson's new book, *Revolutionary Terrorism* is received—a study of the use of terrorism by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) during the Algerian war. It is odd that the FLN terror campaign, matched in its

scope and effect probably only by the Irgun in the Holy Land, has not been subjected to more thorough treatment to date. Even in the general works, the space accorded the Algerian revolution is disproportionately small when compared to other terrorist campaigns. Two of the better recent books only cite the FLN on five out of nearly 700 pages; only Anthony Burton provides more than cursory treatment (about 10 pages). Thus, *Revolutionary Terrorism,* to the extent that it succeeds, is an especially welcomed addition to the literature.

Perhaps it is best to be explicit about what *Revolutionary Terrorism* is not. It is *not* a comprehensive chronicle or history of the events of the Algerian revolution. In fact, the reader unacquainted with those events would be well advised to first read Alistair Horne's superb history, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962,* before starting *Revolutionary Terrorism.*

Hutchinson proceeds from a definition of revolutionary terrorism as a systematic and purposeful method for seizing political power through individual acts of extraordinary and symbolic violence, directed against victims or objects in such a way as to be psychologically effective, in order to change political behavior and attitudes. She ascribes the prevalence of revolutionary terrorism to its small costs as compared to its much larger benefits for the perpetrator (terrorism at its essence being an effective weapon of the weak).

> Paradoxically, terrorism, which often appears irrational or unpredictable—an image that may contribute to its political effectiveness—is basically a rational revolutionary strategy, in the sense of being a reasonable political choice. Terrorism is a policy that entails foreseeable costs and benefits. The terrorism of the FLN was the result of deliberate decisions by the revolutionary elite, not, in most cases, a pathological or irrational outburst. (p. 36)

(Perhaps 100,000 Muslim Algerians and 5,000 Frenchmen died at FLN hands. Whether this represents a "reasonable political choice" is at least problematic; it is certainly ghastly within any humanist philosophical framework.)

The fundamental aims of the FLN were to obtain the absolute independence of Algeria from France and for the FLN to be the sole representative of Algerian nationalism. In pursuit of these aims, the FLN sought to: (1) gain support of the "native" population; (2) isolate and weaken the French in Algeria; (3) influence the population of France; and (4) gain international support and assistance. In furtherance of these aims, terrorism was consciously chosen as an instrument of the Algerian revolution.

Hutchinson imposes a typology on FLN use of terror. While the typology is useful, the categories are not mutually exclusive, and one suspects that it might be the orderliness of the presentation, rather than the analytical neatness of the terrorists, that attentuates the chaos (and passion) of the revolution. In any event, there is something to be gained in contemplating the functions of FLN terrorism, even if the data is less than orderly; accordingly, a verbal sketch of parts of Hutchinson's typology follows: No doubt the most important function of terrorism in Algeria was creating an *obedient* and *compliant* population. "Anyone who was not actively pro-FLN risked being labeled a traitor . . . ." Concomitant with the creation of a compliant populace was the use of *endorsement* terrorism largely directed against the *colons,* and intended to influence Algerian Arab attitudes toward the FLN. Endorsement terrorism included acts of vengeance, as well as acts carefully calculated to provoke repression by the French against the Muslim populace. For example, the terror-murders of

71 Europeans, 31 French soldiers, and 21 Algerians in August 1955 led swiftly to an estimated 12,000 dead at French hands. There were two supreme ironies in the Algerian war. One was the degree to which the French acted as if they sought the alienation of the Arab people of Algeria, and the second was that in an anticolonial revolution against France, the preponderance of victims were not French, but Arab objects of both French *and* FLN violence.

A third function of terrorism was the *destruction* of the French regime through the truncation of intelligence links, the promotion of noncooperation, the discouragement of *colon* contacts with the Muslims, and the creation of an atmosphere of pervasive insecurity. In general, this facet of the FLN campaign did not succeed in affecting the resolve of the French colonialists (indeed it had an opposite effect), but it did isolate the two communities from each other, and it did render both more susceptible to extremist leadership. Hutchinson appears to be mistaken in her assessments of the damage done to the French intelligence system, which managed to sustain itself through a brutal policy of torture and intimidation that was especially effective in the Battle of Algiers.

Yet a fourth functional variant was *organizational* terrorism, intended to settle internal disputes, eliminate competitors, enforce discipline, and recruit members. Hutchinson holds that this use of terrorism "was probably less significant for the FLN, however, than any other form." In view of Alistair Horne's citation of French claims that 12,000 members of the FLN were killed in internal purges, as well as 4,300 Algerians killed in factional disputes in France, it is hard to understand the author's diminishment of this facet of FLN terrorism. Perhaps the only explanation for Hutchinson's interpretation is the fact that she might consider such terrorism as of the *compliance* rather than the *organizational* variety, thus illustrating the ambiguity of her typology.

Hutchinson concludes her treatment with discussions of the French response to terrorism, and the FLN's attempts to internationalize the conflict. We know that the French combination of "unresponsiveness with impotence" led to political gains for an adversary that had been defeated militarily. In France, the pattern of FLN terrorism seemed constantly to remind the French public of their presence in Algeria and its costs, both in gold and flesh. In the end, of course, DeGaulle sacrificed the province to save the state. "It was not so much that the FLN 'won' but that the French 'lost' the war."

Revolutionary Terrorism is a step in the right direction—that is, toward the intensive study of specific groups and campaigns. The prose is not elegant; there is a bit too much equivocation; a lexicon might have been nice; and the lack of adequate development of several chapters is distressing (e.g., especially the chapter treating internationalization of the war). However, that being said, the reader interested in terrorism (or revolution or Middle Eastern studies) will find Professor Hutchinson's book a worthwhile afternoon's reading, which is more than can be said for many books in the terrorism family.

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Major, U.S. Army

Jones, David R., ed. *The Military-Naval Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union*, Volume I. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1978. 247pp.

This is the first of a projected 50 volumes plus indexes and supplements. Entries run from a few lines to 15 or more pages and the longer signed entries have extensive bibliographic notes. Subject coverage, at least in this volume, appears comprehensive: there are

aircraft, ship, and weapons systems designations and descriptions; battle, campaign, and unit histories; biographies; essays on diplomacy, doctrine, and geography; military terms and the many other categories necessary for thorough treatment of entries from "A" to "Ad."

This encyclopedia promises to become the leader in its field. Scholars, researchers, even those with casual questions will find it invaluable—if they are patient. The publication schedule calls for only 2-3 volumes annually and that translates to a 15-25 year wait for the entire series; and they will want to be associated with a subscribing library because at $30.50 per volume, the total investment may be more substantial than most individuals will wish to undertake.

W.R. PETTYJOHN
Commander, U.S. Navy

King, Irving H. *George Washington's Coast Guard.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978. 229pp.

Dr. King offers an interesting history of the Revenue Cutter Service, forerunner of today's Coast Guard, during the years 1789-1801. At first impression this book would seem to have a somewhat narrow appeal to American history buffs and coastguardsmen but after just a few pages the reader is quickly immersed in the problems of this young nation and the urgent needs for an agency to collect revenue during the Federalist Era.

The fascinating thing about this short book (only 170 pages of text) is that many of the problems and circumstances faced by our founding fathers are still with us today. There is a chapter on command selection for the first 10 cutters. President Washington and Secretary Hamilton sought information about candidates from many sources but kept close personal control over the final selection process. Washington retained for himself the exclusive right to appoint these masters. Prior military experience, seamanship ability and even political influence played roles in the selection process.

The building of these first 10 ships, for which Hamilton desired to pay no more than $1,000 apiece, was plagued by cost overruns and change orders. Finding builders who would construct "large" cutters for limited money was frustrating. In spite of this, Hamilton had the foresight to have the ships built in shipyards in various parts of the country to set up a shore establishment rather than have them all built in a single yard, and he had the prospective masters of the vessels supervise the construction. His objective was to "... build a ship not just to acquire a revenue cutter but to reap for the nation a harvest of military, economic and political benefits that would surely flow from the cutter establishment."

The domestic manufacture of sailcloth was fostered to decrease dependency on foreign imports and when, in December 1794, it was decided to import 20 anchors from Europe for use on six frigates Hamilton ordered the U.S. Minister to the Court of St. James to give a preference to American bottoms when he shipped the anchors.

Pay for the crews of the cutters was frequently a problem, and the fact that a master mariner could secure better compensation for sailing merchant ships than for sailing cutters made it difficult to attract officers for the service. This must sound familiar to the naval aviation and nuclear submarine communities.

In the desire for economy many of the cutters sailed shorthanded and in 1796 Hamilton's successor at Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, in a report on officers' pay to the House of Representatives, explained that the petitioners reported "... their compensation as being inadequate in consequence of the late increase of the prices of provisions

& . . . [cost] of liv[ing], and pray that they may be increased."

Concerning operation of the cutters, although their primary mission was revenue collection, they quickly were engaged in such additional duties as aiding distressed mariners, charting the harbors and coastal waters, maintaining aids to navigation and augmenting the new Navy during the Quasi-War with France. During that period, the cutters convoyed American merchant ships, helped keep open the sealanes of the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, captured 16 armed French vessels, participated in the capture of four others and recaptured 10 American vessels that had been seized by the French. One master even developed a method to distill fresh water from salt water aboard ship, no doubt the precursor of today's shipboard evaporators.

Coast Guard and Navy officers and those with a liking for American history should find this a fascinating book despite the narrow time period covered and the resemblance to a doctoral dissertation. The similarity of problems of the 1790s and the 1970s should give us cause to reflect on how far we really have come in the past 200 years.

J.W. DUENZL
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard

Lewy, Guenter. *America in Vietnam.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 576pp.

Shortly after the fall of Saigon, President Ford announced that there would be no official investigation of the causes of the American defeat in Southeast Asia. By and large, journalists and scholars have exhibited a similar disinterest. Vietnam is yesterday's newspaper that featured a confusing, emotional and tragic story we'd rather forget.

One, however, who chose to analyze rather than ignore the war is Dr. Guenter Lewy, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts. A scholar who previously had been nominated for a National Book Award, Lewy devoted 5 years of research to his subject. The result is an excellent book organized around the examination of two issues: U.S. military strategy and tactics in Vietnam and the morality of the U.S. combat conduct.

Lewy's 200-page military history of the Vietnam war—the first half of the book—relies extensively upon thousands of official secret reports he demanded and received under the Freedom of Information Act. He explains succinctly the major phases of the war, criticizing as futile the basic U.S. military strategy of attrition. He attributes this strategy to organizational determinism: a military bureaucracy that persisted in "doing its thing" even when its own analyses (that Lewy quotes) damned the strategy. According to Lewy, it was this "special [military] knowledge that Westmoreland and most of his subordinates had [that] equipped them poorly to understand the political and social dynamics of the war."

Lewy does not suggest that it was communist rhetoric that triumphed over American bullets. The final defeat of South Vietnam was brought about by a strong, modern, conventional North Vietnamese army. Lewy's point is that the basic South Vietnamese weakness was a lack of leadership. U.S. military professionals, he writes, knew of and yet chose to ignore that fact, preferring to fight in place of the South Vietnamese. Lewy does not suggest, however, that defeat was inevitable. He explains, without excusing them, Thieu's 1975 decisions as heavily influenced by the sharp drop in American material support. He cites Nixon's 1973 secret written promise that the United States "will respond with full force should the [cease-fire] settlement be violated by North Vietnam." Lewy concludes that the fall of South Vietnam had many causes: the iron will and incredible

sacrifice of lives by the North Vietnamese politbureau; lack of South Vietnamese leadership and of a cohesive society; an inept U.S. military strategy; and American domestic divisiveness and incoherent war aims.

Lewy devotes the latter half of his book to the moral aspects of the U.S. military conduct of the war. He deals with terrorism, atrocities, prisoners, and aerial bombing. For each subject he systematically presents the case against the U.S. military and reviews the evidence. Many of the accusations were well-publicized, as were the accusers: David Dellinger, Richard Falk, Jane Fonda, Ramsey Clark, etc. Lewy concludes that "charges of officially condoned illegal and grossly immoral conduct are without substance." He states that the American military showed more concern for the safety and property of civilians during the Vietnam war than during World War II or the Korean war. The reader is left with the impression that truth about the American military conduct in Vietnam counted for less than political expediency and news sensationalism.

In sum, Professor Lewy has written a careful, documented, readable capsule military history of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam. It is an excellent professional work.

F.J. WEST
Naval War College

Murphy, Paul J., ed. *Naval Power in Soviet Policy*. Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, 1978. 341pp.

This is a balanced, scholarly, and current collection of essays for serious students of the Soviet Navy. The tired "Russians are coming in Tall Ships!" material standard in popularized writing for the past 15 years is absent. This is a lean, tough book written by professionals for other professionals who are not reluctant to let their minds probe ahead of any party line. Its solid content is comparable to that of the landmark MccGwire series at a fraction of their price.

A concise opening chapter, cataloging Admiral Gorshkov's writing by subject, serves as a springboard for discussion of policy and Soviet naval employment. Included is William H. Thomson's essay on the long and continuing internal debate on the role of Russian navies in Russian policy concluding that Gorshkov faces internal Soviet opposition to his vision for the navy and that it is questionable to assume that all of his writings will be translated into naval reality. John J. "Buck" Herzog matches Soviet naval development with unfolding national purposes and makes the best case yet for the existence of an important Soviet pro-SSBN mission--a logical theory gaining belated acceptance in the United States. Concluding the policy/naval employment section, Alva M. Bowen's essay examines the Anglo-German and Soviet-American naval rivalries, and is a useful reminder of the continental origins of Soviet naval doctrine.

The second part of the book, "Naval War-Fighting: Capabilities and Missions," plows scant new ground but adds current and complete summaries of structure of the Soviet Navy and Soviet Naval Aviation by the editor to updates of the works of Michael MccGwire and Robert W. Herrick. The chapter on Soviet Naval Aviation is a particularly useful and complete reference. Chapters by Claude R. Thorpe on the use of the Delphi Technique in determining Soviet naval mission priorities and by the team of Dimitry N. Ivanoff and Frank M. Murphy on the methodology of predicting Soviet naval technology are informative but concern analytic technique more than the Soviet Navy. Donald C. Daniel of the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School explores trends in major Soviet naval exercises in a piece worth remembering when OKEAN 80 begins its run on the world oceans.

Rounding out the "War-Fighting" section is the most stimulating and entertaining essay in the book, "U.S. vs. Soviet Style Fleet Design," by Norman Friedman. He uses fresh and freewheeling historical analogy to look at the Soviet Navy from novel angles. By daring to be wrong, Mr. Friedman may be startlingly right over a wide range of topics. New thought about the Soviet Navy has always been scarce and is sometimes not officially welcomed.

Shifting the focus to peacetime issues are short sections on the Soviet view of naval arms limitation and Soviet forward naval deployment. Sophisticated analyses by Abram N. Shulskey, Albert E. Graham and a trio from the Center for Naval Analysis, Robert Weinland, Anne Kelly Calhoun, and Charles Peterson are equal to the complexities of the subject.

A nice bonus is the compact mass of reference material tabulated in the appendixes and interspersed in the text. A glossary of selected Soviet naval terms is unusual and illuminating. Much is suggested by subtle differences in our naval language.

Naval Power in Soviet Policy is recommended reading for military professionals. Mr. Murphy, assisted by his wife Margaret Murphy, should repeat this fine effort 2 or 3 years hence. The Air Force is commended for making so much information and expert opinion available in a compact, affordable book. Similar collections on Soviet ground and air forces are needed.

HAMLIN CALDWELL

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *The Imperialist Revolutionaries. Trends in World Communism in the 1960s and 1970s.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. 152pp.

Readers in the Kremlin, if there are any, will not like this book.

Hugh Seton-Watson, the dean of Western historians specializing in communist affairs, plays hard-ball:

> One point on which Marxist-Leninists and old-style Russian imperialists could unite . . . was that what was good for the CPSU and the Soviet state was also good for its non-Russian citizens . . . .
>
> . . . the system of repression by the Committee of State Security (KGB) is immensely more ruthless and comprehensive than was any modern European colonial repression . . . .
>
> The language of Russian falsifiers of the histories of non-Russian peoples strikingly recalls the language of Victorian British or Wilhelmian German imperialism . . . for the Soviet Russian myth-makers are one more in the line of upstart imperialist elites glorifying their supremacy over lesser breeds . . . .
>
> Soviet propaganda has created a grotesque dreamworld of blissful brotherhood among socialist nations: judged by this standard, Soviet reality is shameful and oppressive . . . .
>
> The public posture of the rulers of the second super power was arrogant, boastful, and self-righteous.

Seton-Watson's purpose is to survey the activities of communism in the world in the 1960s and 1970s. Tasks of this magnitude usually are undertaken through collective action and the result is an uneven volume of essays by assorted authors. By contrast, *The Imperialist Revolutionaries* is an even, strong, brief work of scholarly interpretation that packs important political and strategic punch.

Starting on the basis that polycentrism is a fact (two centers of communist power: Moscow and Peking; an illusory third center, Havana, actually subservient to Moscow; and a possible fourth center, Hanoi), Seton-Watson proceeds to survey the globe. More comfortable with East European and

Soviet internal developments, he nevertheless casts a critically interpretive eye on events in Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and the Asian southern and eastern rims. Conclusion:

> The events of the last decade showed less progress for the communist cause in developing societies, and more progress in advanced industrial societies, than was to be expected in the early 1960s.

The basis for this judgment is not that of revolutionary takeovers. These occurred in five developing states: Cuba, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Angola. Rather, the basis is that of growing Communist Party strength in Western Europe, "The Enigma of Eurocommunism," simultaneously with the lapse of noncommunist resolve into "short term hedonism and a collective guilt complex." Seton-Watson sees a failure of nerve in the West that bodes ill.

However, if the European communist parties succeed to power, he does not accept that they will be clients of Moscow:

> . . . Italian or French Eurocommunists might conceivably welcome NATO as a defense against Soviet attack. It was, after all, true that the Chinese and Yugoslav governments had long reckoned with the possibility of armed resistance to Soviet forces; why should not West European communists do likewise?

Thus Seton-Watson sees Eurocommunism as, at best, a mixed blessing and, at worst, a curse, for the Kremlin. Eurocommunist issues impact on the Soviet succession. Brezhnev's heirs likely now are taking sides on how to treat its possibilities. If it succeeds, the impact in Eastern Europe and among the nationalities may result in upheaval difficult to control. If it fails, the peaceful road to socialism will be seen to have dead-ended. The military road, with its deadly uncertainties, will remain.

For their part, the Eurocommunists face horrendous choices. To be too revolutionary is to drive the middle classes to the right. To be too conciliatory is to drive the workers and intelligentsia to the extreme left. If they successfully participate in coalitions, they risk feedback on the Eastern European communists. If they defend the Soviet record, they lose votes. If they succeed in reducing defense expenditures, they risk Soviet occupation. If they support defense expenditures, they are typed as American stooges.

To complicate their dilemma there is the Chinese aspect. Seton-Watson notes that Peking is recommending energetic defense measures and Atlantic unity, but the phenomenon is much more significant and deserves more emphasis. The Chinese Government is fully committed to the strategy of a second front against Moscow and is using all means available, ideologic, economic, psychologic, to gain that end. Moreover, Peking's counter-Soviet efforts extend around the globe and encompass the spectrum from espionage and subversion, propaganda, psychological warfare, and diplomacy to proxy combat. This was apparent during the period covered, but is insufficiently highlighted.

One hundred and fifty-two pages of profound interpretation by a great historian, this book is one of true merit.

WILLIAM A. PLATTE
Captain, U.S. Navy

Suid, Lawrence H. *Guts & Glory . . . Great American War Movies.* Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978. 357pp.

There is only one problem with this book; it's mistitled. What if a seductive nude had been used as the cover for *Gray's Anatomy?* A potential reader who is attracted by the title and cover

will probably not make it through the contents. A scholar seeking the wealth of information contained therein might never glance inside, assuming it to be simply another gossipy Hollywood exposé. This is a sincere piece of thorough, balanced research on the portrayal of the military by profit-oriented commercial films. Seventy-one movies are discussed—why they were made, how they were made, and how they were received—including the cooperation given or withheld by military public information offices. It has the quality of a doctoral dissertation, yet a broader appeal to a generation for whom John Wayne had far more influence on World War II than did Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

There are several interesting revelations in the book, providing perceptions not obvious to either a military man or to a moviegoer. In labeling several films as antiwar (or at least in stating that to be the intended statements of their makers) Suid leaves one with the implication that the majority are "pro war." Yet, he's not quite certain (nor am I) what a film advocating war would look like. Newsreels with martial music and a detached observer's view of guns, bombs, airplanes and ships may glorify war. But without fail the films he discusses get inside the airplanes and ships to show the men, then attempt to get inside the men for a personalized view of why they will kill and risk being killed—the personal, unit, corporate and national motivation for what normally would be an irrational act. Perhaps one of the best of this genre is *Twelve O'Clock High*, still used as a teaching vehicle at such diverse institutions as the Naval War College and Harvard.

The second interesting point comes from Suid's lucid exploration of the military bureaucracy's reaction to requests for support of various films. A producer attempting to film scripts about the military obviously can do a more efficient job if he has access to military expertise, hardware, and real estate. Suid makes the point that, while fine films have been done without assistance, credibility among the large audience familiar with military hardware and techniques demands realistic simulation. Military policymakers are pictured as overly concerned not with the artistic quality of a film—more accurately of the script as they are consulted in advance of filming—but with possible derogatory effects on an audience's images of "the American fighting man." Films of posterboard people performing mundane tasks in a "military manner" would be supported more readily than would more penetrating studies of men suffering moral dilemmas and exhibiting physical weaknesses in the face of mortal conflict. Killing and being killed is a rather irrational way for an American to make a living. Acceptance of that fact might make us more ready to permit unretouched and even caricatured pictures to stand or fall on their own merit.

To me it seems vital that we explore as many of the facets of warfare as possible—so that commitments of force, if they must be made, will be undertaken with full knowledge of the possible consequences. The characters of Captain Queeg and Dr. Strangelove do not epitomize man at war—any more than do General Patton and John Wayne. Suid's book provides an authoritative view of Hollywood's contribution to this understanding. It is a readable and commendable research contribution.

D.G. CLARK
Commander, U.S. Navy

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Backer, John H. *The Decision to Divide Germany; American Foreign Policy in Transition.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978. 212pp. $9.95
The author challenges the views of both traditionalist and revisionist historians who contend that some grand strategy on the part of the Soviet Union or the United States was responsible for the partition of Germany along its present boundaries. Instead, Backer shows that the failure to unify the Eastern and Western zones of occupation resulted from a series of small, usually low-level, incremental decisions motivated by expediency rather than by long-range considerations.

Buccheim, Lothar-Günther. *U-Boat War.* New York: Knopf, 1978. n.p. $17.50
As a young artist assigned to report German war operations through "suitable" pictures, Buccheim joined a U-boat crew. To capture the realities of daily life in the inhumanly confined conditions of the boat he draws extensively from 5,000 personal photographs. The monotony of days of vigilance and testing contrasts with the feverish activity of attacks and the harrowing anxiety of defending against enemy action. Insufficient in numbers and antiquated in design, the German submarines were constantly sent out on hopeless missions, while the crews grew increasingly bitter at unfulfilled promises of improved boat replacements. Buccheim's opinion of Dönitz is uncomplimentary. German submarine warfare against the British Isles is classed as "the most frightful chapter in naval history . . . 27,941 German officers and enlisted men dead."

Evron, Yair. *The Role of Arms Control in the Middle East.* Adelphi Papers, no. 138. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977. 43pp. $1.50
The influence of the Arab-Israeli arms race on the strategic doctrines and peace negotiations of the countries involved are explored in this study of the past, present, and future of arms control measures in the Middle East.

Gaan, Margaret. *Last Moments of a World.* New York: Norton, 1978. 273pp. $9.95
A Eurasian woman who grew up in Shanghai during the turbulent years from 1920 to 1950 presents an intriguing blend of reminiscences that reveal her own personal growth and adventure, glimpses of middle-class Chinese family life, and constant awareness of the dramatic political events unfolding all the while—the Japanese invasion, World War II, civil war, and the Communist victory.

Gervasi, Tom. *Arsenal of Democracy; American Weapons Available for Export.* New York: Grove Press, 1977. 240pp. $14.95

Approximately 600 major American weapons and items of defense equipment that are currently being used by other countries, or are available for sale to them, are surveyed in this study of the role of the United States as a major arms supplier.

Gray, Colin S. *The Future of Land-Based Missile Forces.* Adelphi Papers, no. 140. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977. 36pp. $1.50

Because of the growing vulnerability of the ICBM, the future of land-based missile forces will be a major concern to military planners and analysts well into the 1980s. After exploring several alternative strategies, the author advances two claims: that unilateral abandonment of silo-housed missiles would seriously jeopardize the bargaining position of the United States in SALT III; and that the location of land-mobile ICBMs can be accurately verified to an acceptable degree.

Hirst, David. *The Gun and the Olive Branch; the Roots of Violence in the Middle East.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977. 367pp. $12.95

Termed by some a conflict between right and right, violence between Arabs and Jews has erupted into four full-scale wars in the last 30 years. This historical survey, written from an admittedly anti-Zionist point of view, traces the acts of violence from the start of Jewish immigration to Palestine at the turn of the century to the present day, in light of the moral, political, and psychological climate in which they occurred.

Hough, Richard. *The Great Admirals.* New York: William Morris, 1977. 271pp. $19.95

Maps, illustrations, and bits of contemporary songs and poetry enliven these tales of 21 admirals, whose adventures span the years from galleons to aircraft carriers.

Magnusson, Sigurdur A. *Northern Sphinx: Iceland and the Icelanders from the Settlement to the Present.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977. 261pp. $12.00

Written by a native Icelander, this book offers an interesting survey of Icelandic history; the culture and artistry of the people are emphasized, and the contemporary aspects of the country are examined and discussed.

Martin, John B. *U.S. Policy in the Caribbean.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. 420pp. $19.00

Since the optimistic days when President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress attempted to nurture democracy and social reform in Latin America by means of development assistance, profound revolutionary changes have swept that area. This study examines those changes in the Caribbean, the effect they have already had on American foreign policy, and what effects should be expected in the future.

Oxenfeldt, Alfred R., et al. *A Basic Approach to Executive Decision Making.* New York: AMACOM, 1978. 229pp. $12.95

In this prescriptive rather than descriptive approach to decisionmaking the emphasis is on the mental activity in the process and on problem decisions over opportunity and planning decisions. Regarding the executive as a manager of decisionmaking and the decision as a production-line operation, the authors treat eight steps in a sound decision process, ranging from objectives to creativity.

Rubenstein, Murray and Goldman, Richard. *Shield of David; an Illustrated History of the Israeli Air Force.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978. 223pp. $12.50

Known as the *Chel Ha'Avir*, the Israeli Air Force was created shortly before the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1947. Having engaged in four wars and many skirmishes during the last 30 years, it is one of the most battle-tested air forces in the world. This colorful account of the men, the airplanes, and the missions they have flown is supplemented by a chronology, the flight log of one of Israel's first fighter pilots, and data on armament, aircraft, and camouflage.

Sadat, Anwar. *In Search of Identity; an Autobiography.* New York: Harper & Row, 1978. 360pp. $15.00

Throughout this autobiography the Egyptian President features his own self-evaluation and philosophy, describing himself as guided by the principles of love, truth, idealism, and beauty. Yet he practiced deceit in his foreign relations maneuvering for Egyptian freedom, and while stating that his love for Nasser "never diminished," he is highly critical of the former President's nature and leadership. Sadat is outspoken in his disapproval of British colonialism, Soviet unreliability, Israel's totally self-serving conduct, and U.S. executive "deceptions" in support of Israel. Yet he also commends American efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East where his own peace initiative is an attempt to breach the immemorial psychological barrier between Israel and Egypt.

Security Issues Symposium, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1975. *Strategies, Alliances, and Military Power; Changing Roles.* Leyden, Neth.: Sijthoff, 1977. 372pp. $33.95

The research and analysis efforts of a group of officers and civilian professionals at the Army War College are represented in this collection of 16 essays on matters of national security. Among the topics discussed are the moral dimension of strategy; arms trade; U.S. foreign relations and commitments; foreign treaties and politics and their significance for the United States; American and NATO defense policies and strategies; the role of theater nuclear forces; and the civilian based defense concept and its relevance to U.S. security interests.

Stern, Laurence. *The Wrong Horse: the Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy.* New York: Times Books, 1977. 170pp. $10.00

Using American involvement in the Cyprus crisis as a model for U.S. foreign policy as practiced under the leadership of Secretary of State Kissinger, this

study presents an in-depth analysis of the role of the C.I.A., the military, and the diplomatic service in Greek and Cypriot internal affairs from 1960 to 1977. The main premise is that lately the United States has been following an outmoded cold war policy that has supported the forces of oppression and repression rather than the forces of reform and democracy throughout the world.

Udis, Bernard. *From Guns to Butter: Technology Organizations and Reduced Military Spending in Western Europe.* Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1978. 368pp. $16.50

Authoritative interviews provided the data on the experience of seven Western European industrialized countries in transferring resources from military to civilian markets, the major focus being on industry's adjustment to the changeover. Many of the policies and approaches adopted to effect the conversion are seen as applicable and practical for U.S. purposes.

Warner, Denis. *Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won the War.* Kansas City, Kans.: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1978. 295pp. $9.95

The author, with long experience as a war correspondent and journalist covering the Far East and Southeast Asia, writes as a concerned Australian of the war in Indochina that was unremitting despite the Paris Peace settlement. The Cambodian-North Vietnamese struggle is the central focus of the book which draws heavily on North Vietnam's Gen. Van Tien Dung's detailed account of the final offensive against South Vietnam. Of particular interest is Mr. Warner's personal inside knowledge of many of the actors and of Asian political intrigues.

Winslow, Ron. *Hard Aground; the Story of the "Argo Merchant" Oil Spill.* New York: Norton, 1978. 286pp. $10.95

To illustrate the growing need for improved antipollution operations and equipment, this account vividly re-creates the ineffective efforts of the Coast Guard's expert Atlantic Strike Team to prevent the largest coastal oil spill in U.S. history. Although minimal environmental damage resulted from the grounding of the *Argo Merchant*, continued importation of billions of gallons of oil on marginally operated tankers, in conjunction with inadequate cleanup capability, constitutes a serious threat to our ocean fisheries and coastal areas.



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

CONTINUING EDUCATION INFORMATION

"Reading maketh a full man, conference a ready man and writing an exact man." Those words of Francis Bacon are as relevant today as when they were first penned centuries ago. The Naval War College presents an opportunity for growth toward these goals and for most naval officers it is the capstone of their formal career development. Although not every officer has the opportunity to attend the Naval War College, all can participate through nontraditional programs administered by the Center for Continuing Education. These programs afford the nonresident student an opportunity to become involved in resident curricula through correspondence courses. These courses have been designed to assist in developing naval leaders. They provide professional enrichment that will greatly reward the student and the Navy.

COURSE DESCRIPTION. Correspondence courses are offered in the following subject areas:

(1) Employment of Naval Forces
(2) Strategy and Policy
(3) Defense Economics and Decision Making
(4) Electives: International Law and International Relations

Students may be enrolled in only one subject area at a time. The courses in each subject area are listed in the summary below. The estimated hours of study for each course vary considerably. Some require as little as 20-25 hours. Others require 60-80 hours. Course requirements are answered subjectively, in essay-type format, and should be typewritten.

The student's responsibility to this program is only to the course enrolled. Students may enroll in a subject area of their choice. Within a subject area, however, students must enroll in the first course offered.

A Naval War College nonresident diploma will be awarded to students who complete all three core subject areas as well as *one elective*. The total study required is about 900 hours. On the basis of 4-6 hours per week, the diploma program can be completed in approximately three years.

Although students are not obligated to pursue the entire program to completion, they are encouraged to do so. The subject areas of Strategy and Policy and Defense Economics and Decision Making have been evaluated by an independent agency as the equivalent of graduate level university courses. A number of colleges and universities will accept these courses on a transfer basis toward a graduate degree.

PROFESSIONAL RECOGNITION. Correspondence courses are career enhancing, as evidenced by the March 1974 Officer Personnel Newsletter (NAVPERS 15892):

> Reporting seniors are encouraged to document, in the comments section of fitness reports, individual efforts at self-improvement. Such documentation should include correspondence courses from various service colleges; . . . This information is important to Navy Department personnel managers and is often an item of consideration by selection boards.

BUPERINST 1611.12 (series) contains guidance on how such information should be incorporated into officer fitness reports.

Letters of completion are issued for each course via the student's reporting senior; copies are sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel or other appropriate authority for the student's selection jacket. Certificates are issued upon successful completion of all courses in a subject area, and the Naval War College Nonresident Diploma is awarded when the entire program is completed. The program is listed in the "Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classification" (NAVPERS 15839C) and the diploma should be noted on the Officer Data Card.

ELIGIBILITY AND APPLICATIONS. Naval War College correspondence courses are available to all commissioned officers of the U.S. military services (0-3 and above) on active duty or in the inactive Reserve. Selected government employees of the grade GS-10 (or equivalent) and above also may enroll. Waivers may be granted for qualified individuals in lower grades. Students may enroll in only one course at a time. Applications may be by the application card provided, or by letter. Applications from U.S. personnel requiring waivers may be by card or letter via the commanding officer or command maintaining service record.

Direct enrollments are available to international officers at cost. Up to five students may be accepted from each country eligible to send officers to the Naval Command College and Naval Staff College. Student selection is at the discretion of the country concerned, and all correspondence and material is transmitted through the appropriate U.S. agency in country.

SUMMARY OF COURSES The Center for Continuing Education offers the following correspondence courses:

EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES (ENF)*

The ENF subject area is designed to expand the student's understanding of how tactics are developed and implemented in support of naval missions. It teaches those fundamental principles for the employment of weapons systems applicable to present and future naval operations. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for Reserve officers not on active duty also are shown.

ENF-1 Fundamentals of Naval Weapons Systems (39 Hours/13 Points)

Through the use of selected readings, written assignments, and problems, the student examines the fundamental physical properties, capabilities, and limitations of naval weapons systems, sensors and platforms. Written assignments require the student to consider the effect these characteristics have on tactical employment of systems, sensors, and platforms.

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*All courses are prerequisites to those that follow with the exception that ENF-3 and ENF-7 may be taken at any time.

ENF-2 Engagement Analysis (36 Hours/12 Points)

The tactical employment of naval forces is analyzed in one-on-one, many-on-one, and multiunit engagements. Practical problems use current U.S./U.S.S.R. weapons systems, sensors, and platforms.

ENF-3 Military Planning Process (36 Hours/12 Points)

The student examines problem-solving techniques as applied to military planning. Emphasis is on the "Commander's Estimate of the Situation." The student will use the military planning process format to solve a hypothetical military problem.

ENF-4 Sea Control Study (54 Hours/18 Points)

This course examines the Navy's mission area of Sea Control. The problems of sortie, rendezvous, and ocean transit of a carrier task force are studied. The employment of weapons, platforms and sensors and the tactical decisions required to protect the hypothetical force from multithreats are included.

ENF-5 Projection Study (54 Hours/18 Points)

This course examines the Navy's mission of Projection of Naval Power ashore through the use of amphibious operations and the employment of naval air, the relationship between Sea Control and Power Projection, and the effectiveness of tactical airstrikes as a conventional deterrent.

ENF-6 Peacetime Naval Operations (42 Hours/14 Points)

This course identifies the operative factors in a politicomilitary diplomatic operation, compares and contrasts various tactics employed in the naval presence role, and evaluates the use of naval forces in a presence role during international crises.

ENF-7 Strategic Deterrence (39 Hours/13 Points)

The strategic deterrence course uses essays to identify past and present U.S. nuclear deterrent policies, the contribution of the elements of the TRIAD toward deterrence, and the key issues in Strategic Arms Limitations negotiations.

STRATEGY AND POLICY*

The overall objective of these nine courses is to provide students with the opportunity to probe into strategic problems in sufficient depth to understand the complexities of the issues and factors relevant to decisions. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for those Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown.

S 61 The Classical Prototype: Athens Versus Sparta
(27 Hours/9 Points)

This course deals with the Peloponnesian War between Greek city-states in the 5th century B.C. The basic text is Thucydides, one of the most noted of all historians. The book covers many of the great issues with which mankind has been grappling

*All courses are prerequisites to those that follow.

since its beginning—the nature of man, the nature of power, what is right, what is wrong, what is justice, and what are the causes of war. The course is the first of nine case studies that will be dealt with in the subject area of Strategy and Policy. The reader will undoubtedly associate the issues and problems faced then with similar situations confronting various 20th-century leaders.

S 62 Land Power Versus Sea Power: The Struggle Against French Imperialism (27 Hours/9 Points)

This course covers the effects of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on the evolution of modern warfare and strategic thought. The leading naval personage of the period, British hero Horatio Nelson, is also studied in some detail in order to develop fully the relationship between and interdependence of land and seapower.

S 63 Strategic Theory: Clausewitz, Corbett, and Mahan (27 Hours/9 Points)

This course examines the theoretical foundations of the study of warfare in general. Clausewitz, a philosopher of war, is significant for his treatment of war as a whole, his analysis of the relationship of force to policy, and his discussion of the role of human factors in war. Corbett, a naval strategist, built a theory of naval warfare on the fundamentals of Clausewitz. Mahan achieved greatness as a strategist and as an evangelist for seapower. These authors provide a point of departure for all subsequent studies of warfare, ashore and afloat.

S 64 Balance of Power Diplomacy and Limited War: Metternich and Bismarck (24 Hours/8 Points)

This course takes up the relationship between strategy and foreign policy. Firstly, it examines a classic case of balance of power diplomacy as achieved by Austrian Prime Minister Metternich in concert with other European statesmen. Secondly, the course examines how Metternich's balance was destroyed as Bismarck successfully unified Germany through a series of limited wars. Bismarck's assertion of civilian over military authority is also studied as an example of the subordination of strategy to policy.

S 65 Strategy and Policy in Total War: Origins and Lessons of World War I (27 Hours/9 Points)

This course uses an investigation of the long-range and immediate origins of World War I to focus on the modern phenomena of armed peace, accidental war, and the escalation of local war. The role of imperialism, revolutionary nationalism, technological developments and armaments races, and increasingly rigid alliance systems will all be examined. The course also analyzes how the duration and intensity of the war, coupled with the entry of additional participants, resulted in novel conditions within which national leaders were required to coordinate policy (war aims) with military strategy.

S 66 The Origins and Conduct of World War II: A Study in Coalition Strategy and Policy (30 Hours/10 Points)

This course first shows how Western democracies, the United States in particular, sought security by various means following World War I. It was during that period that the relationship between the development of new weapons and strategic doctrine on one hand and the formulation of defense and foreign policy on the other was especially important. The course then focuses on the primary issues confronting the United States in hammering out, with Great Britain and Russia, a coalition

strategy that fit war aims and postwar aspirations, and in agreeing on the allocation of national resources to use in prosecuting the global war against Germany and Japan.

S 67 From Coalition to Bipolarity: The Cold War (30 Hours/10 Points)

This course examines the difficulty in reordering the international political structure after a total war fought with unlimited means for unconditional ends. The collapse of the wartime Grand Alliance and the confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union as postwar superpowers combined to produce a situation in some respects unprecedented in international politics.

S 68 From Bipolarity to Multipolarity: The Era of Détente (27 Hours/9 Points)

This course examines the developments in Soviet/American relations of the past decade and a half. It focuses particular attention on the changing Russian-American-Chinese balance of power, the emergence of détente, the American involvement in the Indochina War, and the issues of polycentrism in a changing world.

S 69 Strategic Uses of Sea Power: The United States and the Soviet Union (30 Hours/10 Points)

This course examines Soviet maritime progress, traditional interests, and probable intentions regarding the employment of seapower. It also covers recent developments within the U.S. Navy and such questions as how U.S. naval capabilities can best be employed to support national policy objectives.

DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND DECISION MAKING*

The Defense Economics and Decision Making area emphasizes the problems associated with translating national strategic goals into force levels and the required specific weapons systems. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown.

DEDM 1 Nonquantitative Factors (60 Hours/20 Points)

This course focuses on relationships among people in organizations and on the nature of decision making, especially as related to defense matters. It covers human values and perceptions, group and individual interaction, and the interrelationships of organizational systems and subsystems. Organizational models for decision making are introduced, and their explanatory and predictive values analyzed.

DEDM 2 Quantitative Factors (81 Hours/27 Points)

This course focuses on microeconomics and decision making under uncertainty in order to develop the theoretical bases for analysis. It examines various tools (e.g., optimization and estimation) useful in the implementations of this theory. Theoretical developments are included to provide general knowledge of the techniques and to examine the philosophic insights into decision making that they provide, as well as to develop a basis for evaluating any specific application of the technique. Applications are examined in order to further study the usefulness of the theoretical technique, to examine the problems that arise when an analyst attempts to develop an analytic model of a large problem, and to develop the manager's ability to extract from an analytic report useful decision making information.

*All courses are prerequisites to those that follow.

DEDM 3 Decision Process (60 Hours/20 Points)

This course covers systems analysis as a process (i.e., an organized, rational approach that helps the manager to relate all the important factors in a situation requiring a decision) that may be applied to various kinds of decisions. Systems analysis, as discussed in various textbooks, assists the decision maker in structuring his investigation of the factors relating to the decision making situation.

DEDM 4 Management Control of the Process (69 Hours/23 Points)

This course addresses the setting within which national strategies are made. The use of analysis in management decision making are also examined to include resource allocation at the national and Department of Defense levels.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

The courses in International Relations seek to provide the student with fundamental concepts and principles of international affairs and with a knowledge of international political processes. Because international relations greatly influence policies of national security and subsequent national strategies, students of these courses may expect to significantly enhance their professional qualifications. The course may be credited toward completion of the discretionary phase of the diploma program or may be pursued separately without regard to attainment of the diploma.

IR-1 The International System: Its Actors and Their Behavior, and the Role of Power (30 Hours/10 Points)

A study of the fundamental concepts of the contemporary international system including the dynamic forces (such as economics, diplomacy and armaments) which affect the relations of nations.

IR-2 Mediating Factors in the Politics of Power (21 Hours/7 Points)

A study of international organizations and international law in modern world politics and techniques of conflict resolution.

IR-3 Foreign Policy (30 Hours/10 Points)

A study of policy objectives of the U.S.S.R., the PRC and the developing nations as these relate to the future goals and challenges to the United States.

INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE NAVAL COMMANDER*

The International Law course aims at enhancing the military officer's capability to make sound decisions involving the application of international legal principles. Upon completion of the course students should have acquired an understanding of basic principles of international law and a means of analyzing their applicability to areas of our potential military operations.

The courses may be credited toward completion of the discretionary portion of the diploma program, or may be pursued separately without regard to attainment of the diploma. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown.

Emphasis in IL-1 through IL-3 is on practical questions that may confront the naval commander.

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*All courses are prerequisite to those that follow.

IL-1 International Law for the Naval Commander: Sea Control
(36 Hours/12 Points)

This course considers problems of deployment from a U.S. port for relief of a naval communications station. It involves the law of the sea, air and space law, asylum, the law of armed conflict, and command responsibility. The "situation" is adapted from the one used in the Employment of Naval Forces ENF-4, Sea Control Study.

IL-2 International Law for the Naval Commander: Projection
(36 Hours/12 Points)

This course continues into problems of shore bombardment, blockade, mine warfare, airstrikes, prisoners of war, occupation of foreign territory, and command responsibility. The problem situation has been adapted from the one used in the Employment of Naval Forces ENF-5, Projection Study.

IL-3 International Law for the Naval Commander: Peacetime Problems in International Law (30 Hours/30 Points)

This course considers status of forces agreements, terrorism, constraints on the warmaking power, mobilization, environmental law, and legal review of weapons under the law of armed conflict.

Course	Title	Hours	Points
S 61	The Classical Prototype	27	9
S 62	Land Power Versus Sea Power	27	9
S 63	Strategic Theory	27	9
S 64	Balance of Power Diplomacy and Limited War	24	8
S 65	Strategy and Policy in Total War	27	9
S 66	The Origins and Conduct of World War II	30	10
S 67	From Coalition to Bipolarity	30	10
S 68	From Bipolarity to Multipolarity	27	9
S 69	Strategic Uses of Sea Power	30	10
	Totals	249	83
DEDM 1	Nonquantitative Factors	60	20
DEDM 2	Quantitative Factors	81	27
DEDM 3	Decision Process	60	20
DEDM 4	Management Control of the Process	69	23
	Totals	270	90
ENF 1	Fundamentals of Naval Weapons Systems	39	13
ENF 2	Engagement Analysis	36	12
ENF 3	Military Planning Process	36	12
ENF 4	Sea Control Study	54	18
ENF 5	Projection Study	54	18
ENF 6	Peacetime Naval Operations	42	14
ENF 7	Strategic Deterrence	37	13
	Totals	300	100
IR 1	The International System	30	10
IR 2	Mediating Factors in the Politics of Power	21	7
IR 3	Foreign Policy	30	10
	Totals	81	27
IL 1	International Law for the Naval Commander: Sea Control	36	12
IL 2	International Law for the Naval Commander: Projection	36	12
IL 3	International Law for the Naval Commander: Peacetime Problems	30	10
	Totals	102	34

APPLICANTS MAY USE THE ATTACHED CARD OR WRITE TO:

Director
Center for Continuing Education
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02840

PHONES: FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

General:

Autovon	948-3898
Commercial	(401) 841-3898

Employment of Naval Forces:

Autovon	948-2024
Commercial	(401) 841-2024

Strategy & Policy:

Autovon	948-2457/4397
Commercial	(401) 841-2457/4397

Defense Economics & Decision Making:

Autovon	948-2135
Commercial	(401) 841-2135

International Law or International Relations:

Autovon	948-2279
Commercial	(401) 841-2279

CENTER FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, R.I. 02840

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

APPLICATION FOR CORRESPONDENCE COURSE (NAVWARCOL 1550.5)

Authority to request this information is derived from 5 United States Code, section 301, Departmental Records, and 44 United States Code, section 3101, Records management. The purpose of this form is to enable individuals to provide the necessary information to the Center for Continuing Education, U.S. Naval War College for enrollment in a specific correspondence course.

The information provided by you will become a permanent part of your Naval War College correspondence course record. The information provided will be used to enroll you in a specific correspondence course and to report your successful completion of that course to the appropriate higher authority.

Completion of this form is entirely voluntary. Failure to provide your social security number may prevent the report of your completion of a correspondence course from being entered in your official service record. Failure to provide your education/experience qualifications will result in an inability to consider a request for a waiver of rank or grade requirements for enrollment in a Naval War College correspondence course. If the other information is not provided, enrollment cannot be accomplished.

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